

## CHAPTER VII

### THE FINAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF ALI AND FUAD, 1867-1871

While their New Ottoman opponents poured forth abuse and criticism from Paris, London, and Geneva, Âli and Fuad in Istanbul were occupied with the business of government. Their first job was to hold the empire together. Though the Cretan rebellion went on, draining the Porte's treasury<sup>1</sup> and obliging the grand vezir Âli Paşa to make an extended trip there in the fall of 1867, the island was under control in 1868, and the vilayet organization as extended to Crete allowed the Christians a special status in local administration. By 1868 also the possible united drive of Balkan peoples against the Turks was averted by the death of its Serb leader, Michael Obrenovich. The Bulgar nationalist agitation for an autochthonous church organization was actually used to advantage by Âli when in 1870 the ferman creating a separate Bulgar exarchate set Greek against Bulgar in a contest for the cure of Macedonian souls. From 1868 until 1871, when Âli died, the customary irritation of revolts and diplomatic crises was somewhat reduced. And collective European diplomatic intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire was unlikely because of the diametric opposition of French and Russian views on Ottoman reform.

Âli and Fuad used these years to pursue their program of westernization, secularization, and the furtherance of Osmanlık by small steps. They were firmly in control of the sultan and the administration. Their most vocal critics, at home or abroad, could do little immediate damage. When Fuad died in February of 1869, Âli, instead of getting another foreign minister, combined Fuad's former duties with his own. By the time of Âli's death, in September of 1871, his grand vezirate of over four and a half years was the longest since 1839, and the third longest in a century of Ottoman history. What reform was carried out bore his stamp and Fuad's.

The major measures involved the creation of a new Council of State, a new venture in nonsectarian schooling and a revamped educational system, the codification of part of the civil law, an attack on

<sup>1</sup> Reportedly fighting the revolt cost at least three million pounds sterling just to the end of 1867: Elliot to Stanley, #76, 28 December 1867, FO 78/1965.

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the capitulations, and a considerable improvement in the military organization. Much of this showed the influence of France, which was strongly asserted in these years; yet the two statesmen had not had a French program forced on them. Their natural inclinations went in that direction. In 1867 both France and Russia had presented fairly detailed plans for Ottoman reform. The French plan led toward amalgamation of the peoples of the empire into an Ottoman nationality through extension of equal rights, mixed education, and minimization of religious influence.<sup>2</sup> The Russian plan suggested dividing the empire into autonomous regions based on nationality.<sup>3</sup> No Ottoman minister could have favored the Russian plan. It would have led, as Fuad epigrammatically told the Russian ambassador Ignatyev, to the establishment of the "Etats Désunis de Turquie."<sup>4</sup> The French plan, however, accorded with the proclivities of Âli and Fuad. They counted, further, on French and British support against Russian designs, and in 1867 Napoleon III was still a distinguished patron despite his setbacks in Mexico and Luxemburg. This trend toward French-influenced reform was measurably strengthened by the trip which Sultan Abdülaziz took to Paris in the summer of 1867.

No Ottoman sovereign had ever before set foot outside the empire except on military campaign. A number of considerations counselled that Abdülaziz should break with precedent. His ostensible reason for travel was to see the Paris exhibition of 1867 at Napoleon III's invitation. The real reason was to reestablish Turkish credit, shaken by the events in Crete, in the capitals of western Europe, and to try to forestall any possible Franco-Russian cooperation in favor of the Cretan rebels. Alexander II had just been to Paris, and the sultan's trip might counteract the tsar's influence. Incidentally, Abdülaziz might counteract also the influence of the khedive Ismail, who visited Europe at the same time, and of his critic Mustafa Fazıl, then in Paris. To do this, the sultan would have to appear as the head of a state that was making

<sup>2</sup> I. de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane* (Paris, 1864-1911), VII, 418-422, French memorandum of 22 February 1867.

<sup>3</sup> "Zapiski Grapha N. P. Ignatyeva," *Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*, 1914, II, 77-80, and III, 94-98; Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882-1884), I, 217-222, and II, 4-6. Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 446-455, gives the Russian memorandum of 18 April 1867. Cf. the Russian memorandum of 24 March, *ibid.*, pp. 433-441.

<sup>4</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," *loc.cit.*, 1914, III, 96. Fuad's report to the British ambassador of this witticism put it as "La Monarchie de la République des Etats non unis de la Turquie." Lyons to Stanley, #200, confidential, 22 May 1867, FO 78/1960.

progress. At the same time, Âli and Fuad intended that the trip have not only diplomatic effect, but domestic repercussions also. Abdülaziz himself should see something of western monarchical government and of western material progress. The two statesmen undoubtedly worked hard to persuade Abdülaziz to go.<sup>5</sup> And they prepared the ground for presenting Abdülaziz and his empire in the most favorable light possible. The process had already been started with Fuad Paşa's memorandum of May 15, 1867, recounting in glowing terms the progress in reform made since the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856, while candidly admitting certain shortcomings to be corrected as soon as possible.<sup>6</sup> Fuad also spoke to the western ambassadors of new reforms coming: a Council of State on the French model, the removal of legal restrictions on certain types of property, including *vakif* land, and legislation to allow foreigners to own real estate in the empire.<sup>7</sup> Europe was further assured by Fuad that no woman, slave, eunuch, or other person offensive to western feelings would be in the sultan's party.<sup>8</sup> Fuad went on the trip officially as foreign minister, but also to keep Abdülaziz from embarrassing errors in personal conduct. During the sultan's forty-four-day absence from his dominions Âli Paşa attained the height of his political power as regent, the first and only time an Ottoman subject was so appointed.

Abdülaziz arrived in Paris on June 30, 1867, and after a brilliant visit of eleven days went to London on Queen Victoria's invitation for a visit of equal length. He returned via Brussels, Coblenz, Vienna, and Budapest, meeting Leopold II, Wilhelm I, and Franz Joseph. On August 3 he reached Ottoman territory in the Tuna vilayet, where he showed appreciation for the work of the vali, Midhat Paşa. Three days later he was back in his own capital, greeted by a tumultuous welcome.<sup>9</sup> There were two unfortunate side effects of the trip

<sup>5</sup> On reasons for the trip see: "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," *loc.cit.*, 1914, II, 89; Haluk Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz* (İstanbul, 1949), p. 34; Andreas D. Mordtmann, *Stambul und das moderne Türkenhum* (Leipzig, 1877-1878), II, 173; Lyons to Hammond, private, 10 June 1867, FO 78/2010. Cf. Frederick Millingen, *La Turquie sous le règne d'Abdul Aziz* (Paris, 1868), pp. 376-378.

<sup>6</sup> Text in Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-1888), II, 24-35, and Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 457-467. The British, and undoubtedly the French, were furnished with an advance draft: "Considérations sur l'exécution du Firman Impériale du 18 Février 1856," endorsed "Rec'd May 2<sup>d</sup> 1867 from Fuad Pasha," FO 195/893. Compare Fuad's optimistic picture here with Engelhardt's gloomy assessment of reform as of 1867: *La Turquie*, I, 237-252.

<sup>7</sup> Lyons to Stanley, #199, 22 May 1867, FO 78/1960.

<sup>8</sup> Lyons to Stanley, #237, 10 June 1867, FO 78/2010.

<sup>9</sup> On the trip generally see: Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 34-44; İ. H. Daniş-

for the sultan personally. One was the shock to conservative Muslims that the sultan-caliph should visit infidel lands; in their view of etiquette it was the inferior who always visited his superior.<sup>10</sup> The other concerned Abdülaziz's relationships with his nephew Murad, the heir-apparent. Evidently fearing to leave Murad and Murad's brother Abdülhamid in the capital while he was abroad, the sultan took both nephews with him, as well as his own son, Yusuf Izzeddin, a boy not yet ten. Murad made quite a favorable impression in Europe, which evidently aroused Abdülaziz's jealousy for his own son, and various rumors arose regarding Murad which only increased the sultan's suspicion of him. Other rumors, probably with some basis in fact, that Abdülaziz wanted to change the order of succession to put his own son first, also increased, and aroused opposition to the sultan. After the return to İstanbul, therefore, the reigning sultan kept Murad under closer watch than ever, and the gulf between the two deepened.<sup>11</sup>

Yet on the whole the trip was a success. Abdülaziz, certainly in part owing to Fuad's watchfulness, committed no major blunders.<sup>12</sup> Diplomatically, the trip marked a point of decrease in Franco-Russian cooperation over Crete.<sup>13</sup> Of equal importance was the impression made on Abdülaziz by western civilization. The material, especially the military, aspects appealed to him most. He inspected several British dockyards and naval arsenals attentively, and saw naval maneuvers at Portsmouth, after which Victoria gave him the Order of the Garter

mend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, IV (İstanbul, 1955), 216-223; Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), pp. 18-19; Adam Lewak, *Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji (1831-1878)* (Warsaw, 1935), pp. 192-193.

<sup>10</sup> Fuad recognized that the shock would come: Lyons to Stanley, #199, 22 May 1867, FO 78/1960. Cf. Morris to Seward, unnumbered, 2 July 1867, USNA, Turkey 20; H. J. Van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870), I, 12.

<sup>11</sup> Among the various rumors were: that Victoria wanted Murad to marry one of her daughters; that Napoleon III wanted Murad to study government in France; that Murad was to stay abroad as a threat to the monarch, like Prince Cem; that Murad was to slip back to İstanbul before Abdülaziz and be proclaimed sultan: Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 38, 41-42; Amand von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Serail und Hohe Pforte* (Vienna, 1879), pp. 74-75, 174-175; Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namuk Kemal* (İstanbul, 1944-1956), I, 549, n.16; A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), p. 95, n.1. On succession change see: Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 45-47; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani ve devr-i saltanatı* (İstanbul, 1327), I, 10-11; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb* (İstanbul, 1294-1295), I, 198.

<sup>12</sup> Fuad is reported to have said to Âli on return, "There! I give back our efendi safe and sound to his *lâle* ["tutor"], but I am done in." Ali Fuad, *Rical-i mühimme-i siyasiye* (İstanbul, 1928), p. 170.

<sup>13</sup> A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1954), p. 184.

with her own hand. He reviewed French and Prussian troops, admiring particularly the weapons and the discipline of the latter.<sup>14</sup> Undoubtedly his renewed enthusiasm for ironclad warships, for new weapons, and for support for the Ottoman military reorganization of 1869 derived from these experiences. Railroads also impressed Abdülaziz. He had already shown great interest in the İzmir-Aydın line in 1863.<sup>15</sup> In the fall of 1867 there were new negotiations between the Ottoman government and various European entrepreneurs, looking toward the building of lines from Belgrade to İstanbul and İstanbul to the Persian Gulf.<sup>16</sup> The craze for railroad-building mounted in the 1870's. In 1873 Ignatyev reported that Abdülaziz was "victim of a veritable railroad fever."<sup>17</sup> Not only the need for railroads, but also the desirability of an enlarged program of public instruction and of building up the material basis for such prosperity as the West exhibited seized Abdülaziz's mind. In a *hat* issued on his return from Europe, and in talking with his council of ministers, he stressed these points.<sup>18</sup>

It is hard to say whether Abdülaziz was much influenced by the samples of constitutional monarchy he had seen in his brief trip. Certainly he did not return a constitutionalist, despite a visit to a session of the House of Commons. But he may have decided that some form of enlarged representative council was compatible with his imperial position. One of the specific pieces of advice sent to London by the British ambassador in İstanbul was that Abdülaziz should be exposed to the splendor of Queen Victoria's position, since the opponents of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire were telling the sultan that there was no splendor without absolutism.<sup>19</sup> Undoubtedly Napoleon of the Liberal Empire and the constitutional monarch Victoria did impress him. In an unprecedented exhibition of individual democracy, Abdülaziz on his return to İstanbul shook hands with a visiting ambassador and asked him to sit down.<sup>20</sup> Probably also it was his Euro-

<sup>14</sup> Mehmed Memduh, *Mîrât-ı şûânât* (İzmir, 1328), p. 89.

<sup>15</sup> *Smyrna Mail*, 28 April 1863.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Barron to Stanley, #58, 15 October 1867, and #60, 17 October 1867; also Elliot to Stanley, #39, 19 November 1867—all FO 78/1964; also Elliot to Stanley, #49, 2 December 1867, FO 78/1965.

<sup>17</sup> B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880* (Oxford, 1937), p. 103.

<sup>18</sup> Outrey to Moustier, 14 August 1867, Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 494; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 44.

<sup>19</sup> Lyons to Hammond, private, 10 June 1867, FO 78/2010.

<sup>20</sup> Barron to Stanley, #26, confidential, 27 August 1867, FO 78/1963. The ambassador was Ignatyev.

pean experience which led Abdülaziz to sanction the transformation of the old Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances into a Council of State on the French model.



The Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i vâlâ-yı ahkâm-ı adliye*) had been set up by Mahmud II in 1838 to discuss and draft new regulations. After the proclamation of the *Hatt-ı Şerif* of Gülhane in 1839 this council was given the special function of working out into law the general principles enunciated in the *hat*, and was endowed with internal rules resembling those of western parliamentary procedure. In 1854 the legislative function of the Supreme Council had largely passed to the Tanzimat Council (*Meclis-i âli-i tanzimat*), which was split off from the parent body to elaborate reform measures. The Supreme Council, which retained certain judicial and supervisory functions, was given a number of appointed non-Muslim members in 1856, thus carrying out one of the promises of the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* of that year.<sup>21</sup> In 1861 the two bodies were again fused as the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, which now had three working divisions: administrative, legislative, and judicial. It is not apparent that after 1861 this council was effective or influential.<sup>22</sup> That the non-Muslim members had any voice at all in the Supreme Council's legislative division (*Daire-i kavâmin* or *kamun dairesi*) is unlikely. But so long as it existed, the Supreme Council represented a potential basis for the development of a deliberative legislature constructed on the principle of representation of all elements of the empire.

Possibly Fuad had such a development in mind, though he was not in favor of a parliament in 1867, and criticized Midhat Paşa in that year as a man "who saw in the parliamentary regime a remedy for all evils, without suspecting that politics rebels against panaceas even more than medicine."<sup>23</sup> Fuad had broached the idea of a Council of State of both Christians and Muslims in March of 1867.<sup>24</sup> Âli had sent back from Crete late in 1867 his famous memorandum in which he

<sup>21</sup> On these developments see above, chapters I, II, and III.

<sup>22</sup> *Hat* of 1861 combining the two councils in *Archives diplomatiques*, III (1861), 436. See, further, on the fusion Cevdet's account in Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Medenî hukuk cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa* (İstanbul, 1946), p. 53 and n.84. Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 251, claims the Supreme Council met only once between 1856 and 1867, which seems impossible.

<sup>23</sup> Mismar, *Souvenirs*, p. 20.

<sup>24</sup> Moustier to Bourée, 15 March 1867, in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 429-430.

advised that Christians be given full chance to participate in government. He and Fuad seem, further, to have felt that the wide powers given to valis under the new vilayet law required some machinery for strengthening contact between the vilayets and the capital, which a Council of State might provide.<sup>25</sup> In addition to the desires to expand slightly the representative principle and to check overdecentralization, there was evidently a feeling on the part of Ottoman statesmen that, as Europeans urged them, judicial functions should be made independent of the legislative and executive.<sup>26</sup> This had already been done at the provincial level in the vilayet law. Finally, there was the European example. In these years the Council of State, especially in France and Austria, was a device for law-drafting and administrative purposes, which might develop either toward constitutionalism or as a mechanism to support absolutism in the absence of a parliament.<sup>27</sup> Abdülaziz had visited both states, and after his return was willing to endorse the concept of Âli and Fuad. Little was done while Âli was on his special mission to Crete for nearly five months from October 1867 to February 1868. But in this interval Fuad, as acting grand vezir, called Midhat to İstanbul to discuss vilayet matters, and evidently the two discussed a Council of State also. On March 5, 1868, less than a week after Âli's return, the order was issued to replace the old Supreme Council with two new bodies, a Council of State (Şura-yı devlet) and a Judicial Council (Divan-ı ahkâm-ı adliye) which became, in effect, a supreme court of appeal and cassation. Midhat Paşa was appointed to head the Council of State, Cevdet Paşa to head the Judicial Council. Each exercised considerable influence in drawing up their respective statutes.<sup>28</sup>

The *règlement organique* of the Judicial Council was promulgated on April 1, 1868.<sup>29</sup> The council was to take cognizance of cases that

<sup>25</sup> Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 106-107; Ahmed Saib, *Vaka-i Sultan Abdülâziz* (Cairo, 1320), p. 49; *Le Stamboul*, 27 December 1875.

<sup>26</sup> Cevdet in his *Maruzat*, quoted by Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, pp. 58-60.

<sup>27</sup> Robert C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871* (New York, 1935), pp. 143, 145-146. The author is not sure whether the assembly created by Ismail in Egypt in November 1866 influenced the Ottoman decision. Cf. Jacob M. Landau, *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt* (Tel Aviv, 1953), pp. 8-11.

<sup>28</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, pp. 58-60; Âli Ölmezoglu, "Cevdet Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, III, 116; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 107; A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Paşa: Hayat-ı siyâsiyesi*, vol. 1, *Tabiri-i ibret* (İstanbul, 1325), 61; Louis Antoine Léouzon, *Midhat Pacha* (Paris, 1877), pp. 74-75, giving the wrong date.

<sup>29</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 514-516; Aristarchi, *Législation*, II, 42-43; *Düstur* (1289 ed.), I, 325-327.

arose under the new westernized law—criminal, and commercial and civil—but not of cases under the seriat or those which would be handled by the millet courts or by the new mixed commercial tribunals. The members, once appointed, were irremovable except if regularly tried and convicted; the executive authority was specifically forbidden to interfere in the court's functions. Thirteen members were appointed to the council in addition to Cevdet Paşa, its president. Of these, two were Armenian Catholics, one a Gregorian Armenian, one a Greek, and one a Bulgar. Among the Muslim members were several of the ulema.<sup>30</sup> Cevdet was quite pleased with the calibre of the Muslim members and with the way he himself organized the council's functioning.<sup>31</sup>

The *hat* setting up the Council of State was issued just a month later, on May 1.<sup>32</sup> By its terms this council was to discuss and draft all projects of law and regulations, to keep a general watch on administration and report deficiencies, to act as a court to judge cases of administrative conflict or of individual officials, and to give general advice whenever asked by the sultan or the ministers. Decisions of the council were to be by majority vote, which could be secret if so desired. *Procès-verbaux* were to be kept. Some of the council members, further, were to participate in the annual examination of the budget and financial condition of the empire. To carry out these functions, five sections of the council were set up: police, army, and navy; finances and *evkaf*; legislation; public works, commerce, and agriculture; and public instruction. Each of the sections was to have its own president, and five to ten of the council members would serve on each. The whole organization was on the French model. In addition, it was provided that the council should discuss with three or four delegates who would be sent each year from the provincial general assemblies the desires contained in memoranda drawn up by those assemblies. Here, obviously, was the potential check on the powers of the valis, and the link between local and central representative government. The ex-

<sup>30</sup> List of members in FO 195/893, #160.

<sup>31</sup> *Tezâkir-i Cevdet*, 19, quoted in Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>32</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 518-521; Aristarchi, *Législation*, II, 38-41; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 3-5; *Düstur*, I, 703-706. The *Düstur* and Young give the date as 1 April 1868 (8 zilhicce 1284), the same day as the Judicial Council's statute was issued. Testa and Aristarchi give 1 May 1868 (8 muharrem 1285), which is also given on the official brochure distributed to embassies: FO 195/893, #159. The author is unable to explain the discrepancy. The internal regulations of the council, as of 1869: Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 7-11 (extracts); *Düstur*, I, 707-718.

perience of a central council to discuss legislation, with its own parliamentary procedure, which had existed since 1839, was here being combined with the experience of the 1845 assembly of representatives from the provinces, but on a regular basis.

The Council of State has been greeted by many writers as a major step toward parliamentary government, and by some as so consciously planned by Âli and Fuad.<sup>33</sup> In several senses the former assertion is true. The separation of judicial functions from legislative and administrative was accepted in principle. A regular sort of parliamentary procedure was set up within the council. The delegations from the elected general assemblies of the vilayets were to participate in discussing the questions they brought before the council. One might justly call the council a parliament in embryo. But Âli certainly was no partisan of parliamentary government. Whether the council would develop in that direction depended on events of the future. Members were not elected, but appointed by the sultan. According to its own statute of 1868, further, the council had no initiative in legislation, but could discuss only matters laid before it by the grand vezir, and all reports went back from the council to him and the ministers. By its internal regulations the president of the council had extensive powers. Even if it did not itself develop into a parliament, however, the council by its provisions for free discussion, majority vote, and keeping of *procès-verbaux* was a "school for the training of statesmen."<sup>34</sup>

The council, further, was part of a conscious effort to extend the principle of representative government to the national level. This was evident not only in the provision for occasional delegates from vilayet general assemblies, but in the official list of members appointed in 1868.<sup>35</sup> Of the thirty-seven men named in addition to Midhat Paşa, who had already been appointed president, eight were provincial notables from important cities of the empire. Eleven, including some of the notables, were non-Muslims, and in the official list were rather naïvely designated by sect, evidently in order to impress Europe. Four of the eleven were Armenian Catholics—a tremendous overrepresenten-

<sup>33</sup> Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdattan hakimiyeti milliyeye* (İstanbul, 1924), II, 77-79; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri* (İstanbul, 1339), p. 96; Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimat nedir?" *Tarih araştırmaları, 1940-1941* (İstanbul, 1941), p. 257; Danişmend, *İzahla . . . kronolojisi*, IV, 226-227.

<sup>34</sup> Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 107.

<sup>35</sup> In FO 195/893, #160. E. Z. Karal, *Islahat fermam devri, 1861-1876* (Ankara, 1956), pp. 148-149, gives a total of forty-one members a year later, of whom thirteen were non-Muslims, but he mentions no Jews at all.

tation of a tiny minority; three were Greeks, two Jews, and one each Bulgar and Armenian Gregorian. Among both the Muslim and non-Muslim members were men of considerable experience and ability. One was Odian Efendi, the Armenian constitutionalist and Midhat's man. A similar proportion of about thirty per cent non-Muslims was maintained in the staff positions of the council.

On May 10, 1868, Sultan Abdülaziz formally inaugurated the Council of State and the Judicial Council at the Sublime Porte in a red-carpeted chamber done over as an amphitheatre.<sup>36</sup> His speech, by whomever written, evidently still reflected the impressions of his European trip.<sup>37</sup> Condemning arbitrary government, and endorsing individual liberty within the proper limits of society's welfare, the sultan proclaimed the separation of judicial from executive authority and the need for good administration to promote prosperity and catch up with Europe. The old ways were insufficient. He reiterated the concept of Osmanlılık—all subjects of whatever creed are "children of the same fatherland." There was also a hint of secularism in his speech, since he mentioned the separation of executive from judicial, religious, and legislative authority. The speech was greeted with praise in the European journals, with thanks by the moneylenders of Galata, and by a rise in the quotations on Ottoman bonds.<sup>38</sup> And for a year or so there was more press freedom, as if the Council of State were inaugurating a "liberal Empire" on Napoleon III's model.<sup>39</sup> The new institutions did not meet with universal approval, however. From London Namık Kemal indicated that popular supervision of government was still needed, and further separation of legislative from executive authority, while Ziya criticized the appointment of Christians to the Council of State as evidence of the Porte's weakness.<sup>40</sup>

While Midhat Paşa was its president, the Council of State was active in the preparation of new measures. Among its products were the new nationality law, the new organization of public education, and regulations on mining, the metric system, and a lending bank to extend credit to small employers.<sup>41</sup> Midhat was jealous of the preroga-

<sup>36</sup> Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>37</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 521-523.

<sup>38</sup> Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdattan hakimiyeti milliyeye*, p. 79.

<sup>39</sup> Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 34.

<sup>40</sup> *Hürriyet*, #1, 29 June 1868, quoted in İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," *Tanzimat*, I (İstanbul, 1940), 845-846; *Hürriyet*, #12, 14 September 1868, quoted in *ibid.*, 795.

<sup>41</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabvara-i ibret*, pp. 61-65; *idem*, *The Life of Midhat Pasha*

tives of the Council of State, and got into argument with Âli over the nonapplication of measures it had drawn up and over the nonreferral of other matters Midhat deemed important. This, coupled with the personal friction between the two which was heightened after Fuad's death in February 1869, caused Midhat's transfer out of Istanbul to the governorship of Baghdad.<sup>42</sup> It is not apparent that Midhat was trying to build the council into a parliament, though he may have entertained such thoughts on its eventual functions. After his departure the council was less active and was in almost constant reorganization, though its approval was still required on important matters.<sup>43</sup> This lack of effectiveness was partly due to the overlapping of functions between the sections of the council and the various ministries, and partly because in the period after Âli's death in 1871 Mahmud Nedim and Abdülaziz seem to have used the council as a dumping-ground for ministers out of office, often second-rate men.<sup>44</sup> In the period 1871 to 1876 it sometimes acted to obstruct useful measures rather than to expedite them.<sup>45</sup> At best, the council remained in those years another administrative device which might work well or badly. Because it was a small-scale example of national representation, and employed some parliamentary methods, it was also another in the long chain of steps which might lead logically, though not inevitably, to the creation of a parliament sometime in the future.



At the same time as Âli and Fuad undertook the formation of the Council of State, they were contemplating reform of the educational system also. Both had been members of the commission of 1845 which had recommended creation of a state system of secular education, from the lowest school to the university. Under the ministry of education

(London, 1903), p. 47; Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, II, 23; Sommerville Story, ed., *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London, 1920), pp. 41-42. Ismail Kemal was one of the council's staff.

<sup>42</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 66; İ. A. Gökbilgin, "Midhat Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, fasc. 82, p. 273; Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, pp. 88-89, n.99.

<sup>43</sup> Siddik Sami Onar, *İdare hukukunun umumî esasları* (İstanbul, 1952), p. 549; Abdolonyme Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1876), pp. 83-84; *Le Stamboul*, 27 December 1875.

<sup>44</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 30, and II, 171; Elliot to Derby, #340, 13 July 1875, FO 78/2384.

<sup>45</sup> Elliot to Derby, #306, 23 June 1875, FO 78/2383. But see Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 46-47, where Ismail Kemal bypassed the council in 1869 on the plea of "erratic discussion."

which was subsequently established there had been quite an increase in the number of elementary schools.<sup>46</sup> The increase in the number of higher elementary (or secondary, depending on the viewpoint) schools, the *rüşdiye*, had been less. The university had never really functioned at all. Figures furnished by Subhi Bey, minister of education, show that in 1867 the Ottoman government claimed 11,008 primary schools with a student population of 242,017 boys and 126,454 girls. There were also 108 *rüşdiye*'s with 7,830 students, and a pitiful 225 students in four specialized higher civil schools.<sup>47</sup> All these students were Muslims. The non-Muslim millets operated their own schools, which according to Subhi numbered 2,495, almost all primary, with 125,404 students. Medreses, which continued under control of the ulema, were not included in these figures, nor were the higher specialized schools such as the naval and military schools and the medical school. Only in these higher schools was there any mixed education of Christians and Muslims, though the Christians were few. Students from the various non-Muslim millets were sometimes mixed together in schools run by foreigners, as in the American Robert College, founded in 1863, or the Izmir school of the Kaiserwirth deaconesses.

The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 had been strangely silent on the need for educational advance, except for the promise that Christians should have equal opportunity to enter the state civil and military schools, and for a reconfirmation of the right of the millets to operate their own educational institutions. But the Tanzimat statesmen were not unaware of the educational problem, and in the 1860's were constantly reminded of it by their New Ottoman critics. The problem was not only one of establishing more schools to broaden the educational base, but of improving the calibre of instruction to reach the level already attained by some of the non-Muslim millet schools and to come closer to the European level. This involved creating more

<sup>46</sup> "Modernized elementary government schools are being opened everywhere all over Turkey," Schauffler to Anderson, 12 December 1859, ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII.

<sup>47</sup> Subhi Bey to Elliot, rec'd. 18 November 1867, FO 195/893. These figures exclude African provinces. They are considerably lower, and probably more accurate, than comparable figures for 1864 from the same ministry: Ubicini, *Etat présent*, pp. 155-156. Karal, *Islahat fermam devri*, pp. 194-195, 200-201, gives the same figures as Ubicini. For a sample description of the educational facilities in an important provincial center (Edirne) as of 1868 by an impartial observer, see Albert Dumont, *Le Balkan et l'Adriatique* (Paris, 1874), pp. 102-106.

state schools, outside the control of the ulema, with improved curricula and teaching staff. But the problem was yet more complex, if Osmanlılık were to be promoted. Mixed schools for Muslims and non-Muslims, such as Midhat Paşa had begun to establish in the Tuna vilayet, would be necessary if the lines of demarcation between millets were to be obliterated. This had been considered by a special commission, discussing the reforms of 1856, which agreed that it was better to have non-Muslim children in Ottoman rather than foreign schools, but found that the religious method of instruction still characteristic of the *rüşdiye* made a mixed student body too difficult.<sup>48</sup> The French note of February 1867, placing before the Porte its reflections on the fulfillment of the Hatt-ı Hümayun, laid great stress on the need for more schools, especially for secondary schools, for mixed schools, for a university, and for the training of teachers.<sup>49</sup> Âli Paşa's memorandum sent from Crete at the end of November 1867 made some of the same points just as strongly, especially the need for better education for Muslims and for mixed schools.

The first big breach in millet barriers to mixed education occurred in 1868 with the establishment of the *lycée* of Galatasaray. This, like the Council of State, had been taking shape before Sultan Abdülaziz's trip to Europe. The French pressed hard for a school patterned on their own, and with an expert from Napoleon III's ministry of education Âli and Fuad had already worked out a plan for a *lycée* in the spring of 1867.<sup>50</sup> After the sultan's trip, and after Âli's return from Crete, the latter renewed the proposal of such a school in a memorandum to the sultan.<sup>51</sup> An imperial ferman was issued accordingly.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Mehmed Selaheddin, *Bir türk diplomatının evrak-ı siyasiyesi* (İstanbul, 1306), p. 145.

<sup>49</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 419-420.

<sup>50</sup> Moustier to Bourée, 15 March and 22 March 1867, and Bourée to Moustier, 22 May 1867, in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 429, 432-433, 467-468. Cf. İhsan Sungu, "Galatasaray Lisesinin kuruluşu," *Bellekten*, VII: 28 (October 1943), 315-347, which uses these dispatches as well as contemporary İstanbul newspapers. The French motive appears not to have been solely altruistic, but to promote French influence and possibly Catholic influence. Jesuit ultramontanism was suspected by Protestants: George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople* (Boston, 1909), pp. 24-25; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 44.

<sup>51</sup> Text in Sungu, "Galatasaray," pp. 323-324.

<sup>52</sup> Text in Aristarchi, *Législation*, III, 315-317; Young, *Corps de droit*, II, 377-380; *Düstur*, II, 245-248. The latter is the fullest. Young's text is based on the *Düstur*, but omits parts. These two are undated. Aristarchi's text is as communicated to foreign powers on April 29, 1868. Young notes one of the significant differences, p. 377. There are others he does not note—for instance, in the curriculum laid down. It may be that Aristarchi's text was drawn for foreign consumption, but it

The ferman stated explicitly that the new school was for boys of all creeds and was to be a conscientious copy of western schools. The five-year course prescribed was essentially a European curriculum. Religious instruction and services for boys of each millet would be in charge of leaders of their own faith. Bulgars, Greeks, and Armenians might study their own tongues as well as French, Latin, and Turkish. A large number of scholarships for needy students was established by the Ottoman government.

The *lycée* of Galatasaray was an immediate success, for which the only demonstrable cause was the comparative excellence of the instruction. Despite opposition on the part of Greek Orthodox leaders, Sephardic Jews, and the Pope—all of whom feared that the tolerant atmosphere of the new institution would wean the rising generation away from their control—341 students were enrolled at the opening in September 1868. Of this number 147 were Muslims, 48 Gregorian Armenians, 36 Greek Orthodox, 34 Jews, 34 Bulgars, 23 Roman Catholics, and 19 Armenian Catholics. At the end of the second year there were over 600 students. Complaints arose among the Turkish students about food, bathroom facilities, Latin, and the little emphasis given to the Turkish language. But on the whole differences in religion and customs and language seem not to have destroyed a harmonious functioning. The principal language of instruction was French, as were the teachers and the headmaster, M. de Salve.<sup>53</sup>

Namık Kemal, from abroad, criticized Galatasaray for virtually ignoring Turkish. He also called it an ostentatious display created at the insistence of the French ambassador, though presented as the work of the Council of State, and not enough to make a dent in the tremendous educational problems of the empire.<sup>54</sup> The criticisms all had some foundation, yet he exaggerated. The school continued to be a

is just as likely that the *Düstur* text is a later emendation. Not only is it undated, but it omits the provision in Aristarchi's text that half the students must be Muslim; the *Düstur* text, therefore, may be an accommodation to the fact that in 1868 well under half the students enrolled were Muslims. Part of the ferman as given in Sungu, "Galatasaray," p. 325, is taken from the Turkish text as published in the newspaper *İstanbul* on June 16-18, 1868. It resembles the text in Aristarchi, which seems to indicate that the *Düstur* version is not the original.

<sup>53</sup> De Salve, "L'enseignement en Turquie: le lycée impérial de Galata-Sérai," *Revue des deux mondes*, 3rd period, V (15 October 1874), 846-849; Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, II, 12-16. Turkish complaints: Osman Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi* (İstanbul, 1939-1943), II, 404.

<sup>54</sup> *Hürriyet*, #49, 31 May 1869, and #56, 19 July 1869, quoted in Sungu, "Tan-zimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," pp. 841-843.

good one and survived some vicissitudes. Enrollment fell after the French defeats of 1870, as the prestige of the French language suffered. Mahmud Nedim, grand vezir after Âli's death in 1871, hurt the school by his "economies." M. de Salve resigned, to be followed in turn by an Ottoman Armenian, two Ottoman Greeks, and in early 1877 by the stormy petrel Ali Suavi, who was a disaster as the director of the school. The school was bodily moved for a time from the Christian quarter to the Muslim atmosphere of Istanbul. In the long run, however, the diminution of French control was undoubtedly beneficial, and even in 1876 the enrollment was fairly sizable.<sup>55</sup>

One year after the Galatasaray *lycée* opened its doors a comprehensive law of reorganization for the state school system was issued.<sup>56</sup> This was the product of deliberation in the Council of State and of the work of Safvet Paşa, the minister of education. The whole scheme, much more thoroughgoing than that of 1846, was an attempt to rationalize the educational system by integrating what had been a somewhat haphazard growth of parts into an orderly pattern, from the elementary grades to the university level. It was justified not on this ground alone, however, but on the grounds that glaring deficiencies in Ottoman education had to be corrected to meet the demands of nineteenth-century civilization.<sup>57</sup> There was also implicit in the system a strong element of Osmanlılık. Five levels of schooling were set up: two primary (*sıbyan* and *rüşdiye*), two secondary (*idadiye* and *sultaniye*), and the higher special schools and the university at the top. According to the plan, schools of the first three levels were to be provided for each village, town, or quarter of a stipulated population, with *sultaniye*'s in each vilayet capital. Curricula were prescribed, and a complete administrative organization laid out. The utmost fairness in regard to language and religion was shown to non-Muslim minorities. In the two primary school levels Christians and Muslims were to be separated, evidently to avoid practical difficulties. From the sec-

<sup>55</sup> Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 405; Washburn, *Fifty Years*, p. 25; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 45; Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Serail*, pp. 227-228; Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), I, 180-181; Charles de Moüy, *Lettres du Bosphore* (Paris, 1879), p. 181.

<sup>56</sup> Text in Aristarchi, *Législation*, III, 277-315; Young, *Corps de droit*, II, 355-375 (defective); *Düstur*, II, 184-219.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. the memorandum in Sadrettin Celâl Antel, "Tanzimat maarifi," *Tanzimat*, I, 450-451. Possibly the Egyptian law of 1867 putting *mekteb*'s under state control had some influence: cf. J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London, 1938), pp. 362-375.

ondary schools on, education was to be mixed. The law recognized also the existence of private schools maintained either by individuals or by millets, providing only that their teachers should hold state certificates. Under the new system the *sıbyan* school was to be free and compulsory, the *rüşdiye* free but not compulsory. Boys were obliged to attend school to age eleven, girls to age ten.

In theory the scheme was fine, though it was greeted with some apathy at home and scepticism abroad. The *Times* of London described the plan as the French system with an admixture of English denominationalism, but admitted that if it were applied it would do a lot to amalgamate the Ottoman peoples.<sup>58</sup> Such a vast scheme could, of course, not be carried out quickly. It remained, with some changes, the basis for Ottoman education until the end of the empire, and was a strong indication that the state rather than the millet was now considered responsible for schools. But the state, partly for lack of money and teachers, was able by the end of the Tanzimat period to increase significantly only the number of schools in the two elementary categories. The *rüşdiye*'s in particular were rapidly developed. The *idadiye*'s, however, remained theoretical only, except in Istanbul, and Galatasaray was the only one of the *sultaniye*'s in existence.<sup>59</sup> A few other sorts of schools were opened or enlarged in the years 1869 to 1875—teacher training schools, including one for women; preparatory schools for the military academies; refresher courses for provincial officials; part-time courses for the poor, especially gild apprentices.<sup>60</sup>

While the secondary schools remained wanting, another attempt was made, as it had been in the 1840's, to start educational development at the top also, by a new formal opening of the university at Istanbul. Tahsin Efendi, a liberal member of the ulema who had been in Paris and had had contact with the New Ottomans, was its head. Inaugurated on February 20, 1870, the university soon ran into difficulties, partly from lack of proper teachers, students, and books, but also because lectures by the famous Jemaleddin el-Afghani aroused protest on the part of the *şeyhülislâm* and other members of

<sup>58</sup> October 15, 1869.

<sup>59</sup> Ubicini, *Etat présent*, pp. 156-159, based on the *salname* for A.H. 1293 (A.D. 1876-1877): Bertold Spuler, *Die Minderheitenschulen der europäischen Türkei* (Breslau, 1936), pp. 71-72, 84-85; Karal, *Islahat fermanı devri*, pp. 202-203.

<sup>60</sup> Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 405-412, 418-423, 557-572; Antel, "Tanzimat maarifi," pp. 449-450; Ubicini, *Etat présent*, pp. 163-166.



the ulema. The university was therefore closed again in 1871, not to reopen until after the end of the Tanzimat period. There remained a faculty of law, which seems, however, actually to have been on the *lycée* level in combination with Galatasaray.<sup>61</sup>

At best, this was spotty educational progress. There were many difficulties. Western institutions were copied, but western-trained teachers were few. Some of the lack was supplied, for the civil schools, by men trained in the military schools.<sup>62</sup> Where teachers were foreign, instruction was often in French, as in Galatasaray or in the military medical school. This aroused protest on the part of patriotic Turkish students, and in 1869 the medical school actually switched to Turkish.<sup>63</sup> The elementary schools did not increase rapidly enough, and the teaching in them was modernized very slowly. In 1873 *Basiret* (*Foresight*), a conservative newspaper, was again voicing the familiar complaint that Greek and Armenian schools were ahead of the Turkish, and better supported by their communities.<sup>64</sup> Education in the provinces lagged well behind that in the capital. Some of the higher specialized schools, like the university, were on no better than a *lycée* level.<sup>65</sup> Yet it is unfair to compare actuality, even by the end of the Tanzimat period, with the master blueprint of 1869. The deficiencies and the disappointments were real, but so was the progress made. Turkish education was more widespread, and somewhat different in tone and in quality, from what it had been in 1856. The state had assumed responsibility, a program of modernization had been adopted officially, some schools were improving. Together with the westernized military schools, the new developments in literature and the press, and the increased contact of individuals with Europe, the civil schools were contributing to the creation of a new educated class formed outside the old patterns of the medrese.



<sup>61</sup> Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 462-468, 581; Antel, "Tanzimat maarifi," pp. 448-449; Ubcini, *Etat présent*, p. 162; Young, *Corps de droit*, II, 382-383; A. Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public et administratif de l'Empire Ottoman* (Vienna, 1908-1912), I, 280-281, n.218; Ölmezoğlu, "Cevdet Paşa," p. 117. On Jemaleddin see below, chapter VIII.

<sup>62</sup> Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 361.

<sup>63</sup> *Université de Stamboul: historique . . .* (Istanbul, 1925), pp. 21-22. A new civil medical school founded in 1866 used Turkish from the start: Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 545.

<sup>64</sup> Cited by Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 148-150. See the general review of Turkish education as of about 1875 in Hermann Vambéry, *Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 171-185.

<sup>65</sup> Ergin, *Maarif tarihi*, II, 355.

At the same time as the educational system in the empire was being redrawn, the legal system was also being reexamined. Like the Ottoman schools, Ottoman laws had been modernized and rearranged piecemeal since 1840. Before 1860, western-inspired codes of commercial law, penal law, and some procedural law had come into being, and the traditional land law had been somewhat better systematized. But the bulk of the civil law, which concerned matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, alimony, inheritance, wardship, and the like) and matters of contract and obligation, so far remained untouched. Courts in these areas followed the prescriptions of the seriat. But these prescriptions were not always plain. The last codification had been centuries before. Judges had to have recourse to many commentators, but often in practice did not know where to look for legal guidance, and did not know enough law and enough Arabic to use the guides and precedents. "Sacred jurisprudence resembles a boundless ocean," said, in 1869, the commission appointed to redraft a part of the civil law, "and as difficult as it is to draw up pearls from the ocean, so great ability and learning are required for a man to find always in the law the necessary rules for the solution of each question." And in the nineteenth century, continued the commission, such men of learning were becoming rarer, both in the new "regular" or westernized civil courts and in the seriat courts.<sup>66</sup> Some systematization for ready reference was needed.

The problem had first been tackled at the end of 1855 by a commission of jurists created within the Tanzimat Council. One of the members was Cevdet, Reşid Paşa's protégé, who had not only a thorough knowledge of the religious law, but was an exceptional member of the ulema in having learned French and enjoyed close contact with the reforming statesmen of the Tanzimat.<sup>67</sup> This committee was occupied, as Cevdet described its task, with putting into one book in Turkish the religious law on transactions, so that every-

<sup>66</sup> From the preface of the *Mecelle*: W. E. Grigsby, *The Mecelle or Ottoman Civil Law* (London, 1895), pp. iii-iv. Cf. Siddik Sami Onar, "Les transformations de la structure administrative et juridique de la Turquie . . .," *Revue internationale des sciences administratives*, IV (1955), 773.

<sup>67</sup> There is some argument on how well Cevdet knew French. Evidently his reading knowledge was fairly good, but he could not speak it freely: Fatma Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve zamani* (Istanbul, 1332), p. 34; Mardin, *Cevdet*, pp. 30-33, n.56. His knowledge of western law was also not great at the start, though it increased: *ibid.*, pp. 9-10. On Cevdet in general see, in addition to the above two works, Harold Bowen, "Ahmad Djewdet Paşa," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., I, 284-286, and Ölmezoğlu, "Cevdet Paşa," pp. 114-123.

one could understand it. The work remained incomplete, however.<sup>68</sup> A part of the motivation came from the increased commercial contacts with Europe and the question of whether to accept French law.<sup>69</sup> This was always a delicate matter, given religious sensitivity among Muslims, though the law of obligations and contracts was less affected by this sensitivity than the law of personal status.

By 1867, however, Âli Paşa as grand vezir was willing, at least, to consider the adoption of large parts of western civil law, and so proposed in his memorandum of that year. He knew something of the French civil code. This had already been translated into Arabic under Egyptian government sponsorship. Âli, evidently with the thought that equality and Osmanlılık would best be promoted by the adoption of one secular law for men of all creeds within the empire, asked that the Arabic version be translated into Turkish.<sup>70</sup> But it is a question as to how far Âli wanted to go in applying the French civil law to the Ottoman Empire. To take over the whole Code Napoléon of 1804 would have been, for the time, a far more radical measure than was, under the republic, the creation of a new civil code based on the Swiss in 1926. Âli's proposal in his memorandum of 1867 was restricted: that the French civil code be used for the mixed courts in cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims.<sup>71</sup> Âli was a cautious man by nature. Quite possibly he intended that only those portions of the French civil code bearing on commercial transactions should be adopted, as a supplement to the already French-based commercial code. For the French memorandum of February 22, 1867, had pointed out specifically that the Ottoman commercial code lacked those general principles needed which were to be found in the French civil code, and that these provisions should be added.<sup>72</sup> The French ambassador evidently thought that some such process was going on when he reported that progress was being made by the commission charged with extracting from the *code civile* some fifteen hundred or sixteen hundred articles that could advantageously be borrowed.<sup>73</sup> Cevdet Paşa, he said, was regarded by Âli and Fuad as a liberal spirit who could

<sup>68</sup> Cevdet Paşa, *Tenzâkir* 1-12, ed. by Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), pp. 62-63.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Said Paşa, *Hatıratı* (İstanbul, 1328), I, 6. Cf. Mardin, *Cevdet*, pp. 173-174, n.138; Ergin, *Maârif tarihi*, I, 230.

<sup>71</sup> Hıfzı Veldet, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri ve Tanzimat," *Tanzimat*, I, 200-201.

<sup>72</sup> Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 420.

<sup>73</sup> Bourée to Moustier, 10 March 1868, *ibid.*, p. 511.

guide the fusion of European and Turkish law. The question of the French code and its possible adoption was argued in the council of ministers, evidently on a broad base, and defeated. Fuad is said to have supported Cevdet and others who opposed such a move. The seriat won out.<sup>74</sup>

The upshot was the establishment in 1868 of a new commission of Muslim jurists under the chairmanship of Cevdet Paşa to take up again the abortive work of 1855 on the law of obligations and contracts. Two years before, Cevdet had made the transition from the ranks of the ulema to the civil service hierarchy. He was involved in other jobs also, and was shuffled about in various posts in the capital and as provincial governor during the eight years that the commission worked. For a time he was removed from the commission, and complained that the work in that period was badly done. The vagaries of Ottoman politics after Âli's death affected the commission's work.<sup>75</sup> But the commission, after a preliminary report in 1869, finished between 1870 and 1876 sixteen books of the law of transactions, known as the *Mecelle-i ahkâm-ı adliye*.<sup>76</sup>

The *Mecelle* was not a complete civil code, and in fact was not so intended. The delicate matters of personal status were left out of consideration entirely by the committee. It is considered by some legal experts not to be a code at all, but simply a guide to the law for the use of those Turkish judges and jurists who otherwise were at sea in the older lawbooks and collections of *fetvas*'s. Nevertheless, the *Mecelle* was meant to render reference to the older books unnecessary wherever possible. Its 1,851 articles gave a clear and orderly exposition of the law of transactions derived from the seriat. Part of the *Mecelle* was also concerned with civil procedure. The basis for most of the work was the Hanefite law, which was the prevailing rite in the Ottoman Empire. As Cevdet said, the *Mecelle* resolved controversial points in the Hanefite law.<sup>77</sup> He was quite pleased with the result, quoting a comparison of his own work and Justinian's code to the benefit of himself.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Ölmezoğlu, "Cevdet Paşa," p. 116; Ebül'ulâ Mardin, "Mecelle," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, fasc. 74, p. 434.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 103; Veldet, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri," p. 189; Mardin, "Mecelle," pp. 434-435.

<sup>76</sup> Text in Aristarchi, *Législation*, VI and VII; Young, *Corps de droit*, VI, 169-446; and sprinkled through *Düstur*, I, II, and IV. English translation by C. R. Tyser, *The Mecelle* (Nicosia, 1901), following the Turkish rather literally.

<sup>77</sup> *Tenzâkir*, pp. 62-63.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

Later jurists have criticized Cevdet's work as having taken too narrow a base, and having missed both the opportunity to profit from western law and the chance to incorporate useful points from the other Islamic schools of law.<sup>79</sup> Western influence on the *Mecelle* was, in fact, limited to its organization into numbered articles. The coincidences between various of its provisions and the French civil code seem to be fortuitous, or the result of some far older influence of Roman on Islamic law.<sup>80</sup> Some jurists have said also that the *Mecelle* was simply insufficient to meet the needs of rapidly changing times. But it is not clear that a commission of jurists in the then condition of the Ottoman Empire could have gone much farther. Cevdet was the most enlightened of the commission, but he had his doubts about innovation and could certainly not have been given sole responsibility for the work.

Though most legal specialists have offered the criticisms mentioned above, they are not agreed on what weight to give these criticisms when balanced against the advantages of the *Mecelle*. The greatest advantage was order and clarity, which was a big step forward. Another was that the sanction of the Ottoman government was behind the *Mecelle*, making it an authoritative work and opening the way for further secularization.<sup>81</sup> The sultan's authority was mentioned in the *Mecelle* itself, though undoubtedly the pertinent provision could not be enforced: "When by order of the sovereign, the opinion of one doctor of the law having been found in conformity with public interest and the needs of the times, it has been ordered to judge according to this opinion, judges cannot validly base their decisions on a contrary opinion."<sup>82</sup> Further, it has been argued that the *Mecelle* had not so narrow a base as first appears. The drafting commission stated in its preface that it had selected, among varying Hanefite opinions, those which best met the demands of modern times and cases. The *Mecelle*, in consequence, was "based not exclusively on the dominant Hanafi opinion regarding every point, but rather on an eclectic selection of

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Veldet, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri," pp. 191-194; Siddik Sami Onar, "The Majalla," in Majid Khadduri and Herbert Liebesny, eds., *Law in the Middle East*, I (Washington, 1955), 298, 307; Mardin, *Cevdet*, pp. 171-175.

<sup>80</sup> Leon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* (London, 1927), pp. 77-78; Veldet, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri," p. 195, criticizing Young's citation of French law parallels, as well as the translation.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195; Gotthard Jäschke, "Der Islam in der neuen Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams*, N.S., I:1/2 (1951), 12-13.

<sup>82</sup> Article 1801.

provisions that had received recognition of some sort in the Hanafi school (even though some of them had in fact originated elsewhere). This was an innovation of outstanding importance. . . ."<sup>83</sup>

The *Mecelle* was to be applied both in the şariat and in the *nizamiye* courts.<sup>84</sup> The former, under supervision of the *şeyhülislâm*, judged civil cases among Muslims only, according to the religious law.<sup>85</sup> The latter, under the ministry of justice, were the westernized "regular" courts, a product of the Tanzimat period, established to take cognizance of all criminal cases and of cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims or non-Muslims of different sects. These courts applied the new westernized laws of the empire, such as the penal code, as well as religious law where that was the sole applicable standard. Westernized courts had grown in haphazard fashion, starting with the mixed commercial courts and Istanbul police courts of the 1840's.<sup>86</sup> There had been periodic revisions and additions to the number of westernized courts—in particular, commercial courts that operated under the commercial code of 1850 and appendices thereto, new police courts that operated under the penal code of 1858,<sup>87</sup> and the *nizamiye* courts composed of Muslims and non-Muslims set up under the vilayet law in every vilayet, sancak, and kaza. When the *Divan-ı ahkâm-ı adliye* was established in 1868, it was to act as a court of appeal for cases that came up from the various *nizamiye* courts. But the whole judicial apparatus required better systematization.

So in 1869, when Cevdet Paşa was minister of justice—a position into which his presidency of the Judicial Council had been transformed—a new set of regulations was prepared in an effort to clarify the situation.<sup>88</sup> The courts were thereby organized into a hierarchy. At the lowest level the council of elders in the *nahiye* served as a court of conciliation, and could settle cases only when both parties accepted the solution. Courts in the capitals of kazas, sancaks, and vilayets had

<sup>83</sup> J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in the Modern World* (New York, 1959), p. 24. Cf. Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public*, II, 286, n.230.

<sup>84</sup> Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 63.

<sup>85</sup> Tribunals with analogous functions, though, of course, not so extensive, existed within the non-Muslim millets also for their own members.

<sup>86</sup> For a review of the courts before 1854 see Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey* (London, 1856), I, 47-49, 168-185.

<sup>87</sup> Veldet, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri," pp. 196-197, 203.

<sup>88</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 535-540, dated 21 zilhicce 1285 (4 April 1869); Aristarchi, *Législation*, II, 289-295, dated 4 muharrem 1286 (16 April 1869).

the usual judicial powers, but their competence was carefully defined for both civil and criminal cases, those in the larger divisions taking the more important cases. Appeal procedures were specified. Presiding judges in the *nizamiye* courts continued, however, to be appointees of the *seyhülislâm*, as laid down in the vilayet law. And confusion in jurisdiction between religious and secular courts was not yet entirely removed.<sup>89</sup> Nor, despite the acceptance in principle of the separation of powers, were the courts completely independent of the administrative authorities. Some confusion persisted in the *nizamiye* courts, as well as the confusion inherent in the characteristic dualism of the Tanzimat period as two sets of institutions, in this case religious and secular courts, stood alongside each other. New regulations were, therefore, periodically issued, and the *nizamiye* courts were to get their final organization only after the constitution of 1876 was promulgated.<sup>90</sup> Entirely aside from the matter of court organization, however, the administration of justice suffered from the traditional defects: the ignorance or venality of judges, and the practice of suborning witnesses. Complaints on these counts, too numerous to catalogue, continued to the end of the Tanzimat period. Muslims and non-Muslims alike felt these shortcomings.



Fuad Paşa had said in the spring of 1867 that some reform measures concerning land tenure were coming soon. Before Sultan Abdülaziz left on his trip to Europe, three decrees had actually been issued. Each had relatively small effect on the total pattern of landholding in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, taken together, since each freed some type of land from some legal restrictions, the measures represented an increase in the transferability of land and a step toward a more secular, western concept of landholding. Further involved in the measures were small but significant attacks on the system of *vakıf* and on the system of capitulations.

In the past the practice of dedicating land or other immovable property to the support of religious and charitable objects—whether of mosques, medreses, hospitals, or poor relief—had been of immense benefit to Islamic civilization. Such endowments could even be created

<sup>89</sup> Veldet, "Kanunlaştırma hareketleri," pp. 203-204; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 291-293.

<sup>90</sup> See, on court development in general, Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public*, I, 216-228; Ubicini, *Etat présent*, pp. 147-151.

for what, by the nineteenth century, were coming to be recognized as public works that ought to be state-supported, such as roads and bridges. In the course of time many abuses had arisen—the turning of state land illegally into *vakıf*; the establishment of "camouflage" *vakıf*'s, the income from which went essentially to the creator of the trust and his heirs rather than to charitable objects; graft on the part of administrators of the endowments; and so forth.

While these abuses were important in themselves for hurting the whole *vakıf* system, their significance here is in the economic effect on the state and the individual in the nineteenth century. So far as the state went, it suffered whenever any of its land was transformed illegally into *vakıf*, since *vakıf* was exempt from most kinds of taxes. The state suffered, in fact, simply because so much property was *vakıf*, legal or not. It was variously estimated in the nineteenth century that between half and three quarters of all arable and built-on property in the Ottoman Empire had become *vakıf*.<sup>91</sup> Almost the entire city of Istanbul had become *vakıf* by the start of the nineteenth century. The whole village of Bebek, up the Bosphorus from Istanbul, was the property of one mosque.<sup>92</sup> The state suffered further because *vakıf* property, as experience showed, tended to degenerate, among the reasons for which was the simple fact that he who leased or worked the property was not the owner and often had little interest in long-term repair or improvement. Consequently the general economy suffered again from low productivity. The *vakıf*'s also supported many unproductive idlers. Mahmud II attempted to counteract some of these bad effects by creating a ministry to supervise *vakıf*'s. In fact, the effect was small, since the state usually paid out more to maintain the endowments than it received in income from them, and the deficit was enhanced by the expense of paying the bureaucrats involved, by inflation that ate into the real income from *vakıf* leases, and by illegal diversions of funds to other state purposes.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Ubicini, *Letters*, I, 261; Prokesch to Beust, 15 March 1867, in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 738; Heffening, "Wakf," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, IV, 1100; Young, *Corps de droit*, VI, 113.

<sup>92</sup> Fuad Köprülü, "L'institution du vakouf: sa nature juridique et son évolution historique," *Vakıflar dergisi*, II (1942), 32; Schaffler to Anderson, 12 December 1859, ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII, #92.

<sup>93</sup> On the institution of *vakıf* in general, and abuses, see H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I, part 2 (Oxford, 1957), 165-178; Köprülü, "L'institution du vakouf," pp. 3-48; *La Turquie*, 1/2 August 1875; Onar, "Les transformations," pp. 759-764; Halim Baki Kunter, "Türk vakıfları ve vakfiyeleri üzerine mücmel bir etüd," *Vakıflar dergisi*, I (1938), 103-129.

Of just as great concern to the state, and of greater concern to the individual in the nineteenth century, was the fact that *vakıf* property was taken out of the channels of normal commercial transaction and inheritance. The act of dedication made the property God's, in perpetuity, and fixed the purposes for which the revenues might be used. The property could be leased, but not bought or sold like freehold property; it was not subject to suit and seizure for nonpayment of debt, so could not be used in the ordinary way as security for borrowing. In the Ottoman Empire a system of what amounted to almost perpetual lease had been worked out by statute, thus circumventing the general rule of Islamic law that leases of *vakıf* property should be for one year.<sup>94</sup> The direct heirs of the holder could inherit the right to use the property, but in default of direct heirs the religious or charitable institution took over, other members of the family being excluded. Such leases still did not amount to freehold property. "The principle is pushed so far," as Fuad explained, "that the grandchild cannot succeed, if his parent dies in the life time of the grandparent; only the son or daughter of the last holder can inherit."<sup>95</sup> There were many other obstacles to freedom of transaction as far as *vakıf* property went, and some complex situations, such as that one party could hold the right to land as *vakıf*, while another could own outright trees and buildings thereon.

As European ways and commercial connections grew in the nineteenth-century empire, and as the abuses in the whole *vakıf* system became more and more apparent, there was a tendency on the part of the top westernized bureaucrats to try to do away with these legal restrictions on so much of the real estate in the empire, even to abolish the *vakıf* system itself.<sup>96</sup> This would open up possibilities for further economic development. European powers urged such reform on the Porte periodically in the Tanzimat period, in part with the desire to help the empire, in part to ease the way for their own nationals to invest there. Any secularization of *vakıf*'s, or steps in that direction, would also be a further blow at the influence of the ulema, whose stipends and support depended so much on the endowments and whose influence as administrators of *vakıf*'s was often considerable.

In the years after the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 there were recur-

<sup>94</sup> This was lease by *icareteyn*, or "double rent." Cf. Henry Cattan, "The Law of Waqf," in Khadduri, *Law in the Middle East*, p. 209.

<sup>95</sup> Lyons to Stanley, #199, 22 May 1867, FO 78/1960.

<sup>96</sup> Köprülü, "L'institution du vakouf," p. 34.

rent reports that some such step toward secularization was about to be taken. So early as December of 1859 the measure that was ultimately adopted in 1867 was rumored to be forthcoming—an extension of the right of heritability to more distant relatives of *vakıf* leaseholders, so that, in effect, the property would be closer to *mülk*, or property held in fee simple. In return for the extension of the right of inheritance, the government would collect an extra five per cent of the income from the property.<sup>97</sup> By this means, the property technically would remain *vakıf*, and so would avoid the odium of secularization. Probably because of opposition from the ulema, the project was dropped, and similar proposals in 1863 and 1865 failed also.<sup>98</sup> By 1867 the urging of France, plus the difficult position of the treasury in meeting costs of suppressing the rebellion in Crete, plus undoubtedly a desire on the part of Âli and Fuad to create a liberal nimbus for Abdülaziz before he went to Europe, brought the project to the fore again.<sup>99</sup> Possibly complete secularization of *vakıf*'s was contemplated for a moment.<sup>100</sup> But this was likely to arouse too much opposition among the ulema.

What resulted, then, was that the idea of 1859 was revived in two edicts of May 21 and June 18, 1867.<sup>101</sup> The first allowed the extension of the right of inheritance from relatives of the first to the seventh degree for *vakıf* and state (*mirî*) properties which were held of the state by *tapu*, or official title-deed of possession.<sup>102</sup> In return, the state collected, in addition to the usual tithe on the produce of the land, a fifteen per cent tax on the income for the next year, though the collection of the increase was spread over five years. The second decree allowed a similar extension of the right of inheritance, in return for an additional payment, of rural (*müstağallat*) and urban (*müsakkafat*) *vakıf*'s held by double rent (*icareteyn*).<sup>103</sup> Conversion to extended heritability was optional with the holder. "The principle

<sup>97</sup> Schaffler to Anderson, 12 December 1859, ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII, #92.

<sup>98</sup> Morris to Seward, #70, 4 December 1863, USNA, Turkey 17; Morris to Seward, #129, 18 October 1865, and #133, 22 November 1865, USNA, Turkey 19. The government evidently did take over some property of the Mevlevi dervishes about 1864: Van Lennep, *Travels*, II, 235.

<sup>99</sup> Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 209; Morris to Seward, #195, 27 February 1867, USNA, Turkey 19; Prokesch to Beust, 15 March 1867, in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 737-738.

<sup>100</sup> Young, *Corps de droit*, VI, 113.

<sup>101</sup> Texts in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 740-745; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 316-318 (defective); Aristarchi, *Législation*, I, 254-263; *Düstur*, I, 223-226.

<sup>102</sup> These are not the same degrees of relationship as in western civil or canon law.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Omer Hilmi, *A Treatise on the Laws of Evkaf* (Nicosia, 1899), pp. 45-49.

of the new laws is to assimilate the *vacoufs* and 'terres seigneuriales' to freehold property," Fuad explained to the British ambassador.<sup>104</sup> This was only partially true. Many sorts of *vakıf* were not touched by the laws, but only those founded by members of the imperial family or those administered by the state after the founder's family had died out.<sup>105</sup> Further, not many *vakıf*'s appear to have been converted in accord with the new law. So far as the state lands were concerned, the benefit accrued not necessarily to the cultivators of the land, but to those who held the official title of possession, the *tapu*. Europeans were disappointed. Property was not much more mobile than before.<sup>106</sup> Yet a cautious step in the direction of secularization had been taken, opening the way for further such steps and for consideration of more radical measures.<sup>107</sup>

The third of the land laws of 1867, also announced on June 18, granted permission to foreigners to own real estate in the Ottoman Empire. This was not only a liberalization of legal restrictions on transactions in land, but a weapon used by Âli and Fuad to attack the capitulations. Behind the edict lay a history of considerable controversy. Under Ottoman law foreigners were not allowed to own Ottoman real estate. In fact they sometimes did, but only through a dummy representative, subject of the Porte, who was the nominal owner.<sup>108</sup> But this involved legal troubles and the risk that the dummy would cheat the owner. Of course, the foreigner had an advantage in that, if bankrupt, property not held in his name could not be seized. But the whole situation curbed foreign ownership and investment. The powers pressed for free ownership of land by foreigners, which the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 had promised. But the Porte would concede this only if the powers should give up capitulatory privileges

<sup>104</sup> Lyons to Stanley, #199, 22 May 1867, FO 78/1960.

<sup>105</sup> *La Turquie* of 1/2 August 1875 put all these in the category of "customary *vakıf*'s," as opposed to those whose revenues went entirely to religious or charitable objects.

<sup>106</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, II, 206; *La Turquie*, 27 and 30 November and 2 December 1871, and 1/2 August 1875; Halil İnalçık, "Land Problems in Turkish History," *Muslim World*, 45:3 (July 1955), 227.

<sup>107</sup> As in 1873 and 1875: Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, II, 125-128; Maynard to Fish, #67, 20 May 1876, USNA, Turkey 29; *La Turquie* 1/2 August 1875. Evidently on each occasion a more drastic *vakıf* secularization law remained ineffective.

<sup>108</sup> Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey* (Baltimore, 1933), p. 82 and n.37. İzmir was an exception, where foreigners could hold property in their own names.

in respect of the property.<sup>109</sup> The Ottoman position was maintained until 1867, and reiterated in Fuad's memorandum of that year on the Hatt-ı Hümayun. Finally, France and Austria seemed to recognize that extensive extraterritorial privileges were no longer justified. The new edict permitted foreigners to hold real property in the empire, except in the Hijaz.<sup>110</sup> But they could hold it only on the same basis as any Ottoman subject—on condition of conforming to local police regulations, submitting to Turkish civil courts, and paying the usual taxes. The next year a protocol accepting the new dispensation was signed by France, and soon thereafter by other powers.<sup>111</sup> The protocol accorded certain privileges of consular protection to the persons, movable goods, and court appearances of foreign property owners.

Ziya Bey, from exile in London, bitterly attacked the granting of permission to foreigners to own property. He conjured up a picture of Turks, already suffering from western predominance in trade and industry, selling out in Istanbul to foreigners and migrating, homeless, with barefoot children, to Anatolia. What would it profit the Turks if Istanbul, bought by the blood of their forebears, were rebuilt like Paris, but foreigners owned the property?<sup>112</sup> Ziya did not recognize that the measure was also an attack on the capitulations. But westerners did, and some of them criticized the new measure just as bitterly as Ziya, for opposite reasons. They called it a snare, depriving foreigners of all capitulatory protections.<sup>113</sup> Ignatyev, Russian ambassador to the Porte, thought that Âli and Fuad were counting on a great influx of English and French colonists whose tax payments would aid Turkish finances and whose political weight would support Turkish sovereignty against particularist Christian nationalisms.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>109</sup> Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 733-740, especially Âli's note of 3 October 1862; Morris to Seward, #36, 27 November 1862, USNA, Turkey 17; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 334-335.

<sup>110</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 745-747; Aristarchi, *Législation*, I, 19-21; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 337-341; *Düstur*, I, 230-231.

<sup>111</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 730-733; Aristarchi, *Législation*, I, 22-25; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 341-345. Cf. Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 213-214. The United States resisted signing longer than any power: Elliot to Granville, #91, 26 March 1873, FO 78/2226; Boker to Fish, #116, encl., 4 June 1873, USNA, Turkey 24.

<sup>112</sup> *Hürriyet*, #21, 16 November 1868, quoted in Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," pp. 835-836.

<sup>113</sup> Benoît Brunswik, *Etudes pratiques sur la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1869), pp. 65-87; Morris to Seward, #265, 25 July 1868, USNA, Turkey 20; *Levant Herald*, 29 July 1868.

<sup>114</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1914, III, 97. Cf. Morris to Seward, #13, 19 March 1862, USNA, Turkey 17.

Possibly they indulged in this hope, though it seems farfetched. The essential in Âli's mind seems, however, to have been that a breach should be made in the capitulations. The last paragraph of the protocol recognized that the Porte reserved to itself the right of coming to an agreement with the powers as to revision of the old treaties of capitulation.

For the Tanzimat statesmen, notwithstanding that they often welcomed the support and followed the advice of the western powers in their reform measures, were at the same time waging a battle against foreign intervention of all sorts. They objected strenuously to such intervention in times of crisis, like the Cretan rebellion. They also objected continuously to the capitulations, and nibbled away at the privileges of foreigners in the empire whenever it was possible. Âli had begun this at the negotiations in Paris following the Crimean War, trying to get rid of the capitulations, which he called "an insuperable obstacle to all improvements."<sup>115</sup> The powers, of course, resisted any weakening of their privileges, and with reason, given the state of Turkish courts and of the tax collection system. But the Tanzimat statesmen persisted.<sup>116</sup> They tried to assimilate foreigners to the legal status of Ottoman subjects wherever they could. The press law of 1865 had already provided that foreigners might publish periodicals in the empire only if they accepted the jurisdiction of Ottoman officials and courts.<sup>117</sup> The law on the ownership of property by foreigners was another step in the same direction. Then in 1869 came an even more significant attack on the capitulations, in the form of a law on nationality.

Europe was surprised by the issue of the law on nationality and naturalization on January 19, 1869.<sup>118</sup> The powers at first claimed that such a measure, affecting all nations, should have been the product of international discussion. The Porte maintained that it was a domestic question. As it became apparent that the law would not be applied retroactively, and would not be used to punish Greeks in the empire after the tension over the Cretan affair, protests were allowed

<sup>115</sup> Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1856, vol. 61, *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 24, "Protocols of Conferences held at Paris . . .," p. 54.

<sup>116</sup> They got some aid from the Roumanian position on the same question: T. W. Riker, *The Making of Roumania* (London, 1931), pp. 230-235.

<sup>117</sup> Article 3.

<sup>118</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 526-527; Aristarchi, *Législation*, I, 7-8; Young, *Corps de droit*, II, 226-229; *Düstur*, I, 16-18.

to drop.<sup>119</sup> Superficially the new law seemed only to be a step in the direction of secularization and Osmanlılık. It substituted modern political definitions of nationality and naturalization for the old criterion of conversion to Islam. So the empire moved toward Europe's secular standards. But the law also stated that all persons domiciled in Ottoman territory were to be considered Ottoman subjects unless they could prove the contrary and, further, that no Ottoman subject might become a citizen of another state without the preliminary consent of the Porte. This provision was aimed at the woeful state of affairs wherein all manner of Ottoman Christians and Levantine rabble obtained the protection of great powers by a nominal transfer of citizenship.<sup>120</sup> Although aimed at an abuse of capitulatory rights, this measure might also be construed as part of an attack on the system itself. The nationality law was supplemented in the summer of 1869 by three others. One established a commission to inquire into the status of presumed Ottoman subjects who claimed foreign nationality or protection. The other two set up a more stringent passport control for both Ottoman and foreign subjects.<sup>121</sup>

Âli's purpose in all this, as Ignatyev readily saw, was to sabotage the capitulatory privileges one by one, instead of launching a frontal attack.<sup>122</sup> Âli evidently contemplated a more general offensive in the spring of 1869. He inspired the semiofficial *La Turquie* to denounce the capitulations.<sup>123</sup> A memorandum from the Porte to the powers carried on the offensive.<sup>124</sup> This dealt only with abuses under the capitulations, but Âli's bitterness against the system was evident throughout. He ended his memorandum with the statement that "we have pointed out many times how the very existence of the capitulations hinders the regular functioning of the institutions, and the progressive advance of civilization, in the Empire." European opposition,

<sup>119</sup> Testa, *Recueil*, VII, pp. 529-534, 540-545, 554-560; Aristarchi, *Législation*, I, 9-11; Young, *Corps de droit*, II, 224-225.

<sup>120</sup> See above, chapter II. The Porte had made previous efforts to curb this abuse: Sousa, *Capitulatory Regime*, pp. 100-104. In 1860 the Porte had required that Ottoman subjects naturalized as foreign subjects leave the empire within three months after selling their goods: Safvet's note of 11 September 1860, in Williams to Cass, #98, 17 September 1860, USNA, Turkey 16. It is not apparent that this was effective.

<sup>121</sup> Texts in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 561-563; Aristarchi, *Législation*, III, 99-102; Young, *Corps de droit*, II, 238-240, 272-273.

<sup>122</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1914, VI, 154-155. Cf. Brunswik, *Etudes pratiques*, pp. 167-267.

<sup>123</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 68.

<sup>124</sup> Text in Testa, *Recueil*, VII, 548-554; Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 268-274. Cf. Sousa, *Capitulatory Regime*, p. 104.

nevertheless, was too strong to permit any wholesale change in the capitulations. Instead, the policy of tangential attack was pursued. Some of the majesty of the position of the foreign consuls was removed by a regulation of 1870, signed by Âli Paşa as foreign minister, that they should no longer be greeted by salvos.<sup>125</sup> After Âli's death there were other efforts.<sup>126</sup> But the capitulations remained a galling sign to the Turks that, though admitted to the European family of nations, they were still considered inferior. Europe's attitude continued to be a psychological block to more general Turkish acceptance of western-oriented reform.



The one area in which western-oriented reform was most acceptable was the military. Since the later eighteenth century, and more rapidly since Mahmud II's destruction of the Janissaries, the army had undergone progressive changes in this direction. During the Tanzimat period the army was considerably improved, although it never reached the desired standard. The common soldier was no problem; it was generally admitted that the Turk soldier was among the best in the world.<sup>127</sup> What was needed was better organization, a better officer corps, better equipment, better training, better supply, better sanitation, and a general economic and educational development such as would undergird a modern army. Progress of some sort came in all these ways in the Tanzimat period, but principally in organization and equipment. This was due, in large measure, to the interest of Sultan Abdülaziz in military affairs, particularly in the visible aspects of equipment, and to the work of Hüseyin Avni Paşa, who became Âli's minister of war in 1869.<sup>128</sup>

Hüseyin Avni had started life as a theological student, but had switched to the military school and had capped his twenty-year army

<sup>125</sup> Text in Young, *Corps de droit*, III, 42, n.1; Aristarchi, *Législation*, IV, 24.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Young, *Corps de droit*, I, 258-259, on an attempt to deny foreign dragoons the right to appear in the new civil and criminal courts, 1875; and IV, 342, on an Ottoman protest against the foreign post offices as an anachronism and violation of sovereignty, 1874.

<sup>127</sup> "Your privates proved that they are without equal," Francis Joseph was reported to have said to Âli, of the Crimean period: Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 44.

<sup>128</sup> For varying estimates of the Ottoman army between 1856 and 1869 see Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, I, 115-121; Millingen (an officer), *La Turquie*, pp. 38-61, 439-444; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 16-18; F. W. von Reden, *Die Türkei und Griechenland in ihrer Entwicklungsfähigkeit* (Frankfurt a.M., 1856), pp. 317-329.

career as a successful general in Crete, fighting rebellion.<sup>129</sup> When he came to be minister of war, the Ottoman army was still organized on the plan adopted in 1842. Infantry, cavalry, and engineer corps were on the French model, artillery on the Prussian. The six army corps, plus reserves, and a dubious 120,000 men owed by the tributary states, gave a maximum of 500,000 possible effectives. Soldiers were required to do five years' active service and to spend a further seven in the reserves.<sup>130</sup> Since that time, a good many modern weapons had been acquired, and the training of officers improved, but no basic changes had been made. Hüseyin Avni calculated that such an army was insufficient for the defense of the empire, and submitted to Abdülaziz in 1869 a memorandum which outlined a reorganization that would produce a dependable army of over 700,000, if needed.<sup>131</sup> The law issued later that year on the basis of his recommendations placed the reserves for the first time on an effective and rational basis.<sup>132</sup> The Prussian organization of 1860 served as the model. The period of active service was reduced from five to four years, and a new active reserve status of two years was created, along with two further reserve categories of six and eight years respectively. There were not in fact enough trained officers to command the reserves, so that the actual strength was estimated at something over 300,000 by some.<sup>133</sup> Yet a seventh army corps was created, based on the Yemen, and in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 there were 750,000 under arms.<sup>134</sup>

Although all kinds of imperfections remained—notably still an officer corps of most uneven quality, lack of good communication and supply and even of maps—the army by the end of the Tanzimat period seems to have been in reasonably good shape. It was equipped with Henry-Martini and Snider rifles, with heavy Krupp guns, and outfitted in comfortable Zouave costume. Though the Turkish army was defeated in 1878 by the Russians, the first two categories of reserves were shown to be as good as the regulars.<sup>135</sup> The Russian ambassador

<sup>129</sup> Ahmed Saib, *Vak'a-i Sultan Abdülaziz*, pp. 80-81; J. H. Mordtmann, "Hüsain 'Awnî Paşa," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II, 342.

<sup>130</sup> H. Zboinski, *Armée ottomane* (Paris, 1877), pp. 12-13.

<sup>131</sup> Text in *ibid.*, pp. 13-21.

<sup>132</sup> Text in Aristarchi, *Législation*, III, 514-519.

<sup>133</sup> Ubicini, *Etat présent*, pp. 178-179.

<sup>134</sup> Necati Tacan, "Tanzimat ve Ordu," *Tanzimat*, I, 135.

<sup>135</sup> W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 111-114, 217; Zboinski, *Armée ottomane*, pp. viii, 75-77, 85. Zboinski was a Belgian, professor at the Istanbul military school. For a more cynical picture by a



Ignatyev, who would have the best reason of any to follow Ottoman military progress closely, thought the reorganized army quite effective and generally underestimated.<sup>136</sup> Cevdet Paşa somewhat complacently observed in 1872 that the military service had been brought up to the required level.<sup>137</sup> An Austrian officer who had served in the Ottoman army during the Crimean War observed a great improvement by 1874 in the officer corps and in general *esprit*. He noted also that, whereas formerly most officers had risen from the ranks, now the products of the westernized military education were increasing, creating a class distinction among the military.<sup>138</sup> This was to have its effect later on Ottoman political life as well as on the army. And Hüseyin Avni, the reorganizer of the army, could count on the support of a good many officers and cadets when he combined with Midhat to overthrow Abdülaziz in 1876.

The Ottoman navy was Abdülaziz's favorite plaything. Through his efforts it was, by 1876, the third most powerful in Europe with regard to the number and armament of its ships. More than twenty ironclads had been acquired since 1864.<sup>139</sup> But in personnel and spirit it could not match the army, and there was no organizer like Hüseyin Avni to make it effective. Hobart Paşa, the English sailor and adventurer who took charge of the Halki naval school about 1867, did not fill the bill. It is likely, however, that the increase in naval as well as land strength gave the Turks an increased confidence and contributed to their increasingly pugnacious attitude toward Europe and European intervention in the 1870's. The armed forces were a bulwark for the empire that the Tanzimat statesmen were trying to resuscitate. But the forces did not support the sultan who had shown such interest in them. The navy also took a hand in the deposition of Abdülaziz in 1876.



The years 1870 and 1871 marked the end of an era in the Ottoman Empire as much as in western Europe. Âli Paşa died in September

French engineer working in the Balkans, see F. Bianconi, *La question d'Orient dévoilée* (Paris, 1876), pp. 137-148.

<sup>136</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, IV, 228-230.

<sup>137</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 345.

<sup>138</sup> Murad Effendi [Franz von Werner], *Türkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, 1877), II, 118-132.

<sup>139</sup> Zboinski, *Armée ottomane*, pp. ix, 121-128. Cf. Ubcini, *Etat présent*, p. 183, who seems to list some wooden ships as armored.

1871. Thereafter the lack of a strong hand in guiding the empire toward gradual westernization was sorely felt. But, even before Âli's death, his policy had suffered when the Second Empire met defeat at the hands of Prussia. The collapse of France affected the Ottoman Empire's domestic situation, as well as its relationships with the powers, since the French support and example had been the strongest in the preceding decade.

Little indications of the French defeat were at once noticeable in Istanbul. The editor of *La Turquie* said that, sitting in a public garden in the capital, he could see French prestige fall as the war bulletins came in.<sup>140</sup> The study of French declined. An Armenian father asked that Robert College teach his son "Prussian" instead of French.<sup>141</sup> Âli, who favored France though he remained diplomatically reticent during the war, was hurt by the French defeat. He was also worried by Russia's seizure of the chance to declare null the Black Sea clause of the Paris treaty of 1856, which forbade Russian armament on the Black Sea. He tried to put the best face possible on both matters, accepting the Russian action since there was no great power support to combat it, declaring that French influence in the Ottoman Empire had not always been good, and hoping that Prussia would help to maintain the empire.<sup>142</sup> But the new German Empire was not yet ready to fill the gap, and for a time the defeat of France meant that Russian influence in Istanbul, in the person of Ambassador Ignatyev, was in the ascendant. The French defeat was not unpleasing to some—conservative opponents of Âli, palace intriguers, even Abdülaziz himself. The sultan may have harbored a dislike of Napoleon III, and he certainly had admired Prussian arms since his trip in 1867.<sup>143</sup> Possibly Abdülaziz also felt that the French defeat would help to loosen the control of Âli, under which he chafed.

Âli, in fact, survived the Second Empire only by a year. In June of 1871 he fell ill and kept to his house in Bebek. Since at this time Âli

<sup>140</sup> Mismar, *Souvenirs*, p. 174.

<sup>141</sup> Wood to Clark, 10 October 1871, ABCFM, vol. 286, #404. Cf. De Salve, "L'enseignement en Turquie," p. 849.

<sup>142</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 26; Mehmed Memduh, *Mîrât-ı şûnat*, p. 42; Ahmed Saib, *Vaka-i Sultan Abdülaziz*, p. 46; Ludwig Raschdau, "Aus dem politischen Nachlass des Unterstaatssekretärs Dr. Busch," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 137 (December 1908), 386-388; Anton Graf Prokesch-Osten, "Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1870 und 1871," *Deutsche Revue*, IV (1880), 19; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1914, IV, 90-93.

<sup>143</sup> Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," pp. 387-388; Georges Douin, *Histoire du règne du Khédive Ismail* (Rome, 1933-1934), II, 581.

was acting as grand vezir, foreign minister, and minister of the interior; it was difficult to conduct the business of government. Characteristically, Âli clung to power and to life as long as possible, while the various public men who aspired to the grand vezirate pulled all possible wires to assure themselves the succession. Little cliques formed, each with its palace contact, to struggle for the mantle. The khedive Ismail, who had never been able to buy Âli, now used his money and his influence against Mustafa Fazıl and Halil Şerif, and to bribe in his favor Mahmud Nedim, Safvet Paşa, and other worthies. Nor did he fail to satisfy Abdülaziz's craving for rare birds and animals of all sorts for his collection.<sup>144</sup>

At once it became apparent that Âli had no obvious successor. For ten years he and Fuad had conducted the business of the government with almost no interruptions. After Fuad's death in February 1869 Âli's grip on the administration had tightened. He dug a wide moat around his tenure of office and trained up no political heirs. This was his greatest disservice to the state. Neither in the conduct of foreign relations, at which he had excelled, nor in the domestic program of gradual reform, had Âli reared any outstanding disciple. His failure in this regard may have been due to his innate jealousy of office or to his memory of how he and Fuad, Reşid Paşa's disciples, had quarreled with the master at the end of his life. Potential rivals had been kept either in specialized positions—men like Safvet or Edhem Paşas—or, for the most part, in provincial governorships—like Midhat Paşa.<sup>145</sup> The sultan also had been kept relatively isolated from affairs and from other statesmen by Âli and Fuad. In part, this accorded with the sultan's wish, since he abhorred interviews with foreign ambassadors. In part, it was a necessity for the welfare of the state, since Abdülaziz was growing more peculiar, exhibiting signs of possible mental unbalance.<sup>146</sup> But Abdülaziz was tired of his tutelage to the elder statesman. The agent of the khedive Ismail reported on July 26 that Abdülaziz was pleased at the prospect of Âli's death.<sup>147</sup>

At the end of August Âli retired into his harem, never to emerge.

<sup>144</sup> Douin, *Khedive Ismail*, II, 599-607; Pierre Crabitès, *Ismail the Maligned Khedive* (London, 1933), pp. 179-192.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," p. 388; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1914, IV, 90.

<sup>146</sup> Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," pp. 384-387; *idem*, "Diplomatenleben am Bosphorus," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 138 (1909), 400-402.

<sup>147</sup> Crabitès, *Ismail*, p. 179.

On September 6, 1871, he died. The next day *La Turquie* appeared with black borders. It was generally recognized that a great man was gone. Some, among European observers particularly, used language tinged with a sense of tragedy like that used in 1890 when Bismarck was dropped from office by the young kaiser; the great stabilizing influence was gone.<sup>148</sup> But Âli was criticized also in the obituaries that appeared.<sup>149</sup> And within the empire interest centered on the question of who would succeed Âli. Mahmud Nedim, at the moment minister of the navy and once the candidate of some of the New Ottomans, was the one whom Sultan Abdülaziz appointed. But Abdülaziz himself seemed desirous of exercising a greater influence within the administration. In reality there was a sort of political vacuum, now that Âli was gone and French influence had declined. No single individual could fill Âli's shoes. And his policy of gradual secularization, of pursuit of Osmanlık, of general modernization, received a setback. In its place came a renascent Islamic sentiment and a rising anti-Europeanism which colored the events of the next few years.

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Elliott to Granville, #318, 7 September 1871, FO 78/2177.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. *Levant Herald*, 7 September 1871.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PERIOD OF CHAOS, 1871-1875

For four years after Âli Paşa's death the Ottoman domestic situation became progressively more confused. Mahmud Nedim's grand vezirate of almost a year produced only administrative instability. Within the next three years there followed six grand vezirates. These changes at the top intensified a process of office-shifting in lower ranks that became chaotic at times. Meanwhile Sultan Abdülaziz, whose personal vagaries grew with the years, exercised more influence within the administration than before, and added to the instability by resurrecting his plan to alter the succession to the throne. Economically, the empire suffered also, both from an agricultural crisis in 1873 and 1874 and from a treasury crisis which came to a head in 1875. A long-drawn-out war against tribesmen in the Yemen added to the financial difficulties. Ismail of Egypt pursued his course of cajolery and bribery to attain yet greater independence of the Porte. By the summer of 1875 the revolt in Herzegovina, which in other circumstances might not have had such serious results, was almost the last straw. It brought renewed European pressures on the empire and increased financial problems. The half decade proved to be a prelude to revolution in 1876, for within these years various sorts of personal, economic, and political discontent arose which finally merged to facilitate the overthrow of Abdülaziz himself.

The currents of discontent were not well defined. Some men simply complained of capricious government or of economic want. Others complained of autocracy and looked to constitutional government as the remedy. Still others sought to reject the Tanzimat, to return to conservative Islam, and to express this politically by emphasizing the sultan's role as caliph of all Muslims. If there were in the years 1871 to 1875 any common denominator, it was the familiar broad desire to strengthen the empire against European pressures and domestic separatism. This was most often expressed in the 1870's by a renascent antiwesternism which had within it some elements of Ottoman patriotism, rather more of Islamic conservatism, and even a bit of pan-Islamic sentiment.

In part, the new wave of religious sentiment seems to have been simply a reaction against the secularizing policies of Âli and the pressures of Europeans. It probably drew strength, however, from new sources also. One of these was Jemaleddin el Afghani, who appeared in Istanbul in 1870 after a somewhat stormy early career in Afghan politics. Jemaleddin had already acquired quite a reputation for learning, and seems to have been greeted with acclaim in the capital, welcomed by Âli, and given a position on the council of education. Shortly he was invited to lecture in the mosques of Ayasofya and Sultan Ahmed, and also to give an address under the auspices of the ephemeral university then being recreated after the education reform of 1869. Before an audience of statesmen and journalists he spoke of prophecy and philosophy as the soul of the body politic. Hasan Fehmi, *seyhülislâm* at the moment, was apparently jealous of Jemaleddin's popularity, and accused him of unorthodoxy in insinuating that prophecy was a craft and the Prophet a craftsman. The ensuing controversy aroused such furor that the Porte asked Jemaleddin to leave. He departed for Cairo in March of 1871, there to be given a stipend by Ismail's government, with freedom to teach.<sup>1</sup>

How much influence Jemaleddin had on Turkish opinion during his short stay it is hard to say. His later influence in Egypt, in Iran, and again in the Ottoman Empire in the 1890's was certainly greater. But it is a legitimate surmise that his preaching of a revived Islam, of borrowing from the West to combat the West, and of the need for Muslim peoples to work together contributed something to the intensified Islamic and anti-European sentiment of the 1870's in the empire. In some of these views Jemaleddin paralleled opinions of the New Ottomans.<sup>2</sup>

Another of the sources for revived Islamic sentiment was the in-

<sup>1</sup> Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1908* (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 2-30; Ignaz Goldziher, "Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, 1008-1011; Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933), pp. 6, 13-14; Auriant, "Un émir afghan, adversaire de l'Angleterre en Orient; Djemmal ed Dine, ténébreux agitateur," *Mercure de France*, 288 (1 December 1938), 316-330; Ettore Rossi, "Il centenario della nascita di Gemal ud-Din el-Afghani celebrate a Kabul," *Oriente Moderno*, 20:5 (May 1940), 262-265.

<sup>2</sup> Auriant, "Emir afghan," pp. 320-321, claims that Jemaleddin got along well with the "Young Turkey" party. But during Jemaleddin's stay in Istanbul the leading New Ottomans were still in Europe, except that Mustafa Fazıl had returned and Namık Kemal came back at the end of 1870. Auriant says also that Jemaleddin was initiated into a Freemasonic lodge in Istanbul, which may have been the same that Mustafa Fazıl and Namık Kemal had joined.

terest of Ottoman Turks and of their government in their Muslim Turkish brethren of Central Asia. Because the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was so inextricably bound to the West by its reform programs, its Balkan problems, and the actions of European powers, the continuing contacts with the Muslim world of the East are often forgotten. They existed, nevertheless, represented by occasional outstanding individuals like Jemaleddin, by a greater number of nameless travellers or of pilgrims to Mecca, who sometimes came on to Istanbul, and by dervishes from Central Asia who lived in tekkes maintained for them in Istanbul by pious Muslims.<sup>3</sup> In the 1860's and 1870's the Ottoman Turks' awareness of other Muslim and Turkish peoples was increased by upheavals in inner Asia. The Panthais, Chinese Muslims in Yunnan province, revolted and set up a state of their own. Yakub Beg successfully wrested Turkestan from Chinese control and governed it as a Muslim state, centered on Kashgar. Meanwhile the sporadic Russian advance against the independent Turkish khanates east of the Caspian had been seriously resumed in the 1860's. By 1870 Tashkent, Bokhara, and Samarkand were under Russian dominion, while Khiva and Khokand were threatened.<sup>4</sup> The awareness was not only religious and cultural, but political, since the Turkish peoples of Central Asia were caught in the great Anglo-Russian contest that had begun in the 1830's, and they appealed to the Ottoman Empire, as well as to Britain, for help. Between the Crimean War period and 1871 missions to Istanbul had come from Khiva, Khokand, Bokhara, and Kashgar, and even from the Afghans and the Panthais. The Porte had evidently sent a military instructor to Bokhara, but the longing of the Central Asian Muslims for support from Istanbul met with no real satisfaction. Obviously the Ottomans were in no position to wage war beyond the Caspian—much less so than in the Caucasus, where the Circassians and Shamil had gone down before Russian might despite Ottoman sympathy for them. The only tie was a vague recognition by the Turkestanis of Abdülaziz as caliph and his acceptance of this empty honor, symbolized by the ceremonial reception of Central Asian embassies.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. "Zapiski Grapha N. P. Ignatyeva (1864-1874)," *Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Diel*, 1915, IV, 227; Arminius Vambéry, *History of Bokhara* (London, 1873), p. 419 and n.; *idem*, "Jugendwanderungen," *Globus*, 25 (1874), 171; D. C. Boulger, *The Life of Yakub Beg* (London, 1878), p. 170.

<sup>4</sup> B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 36-37, 45-46, 51-52.

<sup>5</sup> On political and sentimental connections 1854-1871: Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir* 1-12,

While Âli Paşa lived, Ottoman connections with Central Asia remained ceremonial only, though Âli is said to have expressed interest in the desire of Turkomans to become subjects of the sultan and so gain protection against Russia.<sup>6</sup> But after 1871 the Porte was willing to go a little farther. Bokharan appeals to the sultan and to Britain for aid evidently met with no results in Istanbul.<sup>7</sup> Yakub Beg, however, whose state was a going concern in the 1870's, got more positive results. His envoy Seyyid Mahmud Yakub, who since the early 1860's had been shuttling between Central Asia and Istanbul as representative first of Khokand and then of Kashgar, appeared again in Istanbul in 1873. The mission, facilitated by Britain, travelled via India. It returned to Kashgar with a group of Ottoman Turks, among them four army officers to act as military instructors, and with a few light weapons. Seyyid Mahmud Yakub also brought back from Istanbul the title of *âmîr* for Yakub Beg and some kind of promise of protection, however unreal, from Abdülaziz as "suzerain." Yakub proceeded to strike coins in the sultan's name which bore the inscription "Protected Kashgar," and Abdülaziz's name was mentioned in the prayers.<sup>8</sup> Again in 1875 the same envoy came to Istanbul, was well re-

ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), pp. 46-47; Fatma Aliye, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve zamani* (Istanbul, 1332), p. 89; Boulger, *Yakub Beg*, pp. 169-170; Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan* (New York, 1876), I, 355, n.1, and II, 303, 308; Vambéry, *History of Bokhara*, p. 390; *idem*, *Travels in Central Asia* (New York, 1865), pp. 71, 157-158, 162, 175, 221, 484-485; Robert Shaw, *Visits to High Tartary, Yarkand, and Kashghar* (London, 1871), pp. 208-209; Ethel Forsyth, ed., *Autobiography and Reminiscences of Sir Douglas Forsyth* (London, 1887), p. 60; Jean Deny, *Sommaire des archives turques du Caire* (Cairo, 1930), plates LI and LII; Morris to Hunter, #117, 3 July 1865; USNA, Turkey 18; Sublime Porte to British Embassy, 3 October 1868, FO 195/893; #353; Elliot to Stanley, #55, encl., 4 December 1867; FO 78/1965; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, IV, 227.

<sup>6</sup> Vambéry, *His Life and Adventures* (New York, 1883?), p. 321. Fuad's political testament also shows awareness of the ring of Sunni Muslims around Iran: James L. Farley, *Turks and Christians* (London, 1876), p. 241.

<sup>7</sup> Stanton (Cairo) to Granville, #2, 10 January 1872, FO 78/2229; Elliot to Granville, #76, 1 July 1872, and #85, 6 July 1872, FO 78/2218.

<sup>8</sup> Elliot to Granville, #147, 14 May 1873, #155, confidential, 20 May 1873, and #172, 30 May 1873, FO 78/2267; Forsyth, *Autobiography*, pp. 134-135, 158; H. W. Bellew, *Kashmir and Kashghar* (London, 1875), pp. 188, 213, 304; Boulger, *Yakub Beg*, p. 196. There is some question as to whether Yakub sought, himself took, or was granted by Abdülaziz the designation of *âmîr ul müminîn*, "commander of the faithful," a title used by the caliphs and sometimes by Ottoman sultans: Bellew, *Kashmir and Kashghar*, p. 304; Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), p. 35; Julius Debelak, "Die central-asiatische Frage," *Streifflur's Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 16 (1875), 129; Louis E. Erechting, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Eastern Turkistan, 1863-1881," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, 26:3 (July 1939): 479. This seems unlikely.

ceived by Abdülaziz, and returned with two thousand Snider breech-loading rifles and six fieldpieces—a fact which he tried to conceal from Ignatyev, whom he called “Satan personified.”<sup>9</sup> But the cordial reception accorded the embassy, the decorations given its members, and the fact that Turkish officers were on loan to Yakub Beg were well publicized in Istanbul.<sup>10</sup> So also, the next year, was the position of Yakub Beg as “vassal” to the sultan.<sup>11</sup>

Inevitably there was greater interest among Ottomans in the Turks of Central Asia, especially as the Russian advance continued in the 1870's, first against Khiva and then Khokand. Ali Suavi, still in Paris, tried to stimulate the interest with a little book on Khiva which emphasized the support given it by Ottoman sultans up to Mahmud II.<sup>12</sup> Various accounts of travel in Turkestan were translated into Turkish.<sup>13</sup> Turkish merchants and villagers, even in the Balkans, were reported eager for news of Central Asia and growing more anti-Russian in their sentiment.<sup>14</sup> The khan of Khiva hoped for another Crimean alliance to beat back the Russians. The Porte knew this to be impossible; yet some Ottoman Turks, as the tensions with Russia grew, would have liked to act to free Central Asia.<sup>15</sup> There may have been some nascent feeling of Turkishness or of pan-Turkism in these expressions of interest in Central Asia; if so, it was extremely slight.<sup>16</sup> The main components of public feeling in the 1870's were a political Russophobia and an emphasis on Islam which more and more verged on pan-Islamic sentiment.

Pan-Islamism was, in part, manufactured in the Muslim world outside of the Ottoman Empire. Some Muslim Turks, threatened by Russia and looking to the sultan for aid, hoped he would declare a jihad.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Elliot to Derby, #247, 18 May 1875, FO 78/2383; #331, 5 July 1875, FO 78/2384; #464, 22 August 1875, FO 78/2385. Cf. Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 324-325.

<sup>10</sup> *La Turquie*, 31 July and 4 August 1875.

<sup>11</sup> *Levant Herald*, 19 August and 14 September 1876.

<sup>12</sup> *Hive* (Paris, 1290), republished as *Hive fi muharrem 1290* (Istanbul, 1326).

Cf. İ. H. Danişmend, *Ali Suavi'nin türkçülüğü* (Istanbul, 1942), pp. 27-28, 35-36.

<sup>13</sup> MacGahan (? “Mageman”)’s, as *Hive seyahatnamesi ve tarihî* (Istanbul, 1292); Schuyler’s, as *Musavver Türkistan-tarihî ve seyahatnamesi* (Istanbul, 1294).

<sup>14</sup> W. G. Palgrave, *Essays on Eastern Questions* (London, 1872), p. 61; “Opinions of the Turkish People on Central Asia,” *Diplomatic Review*, 21:2 (April 1873), 134-136. Both sources are Russophobe.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*; Fred Burnaby, *A Ride to Khiva* (New York, 1877), pp. 258-259; *idem*, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor* (London, 1877), II, 51.

<sup>16</sup> Ali Suavi had some such feeling, which Danişmend, in *Ali Suavi'nin türkçülüğü*, tends to exaggerate.

<sup>17</sup> Vambéry, *Travels*, p. 221.

Some Indian Muslims, wistfully longing for their vanished glory, also wanted a jihad, but directed against Britain. Among them were a group of exiles living in Istanbul, on stipends granted by the Ottoman government, who had fairly wide Muslim connections.<sup>18</sup> Englishmen also contributed to building pan-Islam, both in order to combat Russia and also to keep the affection of Indian Muslims by demonstrating support for the Ottoman Muslims and the sultan-caliph.<sup>19</sup> Probably Russians contributed unwittingly to the rise of pan-Islamism; there are grounds for suspecting that pan-Slavism, which came of age in the late 1860's, helped to produce a pan-Islamic reaction. In part, pan-Islamism was manufactured by Tunisian Arabs within the empire who sought the sultan's support against great power threats just as did the Muslims of Central Asia. Hayreddin Paşa, arriving in Istanbul in 1871 to secure the desired ferman, declared that the sultan had a great hold over the popular Muslim mind in Tunis.<sup>20</sup> Then again, a sort of Arab-Turk pan-Islamism was used by the Ottomans as a weapon against separatist Egyptian tendencies. The newspaper *Basiret* in 1871 carried an article promoting the concept of the unity of Islam and suggesting that Turkish troops occupy Egyptian ports while Egyptian troops should be used elsewhere in the empire. The semiofficial *La Turquie* followed the same tack in proclaiming that the Ottoman task was to link the scattered Muslim elements of the empire, Egypt and Tunis included. “Islam is not only a religion, it is a nationality,” declared *La Turquie*. “The Arabs like the Turks recognize the sultan of Constantinople as legitimate sovereign and caliph.”<sup>21</sup> Ottoman arms were soon engaged in the reconquest of the Yemen in an attempt to keep yet another Arab area from going the way of tribal independence or succumbing to Ismail's intrigues.<sup>22</sup> In 1871 also the official

<sup>18</sup> Elliot to Derby, #339, confidential, 12 July 1875, and encl., FO 78/2384.

<sup>19</sup> D. E. Lee, “The Origins of Pan-Islamism,” *American Historical Review*, 47:2 (January 1942), 284-286; H. A. M. Butler-Johnstone, *The Eastern Question* (London, 1875), p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Elliot to Granville, #348, confidential, 27 September 1871, FO 78/2177. The Bey wanted not only protection against France, Italy, and Egypt, but wanted to make his position hereditary in his own family; cf. Elliot to Granville, #323, confidential, 8 September 1871, and #347, confidential, 23 September 1871; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, “Tunus'un 1881'de Fransa tarafından işgaline kadar burada valilik eden Hüseyinî ailesi,” *Belleten*, 18:72 (October 1954), 556-557, 568-569.

<sup>21</sup> Georges Douin, *Histoire du règne du Khédive Ismail* (Rome, 1933-1934), II, 586-587; M. Sabry, *L'empire égyptien sous Ismail* (Paris, 1933), p. 126.

<sup>22</sup> (Anonymous), “A Glimpse of the Yemen Insurrection,” *Chambers's Journal*, 14 October 1871, pp. 641-644, and 21 October 1871, pp. 659-662; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 591.

journal of the Baghdad vilayet, where Midhat was still governor, boldly asserted that the Algerian Arabs in revolt against France were legitimate subjects of the Porte.<sup>23</sup>

In response to these various events and pressures the tendency toward pan-Islamic sentiment grew in Istanbul. The irrepressible *Basiret* made itself the spokesman for the Muslim world. It was the *Basiret* press which published the translated accounts of travel in Turkestan. The newspaper looked beyond the Arab and Turk worlds, calling in 1873 for a campaign against China to aid the Panthais and for a Muslim crusade against Europe to help the Algerians and the Muslims of India.<sup>24</sup> *Basiret's* most extravagant pan-Islamic excursion concerned the Dutch East Indies. The sultan of Atchin, fighting the Dutch in Sumatra, appealed to Abdülaziz as his suzerain for aid. The Porte was embarrassed by the impossible request, but the Ottoman sultan as head of the Muslim religion, said the foreign minister, could not refuse to receive the emissary from Sumatra. *Basiret* then declared with joy in July 1873 that the Porte would send eight warships against the Netherlands. Upon this, *Basiret* was suspended for a time, and the matter settled by negotiation between the Dutch and the Turks, probably at the insistence of European diplomats and especially of Ignatyev, who feared the precedent of armed aid to non-Ottoman Muslims.<sup>25</sup> *Basiret* represented a fairly large segment of Turkish opinion. It was reputed the most widely read Istanbul paper.<sup>26</sup> Its tendencies accorded with the drive against the capitulations which Âli had initiated, with the emphasis on the cultural bonds of Islam characteristic of the New Ottomans, and with the natural inclination of Turks to think of their sultan as the ruler of the world, superior to other rulers, even non-Muslim. And Abdülaziz seems to have indulged in some dreams of restoring the glory of the caliphate.<sup>27</sup> A pamphlet entitled *The Union of Islam*, written by a functionary of the mixed

<sup>23</sup> Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882-1884), II, 117 and n.1.

<sup>24</sup> A. D. Mordtmann, *Stambul und das moderne Türkenthum* (Leipzig, 1877-1878), I, 241-242.

<sup>25</sup> Elliot to Granville, #145, 8 May 1873, and #160, 23 May 1873, FO 78/2267; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 240-241; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, IV, 226.

<sup>26</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 242.

<sup>27</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 170, and IV, 225, 227; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 240; Karl Braun-Wiesbaden, *Eine türkische Reise* (Stuttgart, 1876), II, 44-45; Murad Efendi [Franz von Werner], *Türkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, 1877), I, 95;

maritime commercial court in Istanbul, enjoyed a considerable success and was translated into Arabic. Esad Efendi, its author, called on pilgrims to come to Mecca to unite and spread Islam everywhere.<sup>28</sup>

Pan-Islamism, of course, amounted to nothing as a political movement. The Muslims of the world did not unite against Russia, Britain, France, China, and the Netherlands. The Ottoman Empire did not aid Muslims outside its borders, nor did they, in turn, aid the Ottoman Turks. This phase of pan-Islamism was a futile search for military aid and a sentimental attachment to the concept of the caliphate. But within the Ottoman Empire the pan-Islamic movement did have some concrete results. It helped to produce a sort of Islamic patriotism, an antiwestern rigidity, which was revealed in the crisis of 1876-1877. When the newspaper *Sabah* during that crisis warned Europe of attack by 300,000,000 Muslims, this was an empty threat; but Ottoman diplomacy at the same time was more unyielding than it had previously been, supported as it was by this kind of sentiment.<sup>29</sup> The more immediate practical effect of the pan-Islamic movement was to reinforce after Âli's death the slowdown of the secularizing, westernizing reform program. *Basiret* was also the organ for expressing this kind of anti-Europeanism.<sup>30</sup>

The anti-Europeanism of the 1870's became almost tangible. "Hostility to foreigners, and jealousy of their presence and operations of every description, commercial, educational, and religious, are on the evident increase," wrote in early 1874 an American who had lived in Syria since the Hatt-ı Hümayun.<sup>31</sup> The hostility was observable in many little ways—in the progressive Turkification of Galatasaray, in the battle of students in the military medical school against Pera Levantines over whether a French chanteuse should sing a song about the "joli Turque" instead of the "Marseillaise," in the actions of a mob that wrecked a modernized school that gave "gâvur" lessons.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, II, 129-130. Esad was also an editor of *Basiret*. Cf. chapter X below, n.40.

<sup>29</sup> On *Sabah*: *ibid.*, I, 258. Cf. George Campbell, *A Handy Book on the Eastern Question* (London, 1876), p. 41.

<sup>30</sup> V. Hoskier, *Et Besøg i Grækenland, Ægypten og Tyrkiet* (Copenhagen, 1879), p. 174.

<sup>31</sup> Henry Harris Jessup to Rev. F. F. Ellinwood, 12 February 1874, quoted in Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), II, 438.

<sup>32</sup> *Levant Herald*, 18 January 1873; Osman Şevki Uludağ, "Tanzimat ve hekimlik," *Tanzimat*, I (Istanbul, 1940), 975 and n.2; Osman Ergin, *Türkiye maarif tarihi* (Istanbul, 1939-1943), II, 395-397.

The government sponsored in 1873 a picture book of costumes of the Turkish people wherein were found sentiments not current before 1870 in official Tanzimat circles. The "Europeanizer," the "progressive," was derided, while the "bourgeois Muslim of the old school" was praised, who had "remained in spite of, in opposition to, and against all, faithful to the old usages and national customs."<sup>33</sup> In Anatolia the precepts of Islam seemed to be more rigorously observed than heretofore.<sup>34</sup> Foreign missionaries felt the change in atmosphere. Whereas in 1864 a temporary closing of the American mission bookstore was revealed to be a political maneuver by Âli to keep the respect of conservatives, a prohibition in 1874 of the sale of Christian scriptures in Turkish, if printed in Arabic characters, was motivated by a deeper antforeign feeling. The government also placed new obstacles in the way of converting Muslims to Christianity.<sup>35</sup> By 1876 *Basiret*, as might be expected, was attacking mission schools run by Americans, British, and Germans as founts of the foreign poison of Protestant proselytism, while *Hakikat (Truth)*, the journal of the ministry of war in Istanbul, generally blamed European poison for the bad conditions in the empire.<sup>36</sup>

In view of this climate of feeling in the 1870's, it was a disaster for the progress of Ottoman reform that there was no statesman of the calibre of Âli to take charge. The ensuing administrative chaos was, in part, caused simply by the lack of an heir to Âli. In part, it was calculated policy by Mehmed Nedim. In part, it came from Abdülaziz, who now embarked on a period of personal rule such as the empire had not seen since the death of Mahmud II. The Janissary and *derebeyi* counterweights existed no more. The Porte's bureaucracy was partially paralyzed by the constant shifting of officials. In this the sultan seems to have played a large part. His character, his interests, and his idiosyncracies further added to the chaos.



<sup>33</sup> Hamdy Bey, *Les costumes populaires de la Turquie en 1873* (Constantinople, 1873), plates I and II, and pp. 13-14.

<sup>34</sup> Palgrave, *Essays*, pp. 111-120, 160.

<sup>35</sup> Brown to Seward, #8, 23 July 1864, and Morris to Seward, private, 8 September 1864, USNA, Turkey 18; Greene to Clark, 11 August 1874, ABCFM, vol. 354, #21, and "Memorandum in regard to Religious Toleration in Turkey," 14 November 1874, ABCFM, vol. 352, #73; Leland J. Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey* (Philadelphia, 1932), p. 228; Charles T. Riggs, "The Turkish Translations of the Bible," *Moslem World*, 30:3 (July 1940), 245.

<sup>36</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 154, and II, 60-62.

When Âli died, Sultan Abdülaziz is reported to have said that he was at last a free man.<sup>37</sup> This was in large measure true. Abdülaziz had, of course, still to depend on ministers and bureaucrats, but they could no longer control him without an Âli. Instead, they truckled to him in their competition for high office. The center of gravity had shifted from the Porte to the Palace. To Halil Şerif, Abdülaziz expressed admiration for the absolutism of the tsar, and said he had learned from this that there should be no first minister, but that each minister should be responsible to the sultan and work with him.<sup>38</sup> The sultan himself seems to have been responsible for a good deal of office-shifting, and to have fired without severance pay "many men whose beards had grown gray from thirty-five to forty years service to the state."<sup>39</sup> It is unclear whether this was pure caprice, or a means of preventing any officials from becoming entrenched in influential positions, or a search for those who would satisfy his whims most fully, or a search for able men. It is likely, however, that the sultan's actions were, in part, simply reaction to Âli's long period of control, and partly a result of his increasing idiosyncracies, which seemed to border on megalomania.

The least of his idiosyncracies was a craze for spending money on warships, on his palaces and harem and household employees, on his collections of small horses and other animals, on music boxes, and on crystal windows for his yacht.<sup>40</sup> This, of course, opened up the way for favor-seeking officials to deplete the treasury to satisfy Abdülaziz, and for outsiders like the khedive Ismail to curry favor with gifts. Another *idée fixe* was to change the succession in favor of his son Yusuf Izzeddin, who when Âli died was an ill-educated boy of almost fourteen.<sup>41</sup> Rumors that such a change was imminent had been current

<sup>37</sup> Henry Elliot, "The Death of Abdul Aziz and of Turkish Reform," *Nineteenth Century*, 23 (1888), 277; İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzamlar* (Istanbul, 1940-1953), p. 28; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 146.

<sup>38</sup> Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 707. Cf. Horace Rumbold, *Recollections of a Diplomatist* (London, 1902), II, 326; *Levant Herald*, 26 February 1873.

<sup>39</sup> Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb* (Istanbul, 1294-1295), I, 202; Hoskier, *Besøg*, p. 150.

<sup>40</sup> Ali Haydar Midhat, *Midhat-Pacha. Sa vie, son oeuvre* (Paris, 1908), pp. 28-30, n.1; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 254-255; Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal* (Istanbul, 1944-1956), I, 102 and n.6,7; Hajo Holborn, ed., *Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz* (Berlin, 1925), I, 239.

<sup>41</sup> A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), pp. 12-13; Hoskier, *Besøg*, p. 149.

in the years 1865 to 1868. In the latter year the heir-apparent, Abdülaziz's nephew Murad, was so alarmed that he consulted Ignatyev on what he should do, and considered flight.<sup>42</sup> The question then lay dormant, but Abdülaziz did not abandon his idea, which was brought up again after Âli's death.<sup>43</sup>

Other idiosyncracies were such as to cast doubt on Abdülaziz's mental balance and emotional stability. He became more domineering in his personal conduct, demanding that ministers prostrate themselves to him and kiss his son's feet. He wanted no one but himself to be called Aziz; consequently officials who bore that name had to be given some other in documents laid before the sultan. He never forgave Midhat for wearing spectacles in his presence without his permission. It was generally believed, and was quite possibly true, that Abdülaziz had bestowed a high decoration on a victorious fighting cock and had exiled a losing cock for one month. This was hardly the same man who had ascended the throne in 1861. He still neither smoked nor indulged in intoxicants, but both his physical and mental health seemed to be deteriorating. Rumors to this effect had been current since 1862. Probably the early ones can be discounted, but by the 1870's Abdülaziz had such eccentricities that the rumors increased, and the conduct of state affairs suffered.<sup>44</sup>

With the sultan in such condition, it was doubly unfortunate that he chose Mahmud Nedim Paşa to be Âli's successor as grand vezir. Though during the next five years, until his deposition, Abdülaziz often switched the tenants of the post, Mahmud Nedim seems to have been his favorite, and held the office twice for a longer period than any of his rivals: for eleven months after September 8, 1871, and for more than eight months in 1875-1876. The choice of Mahmud Nedim

<sup>42</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1914, III, 98-99.

<sup>43</sup> See below, p. 283.

<sup>44</sup> Hoskier, *Besøg*, p. 150; Amand von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Serail und Hohe Pforte* (Vienna, 1879), pp. 111-126; Harold Temperley, "British Policy Towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, IV (1933), 167-169; Sommerville Story, ed., *Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London, 1920), pp. 94-95; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 200, n.; Josef Koetschet, *Osman Pascha, der letzte grosse Wesier Bosniens* (Sarajevo, 1909), pp. 61-62; Raschdau, "Aus dem politischen Nachlass des Unterstaatssekretärs Dr. Busch," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 137 (1908), 383-385; Kuntay, *Namik Kemal*, I, 98-102; Morris to Seward, #33, 6 November 1862, USNA, Turkey 17; Raschdau, ed., "Diplomatenleben am Bosphorus," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 138 (1909), 213-214; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı suûnat* (İzmir, 1328), p. 86. Cf. aspersions on the sultan's sanity in *Inkılâb*, April 1870, quoted in *Tanzimat*, I, 852.

seems to have been the sultan's own, and may be due to the fact that as navy minister at the end of Âli's regime Mahmud Nedim had pleased the sultan by catering to his interest in warships. Mahmud Nedim had had a reasonably distinguished public career, partly in posts as high as undersecretary or acting minister of foreign affairs, or deputy grand vezir. Most of his recent experience, however, had been as provincial governor. He had been the candidate of some of the New Ottomans to replace Âli, but when he actually got the job they became disgusted with him. Almost none of his contemporaries in high office thought well of him. One suspects that there must be more good to say of him than has been said. He had started in political life as Resid's disciple. He did have some ability, and was at times simply the victim of circumstances. Yet, aside from a general distrust of Âli's secularizing policies, it is hard to say that Mahmud Nedim had political principles other than self-advancement. Even before the Crimean War he had been characterized as clever, hypocrite, sycophant, flatterer, untrustworthy.<sup>45</sup> He was undoubtedly venal. His appeal to Abdülaziz, aside from his ability, must have been based on flattery, on playing up the sultan's role in public affairs, and on gratifying the sultan's financial and other whims. Abdülaziz, in fact, remarked that Mahmud Nedim was the first minister he had had who did what he, the sultan, wanted.<sup>46</sup> One way to Abdülaziz's favor in this period was to criticize Âli, and this Mahmud Nedim was quite willing to do. That Mahmud Nedim had never been outside the empire and knew no European language evidently did not bother the sultan.<sup>47</sup>

Mahmud Nedim's grand vezirate was characterized from its start by an indiscriminate firing and shifting of officials. Whether he initiated the policy, or whether he fell in with Abdülaziz's desires on this score, is unimportant, for it seemed to serve the interests of both. Mahmud Nedim declared that the motives were economy and the removal from office of grafters who had abused Âli's confidence. The grand vezir did, in fact, go so far as to try to divide the official year into nine months of forty days each, and so cut three months' pay

<sup>45</sup> Cevdet, *Texâkir*, pp. 16-17, 26.

<sup>46</sup> Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 631.

<sup>47</sup> On Mahmud Nedim generally: İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, pp. 259-273; *La Turquie*, 9 September 1871; *Levant Times and Shipping Gazette*, 9 September 1871; Elliot to Granville, #320, 7 September 1871, and #329, 11 September 1871, FO 78/2177; Hoskier, *Besøg*, p. 155; Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," pp. 388-389; Werner, *Türkische Skizzen*, II, 138-140.



from the salary of each official. But the real motives seemed to be to remove from office supporters of Âli's policies, and potential rivals, and to keep any single official thereafter from becoming prominent. In the fall of 1871 Mahmud Nedim exiled the former war minister, Hüseyin Avni, the former justice minister, Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, the former police minister, Hüsnî, and others, all quite summarily. He thereby made for himself some important enemies. Of more immediate concern, the administration suffered badly. Whatever economies were effected only released funds for Abdülaziz's palace expenditures and new ironclads. Public order decreased as dismissed gendarmes took to brigandage themselves. Meanwhile government business bogged down. Istanbul was like a madhouse, said one official, as ministers and valis flew about like rubber balls.<sup>48</sup> "Your officials have gone on promenade," said Franz Joseph to a recalled ambassador. "They are in ceaseless rotation."<sup>49</sup> It was a senseless administrative chaos. Presumably the influence of the Palace, especially of the harem and the *valide sultan* Pertevniyal, increased the chaos and the chances for gaining office through bribery.<sup>50</sup>

The positive results of Mahmud Nedim's grand vezirate, if such they can be called, were a few steps taken ostensibly to improve government, but which, in fact, undid some of the reform of the previous decade. On the day after his accession to power the semiofficial *La Turquie* carried a rather cynical caricature of the Âli-Fuad period: "Heretofore there was talk of reform, improvement, and progress only when the state had a loan in view, only to forget all these beautiful intentions immediately the loan was assured."<sup>51</sup> The six sections of the Council of State were reduced to three. Special agents (*journalist's*) were appointed to check on government officials. But the grand vezir's speech, in which he reported these achievements of nine

<sup>48</sup> Koetschet, *Osman Pascha*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>49</sup> Mehmed Memduh, *Mîrât-ı şûânât*, p. 45.

<sup>50</sup> Brown to Fish, #26, 21 October 1871, USNA, Turkey 23; Elliot to Granville, #361, 6 October 1871, and #381, 24 October 1871, FO 78/2177; Hoskier, *Besög*, pp. 155-156; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mîrât-ı hakikat* (Istanbul, 1326-1327), I, 35-36; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri* (Istanbul, 1339), pp. 187-188; İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, pp. 274-275; Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdattan hakimiyeti milliyeye* (Istanbul, 1924), II, 148-150; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 147; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 91-96, 105; Elliot to Granville, #169, 5 September 1872, FO 78/2219; Elliot, "Death of Abdul Aziz," pp. 277-278; Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Serail*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>51</sup> *La Turquie*, 8 September 1871, quoted in Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 92.

months in office, was largely devoted to praise of the sultan.<sup>52</sup> The vilayet system was virtually abandoned by Mahmud Nedim, who began to organize smaller provinces and restricted the communication of resolutions by the vilayet general assemblies to the Porte.<sup>53</sup> Probably he intended to hold a tighter rein on valis, as his argument of 1872 with Midhat, then Baghdad governor, indicates. Mahmud Nedim also fell in with Abdülaziz's desire to change the succession to the throne. In the spring of 1872 young Yusuf İzzeddin, now almost fifteen, was appointed commander of the first army corps, stationed at Istanbul. It was generally believed that this was to pave the way for announcing the succession change in June. Probably because of lack of popular enthusiasm, and because of protests by the British, the announcement was never made.<sup>54</sup>

Mahmud Nedim also reversed the trend of the previous decade in another way. Whereas Âli and Fuad had sought advice and support principally from the British and French ambassadors, Mahmud Nedim was closer to Ignatyev than to any other diplomat. The grand vezir came to be called "Nedimoff" by the populace, and the Russian ambassador was sometimes referred to as "Sultan Ignatyev." Whether money passed between them was unimportant, for the two could cooperate anyway on the basis of their opposition to Âli's policies. Nothing in Ignatyev's published memoirs indicates that Mahmud Nedim was his dupe, but obviously the latter looked to Ignatyev for support. It is significant that Ignatyev's picture of Mahmud Nedim is much more favorable than the usual: a man of intelligence, finesse, and hard work, esteemed by conservatives. But Ignatyev was, of course, opposed to the previous policies of Âli not only for their western orientation, but because they strengthened the Ottoman Empire. After 1871 he was pleased to see the policies of Abdülaziz and Mahmud Nedim weaken the empire and to have his own influence rise. He was suspected of encouraging the talk of changing the order of succession. He later boasted of his good relations with the sultan in

<sup>52</sup> Text in *Levant Times and Shipping Gazette*, 17 May 1872.

<sup>53</sup> Elliot to Granville, #138, 13 August 1872, FO 78/2218; George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905-1906), I, 40, n.13; İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, p. 274.

<sup>54</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 111-113; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 May 1872; Rumbold, *Recollections*, II, 324-326; Benoît Brunswik, *La succession au trône de la Turquie* (Paris, 1872); Ahmed Saib, *Vaka-i Sultan Abdülaziz* (Cairo, 1320), pp. 97-102; Elliot to Granville, #94, confidential, 18 July 1872, and #97, confidential, 19 July 1872, FO 78/2218.

this period, while at the same time he was preparing Balkan Christians, Kurds, and Armenians as instruments of tsarist policy, to revolt when it suited Russia.<sup>55</sup>

In addition to Ignatyev, Ismail Paşa of Egypt also obtained greater influence in İstanbul during Mahmud Nedim's grand vezirate. Ismail was constantly on guard lest his aspirations to greater independence be thwarted and his past gains taken away by the Porte. He wanted also to make sure that neither Mustafa Fazıl nor Halim regained the right of succession to the Egyptian throne. While evidently he had been able to buy off Halim, he was much troubled that Mustafa Fazıl from the summer of 1869 on had been included in the Ottoman administration—first as minister without portfolio, then as finance minister—and was still in the fall of 1871, after Âli's death, minister of justice. Ismail was also afraid of the influence of Halil Şerif at the Porte. In addition, Ismail wanted to set up a system of courts divorced from those of the empire, to maintain a strong armament, and to get a new ferman granting him power to appoint a regency for the contingency of his death while his son was yet a minor. To pursue these ends, Ismail maintained in İstanbul, in addition to his regular *kapı kâhyanı*, or representative, a special agent, one Abraham Bey. Abraham was an astute Armenian, brother-in-law of the Armenian Nubar Paşa, Ismail's leading statesman. A former Porte official who knew how to move circumspectly among the influential in the capital, Abraham had arguments that were reinforced by khedivial largesse as un-failing as the widow's cruse of oil. In the judgment of Ismail Kemal, Midhat's devoted supporter, Abraham was "the most influential man at the palace."<sup>56</sup> From 1871 to 1873 his gifts to Abdülaziz were fantastic: geese and pheasants in fine cages, the "resplendent lophophore, the crowned goura, the barnacle goose," one hundred dogs, sixty American white mignon ducks, rams and white Tuscan cows, four hundred sheep, three hundred thousand Ottoman bonds, and one million Ottoman bonds, among other things.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 145-148, and IV, 229-230; Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," pp. 389ff.; Alexander Onou, "The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev," *Slavonic Review*, X (1931-1932), 389; Emmerich von Huszar, "Die Memoiren des Grafen N. P. Ignatew," *Oesterreichische Rundschau*, 41 (1914), 174; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 764.

<sup>56</sup> Story, *Ismail Kemal*, p. 94.

<sup>57</sup> Alfred de Caston, *Musulmans et chrétiens: la Turquie en 1873* (Constantinople, 1874), II, 652-654; Pierre Crabitès, *Ismail the Malignant Khedive* (London, 1933), pp. 155-206; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 309ff., 548, 603, 625, 628, 630-635, 723.

Ismail also maintained a good relationship with Mahmud Nedim, well salted with bribes. While Mahmud Nedim was still navy minister, he had been persuaded to send away from İstanbul an enemy of Ismail's, Hürşid Paşa, formerly Ismail's secret police chief, who had defected to the Porte. When Mahmud Nedim became grand vezir, he was paid liberally by Ismail to make sure that Halil Şerif, then ambassador at Vienna, was not appointed foreign minister, as seemed likely at the time. Mustafa Fazıl was, however, retained as minister of justice until January 1872, perhaps simply to attract larger sums from Ismail. To grease the ways for Ismail's new mixed court system, a modification of the capitulations in Egypt, Abraham Bey offered Mahmud Nedim sixty thousand pounds, and Abdülaziz one hundred and fifty thousand. Even Ignatyev accepted twenty thousand pounds from Abraham in return for a letter favorable to Egyptian judiciary reform. The khedive was painfully surprised when the American minister, George Boker, who voluntarily supported his scheme, refused a large sum of money and diamonds for his wife. Other high Ottoman officials were touched by Ismail's generosity. This sort of corruption seems to have been much more widespread under Mahmud Nedim than it had been under Âli, who had better kept Ismail in his place.<sup>58</sup>

By August of 1872, when his grand vezirate was suddenly ended, Mahmud Nedim had done nothing to strengthen the empire. Nor, in fact, had he done anything to strengthen himself except in the regard of Abdülaziz, Ignatyev, and Ismail. Mahmud Nedim, in his self-seeking, developed an extraordinary faculty for making enemies. The New Ottomans, some of whom had once favored him, were amnestied and began to return from exile during his vezirate. They were soon disillusioned by what they found. Namık Kemal in his new paper *İbret* criticized Mahmud Nedim's rapid shifting of officials, and began to think better of Âli.<sup>59</sup> Ziya Bey, in a dramatic gesture,

<sup>58</sup> Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 325-328, 552-557, 610, 618, 631; Crabitès, *Ismail*, 194, 199-207, 220-223; Edward S. Bradley, *George Henry Boker, Poet and Patriot* (Philadelphia, 1927), 288-289. Boker did accept a trip up the Nile. Cf. Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 111-112.

<sup>59</sup> Elliot to Granville, #392, 31 October 1871, FO 78/2177; *İbret*, #20, 30 September 1872, and #97, 20 January 1873, in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, I, 231, 152; *İbret*, #46, 5 November 1872, in İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," *Tanzimat*, I, 784-785.

went to Āli's grave to ask forgiveness.<sup>60</sup> Not only the New Ottomans, but all sorts of others became Mahmud Nedim's opponents as the result of his eleven months in office. There were those whom he had summarily dismissed or whose pay he had reduced, including many minor officials and some influential leaders like Hüseyin Avni. There were those who resented his closeness to Ignatyev, especially now that Muslim sentiment was rising in a Russophobe tide. There were others who resented his ties to Ismail, for the fact of bribery if not the amount involved was known. And there were many who disapproved of Mahmud Nedim's catering to the whims and expenditures of Abdülaziz. Those who believed the rumors current about the sultan's mental health could say, in addition, that Mahmud Nedim was giving in to the whims of a madman, instead of opposing them. All this was to have its effect, particularly when Mahmud Nedim next held the grand vizirate in 1875-1876.

The grand vizir had also done a good deal to damage the reputation of the sultan himself, by making a great parade of attributing all authority to Abdülaziz. Thus, whereas the populace heretofore had generally been disposed to blame ministers for bad conditions, leaving the sultan above direct reproach, now the sultan's name had been brought down to the level of market place criticism. "The shake thus given to the system . . . will be far more difficult effectually to remedy . . . than all the other evils" caused by Mahmud Nedim, the British ambassador astutely reported.<sup>61</sup> This also would have its repercussions in 1876, when a new crisis arose. Further, the talk of succession change which Mahmud Nedim encouraged fostered the identification of Abdülaziz and his son Yusuf İzzeddin with Mahmud Nedim's chaotic administration. The logical result was that the hopes of would-be reformers were pinned on Murad more strongly than ever.

Mahmud Nedim's opponents were by no means all of one cast. They included disparate elements among officialdom, the military, the journalists, and the general populace. It was possible that they might in the future coalesce, and Mahmud Nedim by his actions had helped to create a public opinion which could conceivably bring this about. But before this could come to pass, the initiative was seized by Midhat Paşa, governor of the Baghdad vilayet.



<sup>60</sup> Inal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, p. 41.

<sup>61</sup> Elliot to Granville, #269, 25 November 1872, FO 78/2220.

Midhat Paşa had resigned his governorship in consequence of disputes with Mahmud Nedim, and in May 1872 started back by way of Syria to İstanbul. His reputation as an able administrator was well established, and many in the capital pinned their hopes on him to get rid of the grand vezir. Once arrived, Midhat was visited by various sacked officials, who recounted the horrors of Mahmud Nedim's administration. The latter was obviously worried over Midhat's presence in the capital. On July 29 Midhat's appointment as governor of the Edirne vilayet was announced, evidently a move by Mahmud Nedim without consultation with Abdülaziz to get rid of Midhat. But Midhat obtained an audience with Abdülaziz, and seems to have spoken so forcefully that the sultan in the late evening of July 30 summoned Mahmud Nedim to relinquish the seals of office and appointed Midhat in his stead.<sup>62</sup> The news of the change was greeted by unprecedented public demonstrations of joy on July 31 before the Porte and the palace. Midhat's entry at the Porte was a triumphal procession, while hostile officials gathered in front of Mahmud Nedim's house to hoot him.<sup>63</sup> Shortly, even Abdülaziz seems to have become disillusioned with Mahmud Nedim, referring to him as jealous, duplicit, and corrupt.<sup>64</sup>

The high hopes placed in Midhat were soon deceived, for Midhat was no wizard and had to start simply by trying to remedy some of the mistakes of Mahmud Nedim. His own experience and character, moreover, did not fit him in the best possible manner for the job of grand vezir. During the previous decade and more Midhat had been a provincial governor, except for one year as president of the Council of State in İstanbul. With his energy and efficiency there went a

<sup>62</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Paşa, hayat-ı siyâsiyesi*, vol. 1, *Tabsira-i ibret* (İstanbul, 1325), 133-134; Inal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, pp. 276-277, 324-328; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûânât*, pp. 45-46; *Levant Times and Shipping Gazette*, 29 and 31 July 1872; Elliot to Granville, #118, 31 July 1872, FO 78/2218. The unexpectedly sudden change in grand vezirs gave rise to many stories, some probably in part true: that Hüseyin Avni caused the change by means of a harem girl pleasing to the sultan; that Mahmud Nedim crossed some important palace officials; that he proposed making Ismail governor of the Yemen too; that he doused the sultan with water from a toy fire engine! Cf. Douin, *Khédiwe Ismail*, II, 647-650; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûânât*, pp. 45-46; Elliot to Granville, #154, confidential, 21 August 1872, FO 78/2218; Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), I, 160-161.

<sup>63</sup> *Levant Times and Shipping Gazette*, 1 August 1872; Koetschet, *Osman Pascha*, pp. 60-61; *Aus dem Leben König Karls von Rumänien* (Stuttgart, 1894-1900), II, 276; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 118; Farley, *Turks and Christians*, p. 30.

<sup>64</sup> Elliot to Granville, #246, confidential, 3 November 1872, FO 78/2220.

brusqueness, even a tactlessness, which served him ill in his relations with Abdülaziz and with others in the capital.<sup>65</sup> Sometimes he was more of a theorist, well ahead of his times, than a practical statesman.<sup>66</sup> He also had powerful opponents. The Russian ambassador Ignatyev had tried in vain to prevent Midhat from ever reaching the capital, by urging Mahmud Nedim to appoint him vali of Aleppo.<sup>67</sup> Thereafter Ignatyev worked constantly for Midhat's fall, and gave himself most of the credit for thwarting the reformer, who was notably hostile to Russia. The khedive Ismail also, finding that Midhat was unamenable to his intrigues and opposed his direct dealings with the sultan, encouraged Abdülaziz with a gift of one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds to dismiss Midhat.<sup>68</sup> As a result, Midhat's grand vezirate was destined to last only eighty days.

Despite the difficulties inherent in his position, Midhat started out boldly. He recalled from exile those whom Mahmud Nedim had sent away. He succeeded in getting Halil Şerif as his foreign minister when Cemil Paşa, son of the great Reşid, died after only one month in office. He opposed the granting of new concessions to the khedive. He initiated measures to extend education in the provinces, to regularize the collection of the tithe, to advance railroad construction, to get a telegraph line built to the Hijaz, to systematize interdepartmental correspondence and filing methods in the government, to enforce conversion of weights and measures to the metric system. He raised the salaries of lower officials and cut those of the higher, including his own. He restored the cuts made by Mahmud Nedim in the *gendarmérie*, so that brigandage was lessened. Midhat also investigated the finances of Mahmud Nedim's period, and accused him of graft, inaugurating a campaign against him which went too far for the stomach of many other officials and implicated the Palace as well. This was certainly part of the reason for Midhat's undoing. In short, Midhat acted at the Porte as he had as vali—with many vigorous starts, a campaign against corruption, and a disregard for the politics of office-holding.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, p. 204; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şuânat*, p. 56.

<sup>66</sup> Holborn, *Radowitz*, p. 240.

<sup>67</sup> Elliot to Granville, #162, confidential, 30 August 1872, FO 78/2218.

<sup>68</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 148-150; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 657-658, 667-672; Angelo Sammarco, *Histoire de l'Égypte moderne*, III (Cairo, 1937), 217-219.

<sup>69</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabssra-i ibret*, pp. 134-147; *idem*, *The Life of Midhat Pasha*

Two projects of more far-reaching significance began to occupy Midhat during his grand vezirate—a constitutional plan and a plan for federal organization of the empire. Neither came to a head during his short tenure of office, but each had the support of Halil Şerif, who was continued in the foreign ministry by the sultan for five months after Midhat fell. Halil Şerif probably contributed considerably to each project, for he knew Europe far better than Midhat, had just come from the ambassadorship at Vienna, and had, at least since his memorandum of 1867, had in mind the project of a constitution. Just after becoming minister for foreign affairs, Halil Şerif married Mustafa Fazıl's beautiful and quite Europeanized daughter Nazlı. The marriage seemed to strengthen the cooperation among Halil Şerif, Mustafa Fazıl, and Midhat, all of whom entertained constitutional ideas. Because the western Europeans thought highly of Halil Şerif, and because Abdülaziz knew he would help to attract new loans, the efforts of Ignatyev and Ismail to get rid of him were not at once successful.<sup>70</sup> Probably, therefore, the views that Halil Şerif expressed up to March 11, 1873, when he was dropped, can be taken as representing Midhat's also.

The plan for a constitution seems to have remained in the stage of informal discussion of the general concept, and is known chiefly through the revelations, probably exaggerated, of those who opposed it and who sought to convince Abdülaziz that Midhat was dangerous. Exactly what Midhat's ideas on constitution were in 1872 it is impossible to say. He had contact with Odian and Dr. Servichen and other Armenians who are said to have plied him with constitutional argu-

(London, 1903), pp. 64-66; Hoskier, *Besög*, p. 160; Mahmud Celaledin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 37-38; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 672; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 148-150; Elliot to Granville, #169, 5 September 1872, FO 78/2219; İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, pp. 278-281; Ali Ölmezoğlu, "Midhat Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, fasc. 82, pp. 274-275; *Levant Times and Shipping Gazette*, 1 August to 19 October 1872.

<sup>70</sup> Elliot to Granville, #201, confidential, 25 September 1872, FO 78/2219, and #282, confidential, 9 December 1872, FO 78/2220; Hoskier, *Besög*, pp. 178-180; Holborn, *Radowitz*, I, 240; İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, p. 137; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 667-709. On Ignatyev's opposition to Halil Şerif and Midhat see further G. Giacometti, *Russia's Work in Turkey: a Revelation*, trans. by E. Whitaker (London, 1877), letters 1-10. These documents, published by the Turks at İstanbul in French and Turkish in 1877, purport to be authentic Russian correspondence, the first ten being by Ignatyev. Their authenticity is questionable, but the verisimilitude is remarkable. All deal with 1871-1873. On authenticity see W. L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments* (New York, 1931), p. 68 and n.2; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 130, n.4, 244, 681.

ments during weekly dinners at Odian's house.<sup>71</sup> The khedive Ismail, a month and more after Midhat was out of office, wrote that Midhat, Halil Şerif, and Mustafa Fazıl were in league to take the government out of Abdülaziz's hands, that they were seeking a constitution, and advised the sultan to grant one himself if he wanted it, but not to submit to such pressures.<sup>72</sup> Ignatyev, similarly but more specifically, accused the same three men of seeking power with a plan for an independent and so-called constitutional ministry and a simulation of national representation. He gave himself considerable credit for killing this plan and for warning Abdülaziz that Midhat was nothing but a disguised revolutionary who meant to limit the sovereign rights.<sup>73</sup> Whatever form the constitutional idea had assumed in Midhat's mind by 1872, the dream of constitutional government haunted him thereafter, and he came back to it with other colleagues the next year.

The plan for a federalized empire reached a more advanced stage before it disappeared from the scene. Its essence was to tie the Roumanian principalities and Serbia to the Ottoman Empire in the same way as Bavaria and Württemberg were tied to the newly created German Empire. Evidently conceived during Midhat's grand vezirate, the plan was broached by Halil Şerif only after Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi had replaced Midhat. As Halil Şerif explained it, the scheme intended "that these Dependencies should be raised nearly to the position of those German states which enjoy their independence subject to the condition of their military resources being at the disposal of the Emperor."<sup>74</sup> The scheme enjoyed British and Austrian support, but naturally was resisted by Ignatyev, who used all his influence against it. According to his own report he succeeded in convincing Mehmed Rüşdi that it was dangerous; the grand vezir then said Midhat was the author of the project. The Germans also disapproved it. To the Serbs and Roumanians the plan, of course, meant lowering rather than raising their status. Plans of federal organization, which were fairly widespread at the time, they would consider only if the plans were anti-Turkish. Halil Şerif's plan meant to them political as well as military subjection, and it is questionable whether the foreign minister really thought he could persuade the Serbs and

<sup>71</sup> Mikael Kazmararian, ed., *Krikor Odian* (Constantinople, 1910), I, xiv.

<sup>72</sup> Douin, *Khedive Ismail*, II, 675-677, 693-694.

<sup>73</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 149-153.

<sup>74</sup> Elliot to Granville, #259, confidential, 13 November 1872, FO 78/2220.

Roumanians to accept it, even though he offered them autonomy in matters of coinage and decorations and freedom from the capitulations. After December of 1872 no more was heard of it.<sup>75</sup>

Midhat Paşa had by then been out of office for two months. He had not really given himself a good chance to survive as grand vezir. From the outset he had opposed the influence of the palace functionaries, had said that the sultan alone was master, and had also opposed the sultan himself on certain issues as well as implicating him in financial scandal. This was all in decided contrast to the complaisance of Mahmud Nedim. Further, by his blunt manner Midhat had tried to emphasize the supremacy of the Porte, going so far as to ride on horseback into the palace grounds—something that was never done. Ali Paşa would have agreed with the motive, but never with the methods. In addition, Midhat was opposed by Mahmud Nedim, whose influence continued through palace partisans, as well as by Ignatyev and Ismail. The major cause of his dismissal seems to have been argument with the Palace over new privileges granted Ismail in return for bribes—in particular, the right for Egypt to contract foreign loans. The final *hat* on this point was issued behind Midhat's back; he is said to have seen a copy only after his fall from office. Midhat's opposition to Ismail was obstinate. By his son's account, Midhat angrily returned fifty thousand gold pounds which had been delivered by Ismail's agents to his house when he was absent. On October 18, 1872, the sultan called in Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi Paşa to replace Midhat. Ignatyev congratulated Abdülaziz on getting rid of Midhat. The tributary Balkan states rejoiced that Midhat, "of the unsettled and restless school" of Halil Şerif, was gone.<sup>76</sup>



With the fall of Midhat the Ottoman Empire entered anew on a period of confusion in which the caprice of the sultan, the intrigue of Ismail, the pan-Slavism of Ignatyev, and the deterioration of the

<sup>75</sup> Temperley, "British Policy Towards . . . Turkey," p. 179; "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 170-172; Nicholas Iorga, ed., *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine sous le roi Charles Ier (1866-1880)* (Paris, 1923), pp. 95-99.

<sup>76</sup> Elliot to Granville, #180, confidential, 16 September 1872; #205, confidential, 1 October 1872; #214, 14 October 1872; #215, confidential, 14 October 1872; #217, 14 October 1872; #229, 20 October 1872; #233, confidential, 24 October 1872—all FO 78/2219; also #249, most confidential, 6 November 1872, FO 78/2220; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 147-149; Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 88-89; Mehmed

economic situation set the stage for rising discontent. Office-shifting continued almost as fast as it had under Mahmud Nedim. "The utmost confusion prevails in every department of the State," observed the British ambassador, "the transaction of even the most ordinary routine business having become almost impossible."<sup>77</sup> His judgment was confirmed on all sides. Leading political figures, each ambitious for self, formed parties of one or ad hoc combinations to oust whoever was in office. "Every new Grand Vizier pulls down so far as possible all that his predecessor had built up," said Cyrus Hamlin, who had seen thirty years of Ottoman politics. "These changes have all been from sheer caprice. It disorganizes the administration of government in all its departments. It makes the provincial governors and judges perfectly rapacious. Knowing they will soon be changed they make hay while the sun shines."<sup>78</sup>

At the top of the administrative heap, six grand vezirs were appointed within three years, beginning with Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi. After him came Esad Paşa, then Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, then Hüseyin Avni, again Esad, and on August 26, 1875, Mahmud Nedim for the second time.<sup>79</sup> Their rise and fall were due to many different incidental causes, but in the last analysis to the pressures on, and to the whims of, Abdülaziz. Ignatyev, in congratulating the sultan on Midhat's removal, had recommended as best that form of government where the sovereign was master, as in Russia and Turkey, and expressed the hope that Abdülaziz would continue to act independently of his ministers.<sup>80</sup> Abdülaziz, after Âli's death, needed no such

Memduh, *Mirât-ı şuârat*, p. 47; İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, pp. 328-330; Sammarco, *Egypte moderne*, III, 217-219; A. H. Midhat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872-1946* (İstanbul, 1946), pp. 39-40; Iorga, *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine*, #231, 21 November 1872.

<sup>77</sup> Elliot to Granville, #273, 28 November 1872, FO 78/2220.

<sup>78</sup> Hamlin to Trent, 4 November 1872, ABCFM, vol. 354, #67. Cf. the frustrations of Cevdet Paşa, an able man who never achieved the grand vezirate he desired: Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Medenî hukuk cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa* (İstanbul, 1946), pp. 125, n.108, and 128.

<sup>79</sup> Grand vezirates: Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi, 19 October 1872 to 15 February 1873; Sakızlı Ahmed Esad, 15 February 1873 to 14 April 1873; Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, 14 April 1873 to 13 February 1874; Hüseyin Avni, 13 February 1874 to 25 April 1875; Esad, 26 April 1875 to 25 August 1875; Mahmud Nedim, 25 August 1875 to 11 May 1876. There is question about some of the dates. These are based on İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi* (İstanbul, 1947-1955), IV, 507-509, corrected in three instances from diplomatic dispatches or Istanbul newspapers.

<sup>80</sup> Elliot to Granville, #249, most confidential, 6 November 1872, FO 78/2220.

encouragement. Mehmed Rüşdi the Mütercim blamed his predecessor Mahmud Nedim for confirming Abdülaziz in the belief that now he need not take advice and that his desires would be satisfied anyway.<sup>81</sup> The sultan proceeded to make and unmake ministers without consulting his grand vezirs. Mehmed Rüşdi, a conscientious and honorable man, stood up to the sultan on this issue once, but this was unusual.<sup>82</sup> When Esad replaced Mehmed Rüşdi, the sultan said that he himself would give orders to ministers and that the grand vezir would be more of a figurehead.<sup>83</sup> None of the grand vezirs was without ability. They ranged in character from the young westernized general Esad to Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, a moderately liberal member of the ulema who had made the transition to the civil service hierarchy; from the intelligent, conscientious, and cautious Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi to the self-seeking, amoral, and more energetic Hüseyin Avni. Yet none accomplished any great work during his grand vezirate, and it is unprofitable to follow the ins and outs of personal politics which took so much of their attention. The political infighting was vicious at times. Ismail's intrigue, supplemented by his copious purse, was always present as a complicating factor, even after the khedive obtained in 1873 a ferman consolidating all previously granted privileges so that he appeared almost an independent monarch.<sup>84</sup>

During this chaotic period little beginnings adumbrated the course of future events. Both constitution and deposition were discussed by a few high officials. Constitutional plans had, of course, been initiated by Midhat and Halil Şerif in 1872, and the sultan was aware that such ideas were current, for he reproached Halil Şerif with being a partisan of constitutional government.<sup>85</sup> In 1873, during the grand vezirate of Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, the constitutional idea was evidently mulled over by a somewhat wider group. Şirvanizade himself was a product of medrese training, but no fanatic, rather intelligent, and considered at least by the Russian ambassador to be under British influence.<sup>86</sup> He had also been a member of the New Ottoman

<sup>81</sup> Elliot to Granville, #232, confidential, 24 October 1872, FO 78/2219.

<sup>82</sup> Elliot to Granville, #256, 12 November 1872, FO 78/2220; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 683.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 707; Elliot to Granville, #71, confidential, 2 March 1873, FO 78/2226.

<sup>84</sup> Boker to Fish, #123, 2 July 1873, USNA, Turkey 25. Text in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), I, 174-177.

<sup>85</sup> Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 707.

<sup>86</sup> "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, I, 155-156.

group.<sup>87</sup> An opponent of Mahmud Nedim because of his exile in 1871, Şirvanizade was thrown together with Hüseyin Avni and Midhat, who also were bitter rivals of Mahmud Nedim. These three all happened to be ministers during Esad's short grand vezirate early in 1873—Hüseyin Avni for war, Midhat for justice, and Şirvanizade for finance.<sup>88</sup> After they used their joint influence to get Esad out, Şirvanizade was appointed grand vezir.

It is possible that the three had discussed constitutional government during Esad's regime. It is certain that at least Midhat and Şirvanizade did so during the latter's grand vezirate, meeting at the grand vezir's house in the evenings with some other ministers. Hüseyin Avni was no real partisan of constitution, but knew what was going on. According to Midhat's account, the ministers, alarmed by the general situation and especially the financial condition of the empire, agreed that the remedy was a chamber of deputies, but that since such a phrase would alarm the sultan, a reform proposal of more moderate aspect was to be drawn up. Midhat was delegated to do this. His memorandum, much of it in general terms, talked of the rule of law equally over all subjects, but also more specifically recommended recasting the administrative councils and the courts, establishing financial controls to be effected by the Porte, and other measures. Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi one day unintentionally mentioned the forthcoming memorandum to Abdülaziz, who thereupon packed Midhat off to Salonika as vali and shortly fired the grand vezir himself.<sup>89</sup> The memorandum has been described as "a sort of draft of a defective constitution."<sup>90</sup> This is exaggeration. How far the constitutional planning went is not certain. The assertion of Midhat's friend İsmail Kemal that Midhat drew up at this time "a project of organic statutes" including a responsible ministry and popular control of finances seems also to be exaggerated.<sup>91</sup> But certainly Midhat's thinking went in this direction.

Midhat probably had in mind also the possibility of deposition of

<sup>87</sup> On Ebüzziya's authority: A. H. Tanpınar, *XIX. asr türk edebiyatı tarihi*, 2nd ed., 1 (İstanbul, 1956), 196; M. Z. Pâkalın, *Tanzimat maliye nazırları* (İstanbul, n.d.), II, 137-138.

<sup>88</sup> Midhat came into the ministry about a month after the other two: *Levant Herald*, 13 March 1873. This was on the same day that Halil Şerif was finally ousted as foreign minister.

<sup>89</sup> Midhat, *Tabssra-i ibret*, pp. 150-151, and text of memorandum, pp. 323-326. Cf. Cevdet, quoted in Pâkalın, *Maliye nazırları*, II, 130.

<sup>90</sup> Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdattan hakimiyeti milliyeye* (İstanbul, 1924), II, 153.

<sup>91</sup> Story, *İsmail Kemal*, p. 103.

Abdülaziz. He, Şirvanizade, and Hüseyin Avni have been accused by others of projecting a change in sultans as early as the first months of 1873.<sup>92</sup> After Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi became grand vezir in April of 1873 the project was entertained by a number of the ministers. Hüseyin Avni seems to have been led by his ambition to reveal such thoughts of his colleagues—undoubtedly with added inventions—to the sultan, and so to get himself appointed grand vezir in Şirvanizade's place, in February 1874. But Hüseyin Avni did not give up the idea of deposition—apparently in his case a product of a personal antagonism to the sultan as much as of desire to benefit the state. He is said to have contemplated it during his grand vezirate in 1874 and 1875 and to have continued to work toward it after he was out of office.<sup>93</sup> Abdülaziz's suspicions were somehow aroused, as Hüseyin Avni was thereafter posted to governorships progressively farther from the capital—first İzmir, then Konya, then the Yemen. The latter assignment was, however, never undertaken, as the events of the Balkan revolt of 1875 brought Hüseyin Avni back to the capital so that his military ability might be used.<sup>94</sup> In the crisis period that started in 1875, the plans for constitution and for deposition would again come to the surface.

So also would a more intense and more emotional patriotic feeling which was developing during these same years. Such feeling was, in part, a natural accompaniment of the renewed emphasis on Islam during the 1870's. It was also, in part, the product of deliberate cultivation by a small group of writers, chief among whom was Namık Kemal. Namık Kemal had not reconstituted in İstanbul the New Ottoman group of Paris. This would have been impossible, because of personal antagonisms and because some, like Ali Suavi, stayed abroad. Ziya Bey, further, on his return to İstanbul seemed to have abandoned his former comrades and ideals; he was being paid considerable sums by İsmail, and accepted employment as second secre-

<sup>92</sup> Cevdet, quoted in Pâkalın, *Maliye nazırları*, II, 129; Danişmend, *Kronolojisi*, IV, 244.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 244-246; Story, *İsmail Kemal*, pp. 102-103; Ali Ölmezoğlu, "Cevdet Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, III, 117; Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), pp. 271-275. Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 103, alleges that Hüseyin Avni on his trip to Europe in the spring of 1875 secretly saw English ministers who said that Abdülaziz's deposition and Murad's accession would be well received.

<sup>94</sup> Elliot to Derby, #210, confidential, 27 April 1875, FO 78/2382; #392, 27 July 1875, FO 78/2384; #412, 3 August 1875, and #426, confidential, 5 August 1875, FO 78/2385.

tary of Sultan Abdülaziz while still the recipient of Ismail's bounty.<sup>95</sup> Two of Namık Kemal's comrades in exile, however, Nuri and Reşad, worked with him, as did also the brilliant young writer Ebüzziya Tevfik, now in his early twenties. Namık Kemal contributed to several periodicals, such as *Diyojen (Diogenes)*, a comic semiweekly quite popular among the lesser officials in Istanbul for its lampoons on the administration, which was suppressed by Palace order early in 1873 for insulting Ismail.<sup>96</sup> He contributed also to *Hadika (Garden)*, edited by Ebüzziya, until its suspension for two months because of an article on a strike at the imperial arsenal.<sup>97</sup> But in this world of precarious journalism—in which papers were suspended, and reappeared; were suppressed, and popped up under new names; in which writers were exiled, and their work continued by others—Namık Kemal's chief efforts went into his paper *İbret*.<sup>98</sup>

*İbret (Admonition)* was a Turkish newspaper of Istanbul owned by a Christian, of which Namık Kemal took over the editorship after it had been suspended for two months.<sup>99</sup> Its first issue under Namık Kemal appeared on June 13, 1872, in the grand vezirate of Mahmud Nedim.<sup>100</sup> Here Namık Kemal pursued the course he had previously established in *Hürriyet*. He criticized the administration, criticized Ismail, advocated copying western economic achievement, cultivated love of fatherland, preached the unity of Islam, praised the şariat, and advocated government by consultation. The paper was quite popular and exercised considerable influence among the young theological students of the capital.<sup>101</sup> Mahmud Nedim was obviously unhappy with the paper, but its first suspension seems to have come as the result of pecuniary pressure on the Palace by Ismail, whose efforts to buy the editor had failed.<sup>102</sup> Late in July *İbret* was suspended, and Namık Kemal and his three chief collaborators were ordered to provincial posts. Namık Kemal managed not to take up his appointment until after Mahmud Nedim fell from office. Midhat, however, on becom-

<sup>95</sup> Crabitès, *Ismail*, pp. 178-179; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 654-656, 663.

<sup>96</sup> *Levant Herald*, 13 and 17 January 1873; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 696-697.

<sup>97</sup> *Levant Herald*, 30 January 1873.

<sup>98</sup> Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 162-163.

<sup>99</sup> *Levant Times*, 14 June 1872.

<sup>100</sup> Mehmed Kaplan, *Namık Kemal (İstanbul, 1948)*, pp. 80-83.

<sup>101</sup> Mustafa Nihat Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret gazetesi (İstanbul, 1938)*, reproduces a selection of Namık Kemal's articles. Cf. Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," pp. 778-779, 781-782, 804, 844; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 104-107; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>102</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 110-114.

ing grand vezir insisted that he go to Gelibolu as mutasarrıf, whereupon he went. But *İbret's* suspension was lifted after about two and a half months, and Namık Kemal contributed articles to it from his post of exile. Soon he managed to get himself back to the capital and resumed the editorship openly in January 1873. A new suspension of a month was ordered, in the grand vezirate of Esad Paşa, because of articles critical of censorship of books. Then *İbret* resumed publication, only to be suppressed very soon after events connected with a yet more audacious piece of writing than Namık Kemal had so far attempted in his newspapers.<sup>103</sup>

The audacity resulted from the combination of one of Namık Kemal's favorite themes, the passionate love of fatherland, with a new medium, the stage drama in western style. Aside from translations of western plays, the first modern drama written in Turkish had been Şinasi's *A Poet's Marriage*, and it is not clear that this was ever performed. Namık Kemal, on his return from exile, collaborated with Ebüzziya Tevfik in writing a play, *Ecel-i kaza (Accidental Death)*.<sup>104</sup> This was actually produced in January 1873 under the sponsorship of Halil Şerif Paşa on a double bill with a comedy by Ali Bey, the chief secretary of the quarantine bureau. All the ministers except the grand vezir, plus Mustafa Fazıl and Midhat, who were out of office, were present.<sup>105</sup> These plays, and others translated or adapted from western languages such as Ahmed Vefik's versions of Molière comedies, were staged at the Gedik Paşa theatre in Istanbul. The actors were Armenians, with indifferent accents. The audience seems to have enjoyed the action, but not always to have understood all the spoken parts.<sup>106</sup> The theatre was enjoying an upsurge, its red bills posted on street corners and mosques. The house was often packed.<sup>107</sup> A number of figures of the literary renaissance had formed a committee in January 1873 to promote and improve the new medium. On it were the above-named dramatist Ali Bey; Namık Kemal; Raşid Paşa, who had had a Paris education, had served in the translation bureau, and

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116-119; *Levant Herald*, 8 April 1873; Sungu, *Namık Kemal (İstanbul, 1941)*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>104</sup> E. J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry* (London, 1900-1909), V, 15. Gibb mistakenly calls this "the first original Turkish drama."

<sup>105</sup> *Levant Herald*, 25 and 30 January 1873.

<sup>106</sup> Belin, "Bibliographie ottomane," *Journal asiatique*, series VI: 18 (August-September 1871), 126; Werner, *Türkische Skizzen*, I, 100-107, describing a performance of Schiller's *Die Räuber* in translation.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.



was destined to become foreign minister later that year; Halet Bey, an experienced journalist; and Agop Efendi Vartovian (known as Güllü Agop or Agop Güllian), an Armenian, the director of the acting company.<sup>108</sup> The committee was to improve the acting and diction, and to encourage the translation and composition of dramatic pieces.

Namık Kemal then produced a new play for the Gedik Paşa theatre. In early March it was known that he was writing a piece about the siege of Silistria, where in 1854 the beleaguered Turks had thrown back the Russians.<sup>109</sup> The finished work, entitled *Vatan yahut Silistre* (*Fatherland or Silistria*), was played on Tuesday night, April 1, to a crowded house, which responded enthusiastically. Namık Kemal had packed a tremendous emotional content into the play with his emphasis on patriotism, expressed by the actors in both word and deed, prose dialogue and song. Though the term *vatan* had meant "fatherland" from mid-century on, and had been increasingly so used by the New Ottomans in particular, its association with Namık Kemal's play of 1873 gave *vatan* its full meaning and impact for the future.<sup>110</sup> As drama, *Vatan* left much to be desired. The plot was crude, and its message unmistakable. Kemal also introduced a love story. He began the play with an amorous scene, from which the hero departs for the front to defend his fatherland, upon which he makes a great speech to his beloved. She then dons male disguise and goes to the front to rejoin her man. The succeeding action unrolls at the front, involving a daring raid to fire the enemy's ammunition dump. The whole was tricked out with copious supplies of blood, shouting, cannon, redoubts, and the fanfare of trumpets. The play contained a few unmistakable criticisms of the Ottoman administration. But both these and the love story were secondary to the main theme of Ottoman patriotism, best expressed by Namık Kemal in two songs sung by the volunteers.<sup>111</sup> Typical of the sentiment is this song:

<sup>108</sup> *Levant Herald*, 25 January 1873; Sungu, *Namık Kemal*, p. 18; Cevdet Perin, "Ahmed Midhat Efendi et l'influence française . . .," *Garip filolojileri dergisi* (Istanbul, 1937), p. 136 and n.2; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 151. Kuntay says also the Young Ottoman Nuri was both member and organizer of the committee. Cf. Y. G. Çark, *Türk devleti hizmetinde Ermeniler* (Istanbul, 1953), pp. 278-279, on origins of the acting company.

<sup>109</sup> *Levant Herald*, 6 March 1873.

<sup>110</sup> On earlier uses, see above chapter II and n.15, and chapter VI and n.86. Cf. the emotional description in 1949 of the emotional experience in 1873 by Kuntay in *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 152.

<sup>111</sup> The play has many editions in Turkish. It is also translated into German by Leopold Pekotsch, *Heimat oder Silistria* (Vienna, 1887).

Blood and sword on our flag are flying,  
On our hills and plains roams no fear of dying,  
A lion in each part of our land is lying,  
We rejoice in the fray martyrs' lives to lay down,  
We are Ottomans, giving up life for renown.<sup>112</sup>

And at the final curtain, upon victory, the cast all joins in:

Before us the enemy, ready with arms,  
March, heroes, to the aid of the fatherland!  
March onward, march, salvation is ours;  
March, heroes, to the aid of the fatherland!<sup>113</sup>

After the performance Namık Kemal was cheered when he came to the stage, and cheered in the streets by crowds shouting, "Long live Kemal!" They shouted also: "What is your wish?" "Here is our wish!" "May God grant our wish!" Since the word for "wish" was *murad*, and since Murad was the heir-apparent, the political implications of the pun were not far to seek.<sup>114</sup> There were demonstrations also after a second performance of *Vatan* two or three nights later. The upshot was that Namık Kemal was arrested and exiled to Famagusta (Magosa) in Cyprus. His journalist friends Nuri and Ebüzziya Tevfik were also arrested and exiled to Acre and Rhodes respectively. Ahmed Midhat, who collaborated with them, and was a well-known liberal journalist who had begun his career with Midhat Paşa's provincial newspapers, was also exiled to Rhodes. *İbret* was suppressed, as was also a lesser liberal paper, *Siraj* (*Lamp*). Two Armenians were also arrested—Sarafian, the managing director of *İbret*, and Güllü Agop, the director of the theatre—but each was shortly released. The Gedik Paşa theatre, however, was placed under censorship, all plays requiring advance police approval.<sup>115</sup>

Various reasons have been advanced for the exiling. Officially, the journalists were sent away because of their journalism, which the

<sup>112</sup> Quoted, in new Turkish, in Sungu, *Namık Kemal*, p. 18.

<sup>113</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>114</sup> Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, p. 182; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 155, 163.

<sup>115</sup> *La Turquie*, 8 and 12 April 1873; *Levant Herald*, 8 (Bulletin du Soir), 10 and 12 April 1873; Pekotsch, *Heimat oder Silistria*, pp. iv-v; Elliot to Granville, #112, 19 April 1873, FO 78/2267; Douin, *Khédive Ismail*, II, 712-713; Sungu, *Namık Kemal*, pp. 18-19; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 164-166. Accounts differ as to whether the arrests were made during the second performance or sometime later.

Porte claimed exceeded the bounds of propriety in its criticism. This was certainly a factor. But the play was what moved the government to action. The official censor, Arifi Bey, a well-educated and westernized diplomat by training, explained that *Vatan* was too inciting, with its talk of blood and war. He criticized the westernized theatre in general as dangerous to Turkish culture because sprung from alien soil.<sup>116</sup> But more than this, the play had shown that people could be aroused to demonstrations which were not only patriotic, but might turn against the sultan himself.<sup>117</sup> For Abdülaziz this was serious, since Namık Kemal had renewed his connections with the heir-apparent Murad after his return from European exile. These evidently were facilitated by the British ambassador, Sir Henry Elliot, and kept up through other intermediaries as well. Murad for a time sent a monthly stipend to Namık Kemal's family while the playwright was in exile at Famagusta.<sup>118</sup> Whether or not actual conspiratorial plans were already afoot, as has been alleged, Murad was still the hope of Namık Kemal and others who thought as he did. The Porte may well have feared another conspiracy like that of 1867.

The exiles had to remain in their places of forced residence until after Abdülaziz had been deposed in 1876. Namık Kemal continued active, writing plays, stories, and works on literature and history. During his exile occurred his famous literary quarrel with Ziya Bey over Ziya's anthology, *Harabat (Tavern)*. Some of Namık Kemal's works were published at the time, either anonymously or under others' names. One play, *Gülnehal (Rose-twig)*, a satire on the strife of Abdülaziz and Murad over the succession, was subtle enough to escape the censor in 1875. Another, *Akif*, was laden with emotion on freedom and fatherland.<sup>119</sup> But it was *Vatan*, inferior in literary merit to much of his later work, which became one of the major documents of Ottoman history because of its historic role in first giving dramatic expression to love of fatherland. It fitted in well also with the rising Islamic sentiment of the 1870's, and with the spirit to be expressed in the crisis

<sup>116</sup> Werner, *Türkische Skizzen*, I, 94-96.

<sup>117</sup> *La Turquie*, 12 April 1873, hints at this.

<sup>118</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part I, 120, 159-160, 263, 717, 738; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 52-55, 60. Cf. the undocumented account in Alma Wittlin, *Abdul Hamid, the Shadow of God* (London, 1940), pp. 75-78.

<sup>119</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 233; Sungu, *Namık Kemal*, p. 22; Gibb, *Ottoman Poetry*, V, 77-85.

years of 1875 to 1878. When the 1908 revolution was successful, *Vatan* was again ritually performed in both Salonika and Istanbul.<sup>120</sup>



In the years 1873, 1874, and 1875 general discontent with the government of Abdülaziz took a new upward surge because of economic distress among large sections of the population. An agricultural crisis was followed by a crisis in the imperial treasury. Would-be reformers like Midhat were to profit from this situation, for it threw temporarily into their hands a large following among which were numbered many ordinarily conservative Turks. The economic misery began with a famine which affected considerable areas of Anatolia in 1873, and even reached to the capital as well. The financial collapse of the Ottoman treasury, which was always in a precarious state, was helped along by the international panic of 1873 and brought to a head by the treasury's inability to meet the payment of bond coupons on the foreign debt in the fall of 1875. The two phases of the economic crisis were related, as tax receipts fell during the famine period.

Bad crop years and various types of natural disaster were quite usual in one or another of the Ottoman vilayets. But from 1873 to 1875 there was a greater concentration of troubles than at any time in recent years. In 1872 central Anatolia had been afflicted with a drought which sent the price of seed up at the same time as the government pressed for new taxes. The Roumanian principalities suffered similarly that year. Cyprus was by then in its third season of drought, with locust plagues in addition. Conditions rapidly grew worse, especially in Anatolia, but the Balkan provinces were also affected. The Porte saw itself obliged, because of bad harvests and threatened famine in the spring of 1873, to forbid the export of grain from the districts of Ruschuk and Vidin. That fall a similar measure had to be applied to the vilayet of Adana in southeast Anatolia. Naturally the capital and other usual markets for this grain suffered from growing scarcity

<sup>120</sup> C. R. Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution* (New York, 1909), p. 71; Bertrand Barreilles, *Les Turcs, ce que fut leur empire* (Paris, 1917), p. 238; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part I, 157, 160. Kuntay, in *ibid.*, p. 158, says that *Vatan* was performed five hundred times in Abdülaziz's reign, which seems hardly credible, since the play was suppressed after its second performance. It may have been revived later, but Abdülaziz reigned for only three years more after the first performance. The play continued, however, to be published and sold in bookstores in Abdülhamid II's reign at least to 1889, when the seventh edition appeared. Cf. Pekotsch, *Heimat oder Siliestria*, p.v.

and rising prices. The bad harvests of 1873 were followed by a winter unprecedented for seventy years in its severity. Anatolia lay under a mantle of snow deeper than the oldest inhabitant could remember. Communications were brought to a standstill. Wolves devoured men even near the suburbs of Istanbul. Districts around Harput suffered from earthquake also, which rendered many homeless in temperatures far below freezing. Even so far south as Syria rain, hail, and snow washed out roads, swept away travellers, and killed sheep by the hundreds.<sup>121</sup>

The hard winter, coupled with floods when the deep snow melted, raised the famine to a distressing pitch in 1874. Grain was scarce because of the previous poor harvest and because hungry peasants had eaten their seed supplies during the winter. Worse, nine-tenths of the livestock in some regions had perished from natural causes or slaughtering for food. Men starved in the streets and died without burial. In the Kayseri district a camel forty days dead was torn apart by the hungry; when the vali ordered it buried, the people dug it up and ate the rotting flesh, some dying in consequence. Some merchants cornered food supplies and made large profits. Many villagers began to migrate. Some villages were virtually deserted, larger districts sometimes depopulated by a third or more. In this terrible situation the Ottoman government moved very slowly to relieve distress, hampered by distorted reports from officials in the vilayet system, by corruption, by lack of roads. In some districts in some years the tithe on agricultural produce was totally or partially remitted, but it had been recently raised to twelve and a half per cent, and often was only reduced to the original ten per cent; even this was not uniformly done; and in some regions fifteen to eighteen per cent was collected. Some Turkish officials were absolutely incompetent, and some stole from the relief supplies that were sent by the government. The vali of Ankara, one of the hard-hit regions, had to be removed in favor of Abdurrahman Paşa, formerly one of Midhat's best men in the Tuna vilayet, who then carried out some constructive relief measures. It was

<sup>121</sup> *Levant Times*, 7 October 1872; Maynard to Fish, #34, 4 November 1875, USNA, Turkey 28; Boker to Fish, #93, 14 April 1873, USNA, Turkey 24, and #148, 25 September 1873, USNA, Turkey 25; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #270, 14 February 1874; ABCFM, Eastern Turkey Mission I, #129, 20 January 1874; #131, 14 March 1874; #132, 8 May 1874; #352, 21 May 1874; George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-1952), IV, 248-249 and n.4, 257-258; George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople* (Boston, 1909), pp. 86-87; Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years*, II, 435.

a commentary on the inefficiency of the Ottoman administration that the most effective, though still insufficient, relief was brought by American and English missionaries and Scottish merchants, aided by a relief committee formed in Istanbul under the direction of the British ambassador and the American minister. The regions of Ankara, Kayseri, Talas, and Harput were among the hardest hit; Sivas escaped the worst. Food in the capital became sufficiently dear so that the poorer there also suffered.<sup>122</sup>

By 1875 the famine itself was over, and the harvest of that year was good; yet the results of the ordeal lingered on. Depopulated villages regained only a portion of their former numbers. One kaza in the Ankara vilayet, for instance, retained in 1875 only twenty-five thousand of a population calculated at fifty-two thousand two years before; twenty thousand were dead and seven thousand had emigrated. Sheep there were still only four per cent of the 1873 figure, oxen twenty per cent. Typhus spread. The government, in straitened financial circumstances, now tried to collect heavier taxes from the impoverished peasantry, but many tax farmers were unwilling to try. Even into the spring and summer of 1876 central Anatolia was filled with homeless, with paupers who had been producers, while new droughts in Bosnia and near Sivas caused the government to prohibit cereal exports from those regions.<sup>123</sup> The political effect of the famine was to predispose a large number of ordinarily conservative peasants toward change. The famine had been centered in Turkish-populated areas; by 1875 the Anatolian Turkish peasant was worse off than the Balkan Christian peasant. Economic misery was then capped by the government's calling out Anatolian peasants to fill the army ranks against Balkan rebellion in 1875 and 1876. The peasantry would not initiate a move to overturn the administration, but by 1875 were quite likely to approve such a move. The famine had also affected many

<sup>122</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #41, 15 September 1874; #42, 13 October 1874; #43, 2 March 1875; #437, 26 November 1874; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission IV, #432, 27 April 1874; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #706, 1 January 1875; Stamatiades to Hunter, 25 November 1874, USNA, Constantinople Consulate 11; Maynard to Fish, #34, 4 November 1875, USNA, Turkey 28; Hill, *Cyprus*, IV, 248-249 and n.4, 257-258; *Levant Herald*, 10 October 1874 and 21 May 1875; Elliot to Derby, #138, 12 March 1875, FO 78/2381.

<sup>123</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #732, 15 August 1875; #100, 16 March 1876; and #742, 28 November 1876; Maynard to Fish, #7, 30 June 1875, USNA, Turkey 28; James L. Farley, *Turks and Christians* (London, 1876), pp. 85-87; Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor* (London, 1877), I, 133; Elliot to Derby, #138, 12 March 1875, FO 78/2381; *Levant Herald*, 21 May 1875.

cities, including the nerve center of the empire, Istanbul. But probably the financial crisis of the treasury in 1875 affected opinion in the cities even more than did the famine.

The collapse of the imperial treasury had been preparing for many more years than the famine, and had been staved off by palliatives. The 1861 financial crisis had narrowly missed proving fatal to the credit of the empire.<sup>124</sup> Since that time the Porte had walked the edge of the abyss without plunging in, but only at the cost of increased loans from Europe, the interest and amortization charges on which grew with each year. Had the revenues of the Porte increased substantially during this period, the situation would not have proved so serious. But for many reasons the treasury's income, though increased, did not attain nearly the total that might have been possible.

The basic cause was the underdeveloped state of industry and agriculture within the empire. Mineral resources and industrial possibilities remained largely untouched from lethargy, lack of capital, lack of knowledge, lack of administrative facilitation, and from well-founded suspicion of foreign concessionaires. Native trades and crafts had in many cases been killed off in the nineteenth century by European competition; this was partly the simple result of Europe's industrial advance and partly the result of the capitulation treaties which, even after the revisions of the early 1860's, limited import duties to a maximum of eight per cent ad valorem, and so curbed the Ottoman power to protect native crafts. Internal tariffs on transport of domestic goods were an additional handicap. Since industry produced so little tax revenue, and since import duties were so low, the chief source of revenue had to be the various taxes on land and farming.<sup>125</sup>

Agriculture had made little progress since 1856, still hampered by backward methods, by lack of roads to transport produce, by the discouragement of individual initiative on the part of peasants who worked land that belonged to a landlord or was *vakıf*. This was entirely aside from plagues of locusts, drought, and other natural impediments. Especially important was a noticeable depopulation of the Turkish agricultural districts which was well under way by mid-century, and which found its origins in the heavy burden of military service, in

<sup>124</sup> See above, chapter III.

<sup>125</sup> The American minister, noting with sympathy the Ottoman desire to raise import duties to twenty per cent, observed that the United States government in 1875 got two thirds of all its revenue from that source: Maynard to Fish, #32, 2 November 1875, USNA, Turkey 28.

cholera and other plagues, in abortions and other limitations on the size of families, and in a general tendency toward migration to the cities. Unlike a similar tendency in western Europe and the United States, the increase in number of workers in the cities did not mean a higher birth rate, since the workers were largely bachelors. Nor was it compensated for by more productive and mechanized farming methods. The idleness of a bare city subsistence attracted a good many.<sup>126</sup> The whole economic situation of the empire was further aggravated by sporadic brigandage, by the slow development of road and rail transport, by rapacious and frequently shifted officials, and by the tax system. Some taxes, such as that on Christians in lieu of military service, were not onerous and were collected with a minimum of difficulty. But others, as on silk cocoons, were collected in such a way as to increase spoilage and harm the silk industry. This was often true of the major agricultural tax, the tithe on produce; much of the peasant's crop was often spoiled before the assessor arrived to claim his share. The tithe was still farmed to agents who tried to collect as much as they could, certainly far more than the government ever received from them except in disaster years which deceived their preliminary estimates.<sup>127</sup>

On the basis of such an economy the imperial treasury could not hope for a much larger regular income. True, the budget for the financial year 1874-1875 reckoned on rather startling increases in receipts, but these were of a purely temporary nature in many cases and in others were overvalued.<sup>128</sup> There was no indication that the empire

<sup>126</sup> Nassau W. Senior, *A Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece* (London, 1859), pp. 164, 183-184, 190-191, 214; Farley, *Turks and Christians*, pp. 103-121; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 185-195; *idem*, *Anatolien, Skizzen und Reisebriefe* (Hannover, 1925), pp. 12-13, 97-98, 102-103, 290-291, 425; Friedrich Hellwald, *Der Islam* (Augsburg, 1877), pp. 55-56, n., quoting an article in *Basiret* of April 1875. Provincial inspectors in 1863-1864 had been instructed to seek ways of increasing the population: *Journal de Constantinople*, 13 August 1864.

<sup>127</sup> A good history of economic conditions is needed. The literature is widely scattered. For this period see Engelhardt, *La Turquie*, II, 305-312; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 32-36, and II, 117-118, 181-309; Farley, *Turks and Christians*, pp. 48-71; Albert Dumont, *Le Balkan et l'Adriatique*, pp. 11-23, 337-340; James Baker, *Turkey* (New York, 1877), pp. 337-388, 394-412; G. G. B. St. Clair and C. A. Brophy, *Twelve Years' Study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria* (London, 1877), pp. 114-116, 135-138; Burnaby, *On Horseback*, I, 192; F. Bianconi, *La question d'Orient dévoilée* (Paris, 1876), pp. 65-67; E. Z. Karal, *Islahat fermamı devri, 1861-1876* (Ankara, 1956), pp. 240-273. Cf. also references in chapter III above, n.91.

<sup>128</sup> Sublime Porte, Ministère des Finances, *Budget des recettes et dépenses de l'exercice 1290 (1874-75)* (Constantinople, 1874), and criticism of it in A. DuVelay, *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie* (Paris, 1903), pp. 317-323.

could escape from borrowing again in Europe to make up for annual operating deficits. The sultan still spent wildly—one fourteenth of the budget was for his civil list, but he managed to spend more than twice that.<sup>129</sup> Between his expenditures, corruption, and charges for interest and amortization, the treasury was left with less than the funds necessary for the ordinary business of government. Short-term loans locally contracted carried high interest rates, and were particularly castigated by a commission of experts, many of them Europeans, called in to examine the 1874-1875 budget.<sup>130</sup> The local obligations should have been consolidated into long-term debt, but money for the empire was growing tighter. The international panic of 1873 affected Istanbul as Viennese banks there failed, dragging down with them a host of wildcat houses sprung up in Turkey since 1870. Vienna was unable to lend, and London was now more interested in Egypt, Suez, and the United States for investment. Only French capital supported the empire in a loan of 1873, which was not at all favorable to the Ottoman government. Despite a momentary enthusiasm for Ottoman securities on the London market in 1874, the situation did not improve. Some still believed that Ottoman credit could be saved, but predictions of disaster mounted constantly.<sup>131</sup>

By the summer of 1875 financial disaster appeared close at hand. The grand vezir, Esad Paşa, admitting that the situation was serious, cut his own and other top officials' salaries and circularized valis on measures of economy. The salary cuts were meant also, he said, to influence Abdülaziz into giving over part of his income to railroad-building. The sultan was actually induced to issue a *hat* on August 1 saying that he would build the Baghdad railway at his own expense—an announcement greeted by *La Turquie* with effusive praise, but discounted by public opinion.<sup>132</sup> The full effects of the famine of 1873-

<sup>129</sup> Goodenow to Fish, #17, 23 April 1874, USNA, Turkey 26.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, enclosing the commission's report of 17 February 1874.

<sup>131</sup> DuVelay, *Histoire financière*, pp. 205, 304-316; L. H. Jenks, *The Migration of British Capital to 1875* (New York, 1938), pp. 310-311; Charles Morawitz, *Die Türkei im Spiegel ihrer Finanzen* (Berlin, 1903), pp. 20-57. A favorable view of Ottoman finances in Bailleux de Marisy, "Moeurs financières de la France, IV: les valeurs orientales, les finances de la Turquie et de l'Égypte," *Revue des deux mondes*, 3rd period, v (1 October 1874), 650-678; unfavorable views in Benoît Brunswik, *La crise financière de la Turquie* (Paris, 1874), and "Zapiski . . . Ignatyeva," 1915, VI, 109-120.

<sup>132</sup> Elliot to Derby, #288, confidential, 14 June 1875, FO 78/2383; #341, 13 July 1875; #365, 21 July 1875; #377, confidential, 22 July 1875, FO 78/2384; *Courrier d'Orient*, 28 July 1875; *La Turquie*, 22 July, 3 and 4 August 1875; Braun-Wiesbaden, *Türkische Reise*, II, 332.

1874 were now being felt by the treasury. To this was added the strain of revolt which, simmering since the spring, broke into violent uprising in Herzegovina in July. Grounded in an agrarian dispute between the Muslim landlords and the Orthodox peasantry, the revolt was brought to a head by tax collection methods more vicious than usual, as the Porte attempted to get sorely needed revenues. Hampered by lack of rail transport and lack of funds, with military pay in arrears, the Porte moved too slowly to quell the revolt, which, as it spread, put an added burden on the treasury.<sup>133</sup> Abdülaziz was thus faced in the summer of 1875 with a repetition of the same two crises that existed in 1861 at the time of his accession—financial collapse, and Herzegovinian revolt that was likely to attract support from other Balkan Slavs.

At this juncture the ministry was strengthened by the addition of three former grand vezirs. On August 21, 1875, Midhat was named minister of justice, Hüseyin Avni minister of war, and Mahmud Nedim president of the Council of State.<sup>134</sup> This ministry of all the talents was a curious combination. Midhat could cooperate with Hüseyin Avni, and the two had similar views on the need to act vigorously against the Balkan rebels. But both had previously opposed the grand vezir Esad, and both were undoubtedly suspect to the sultan; Midhat had been unemployed for about eighteen months after a brief tour as vali of Salonika, and Hüseyin Avni had been sent to increasingly distant provincial posts.<sup>135</sup> Mahmud Nedim, further, was the enemy of both, as well as of most other leading statesmen. He had been allowed to return to Istanbul from the governorship of Adana because of ill health and his palace connections.<sup>136</sup> It was evidently the sultan's intention to ease Mahmud Nedim back into the grand vezirate. This took place on August 25, four days after Mahmud Nedim had been made president of the Council of State, and Esad was moved down to the ministry of public works.<sup>137</sup>

From the start, Mahmud Nedim's elevation to the grand vezirate meant trouble. Hüseyin Avni evidently opposed him vigorously, and

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 105-109; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 134-142; Langer, *European Alliances*, pp. 62-72; Elliot to Derby, #446, 17 August 1875, FO 78/2835.

<sup>134</sup> *Hat* in *La Turquie*, 22 August 1875.

<sup>135</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 151-152; n.94 above.

<sup>136</sup> Elliot to Derby, #148, 19 March 1875, FO 78/2381.

<sup>137</sup> Elliot to Derby, #471, 25 August 1875, and #493, 29 August 1875, FO 78/2385.

was forced out of the ministry by October 2. Midhat Paşa resigned in November. Meanwhile Russian influence was immensely strengthened. Ignatyev made no secret of his glee at the turn of events, and it may be that his influence with the sultan was partly responsible for Mahmud Nedim's appointment.<sup>138</sup> Mahmud was so friendly to Russia that Nelidov, the counsellor of embassy, could write: "Ignatyev was master of the situation in Constantinople, where a grand vezir devoted to Russia and a Sultan hostile to the West were more disposed to follow his suggestions than to listen to the advice of our adversaries."<sup>139</sup> Naturally Ignatyev wanted to maintain this favorable situation, and to keep the initiative in the developing crisis over Herzegovina from passing into Austrian hands. Therefore, though Ignatyev did not believe in the vitality of the empire and scorned the westernized reforms of Âli and Fuad, he advocated, for the moment, a policy of new reform measures and of soft answers to the Balkan insurgents. His influence on the various reforms announced by Mahmud Nedim during the last five months of 1875, and on the lenient policy in dealing with the rebels, was considerable. Mahmud Nedim "gave his beard into the hand of the Russian ambassador Ignatyev," said Cevdet.<sup>140</sup> At the same time Ignatyev kept up his relations with minorities in the empire and supported the mission of the pan-Slav general Fadeyev to reconstruct the khedive's army. Of course Ignatyev's forces were all deployed against Midhat and Hüseyin Avni, the two members of the ministry who wanted to put down the insurrection by force and parley afterward.<sup>141</sup>

While the Balkan revolt increased in scope and intensity, Mahmud Nedim was confronted with the problem of imminent bankruptcy. The immediate question was to find funds to pay the Ottoman bond coupons that fell due in October. Service on the public debt now consumed over forty per cent of the annual budget; but by late September the financial year, though only half gone, showed a deficit of eight and a half million pounds sterling. Evidently a three-month

<sup>138</sup> Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 145, baldly credits Ignatyev with bringing about the change. Ignatyev had certainly tried. Cf. Elliot to Derby, #310, confidential, 25 June 1875, FO 78/2383.

<sup>139</sup> Nelidov, "Souvenirs d'avant et d'après la guerre de 1877-1878," *Revue des deux mondes*, 6th period, 27 (1915), 308.

<sup>140</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet Paşa*, p. 131, n.113.

<sup>141</sup> Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 70, 73-76, 143, 145-146; Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 96-104, 112-113; Elliot to Derby, #553, 15 September 1875, FO 78/2386; Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," pp. 392-393.

loan from the Ottoman Bank at eighteen per cent was insufficient. By late September some diplomats, at least, knew that repudiation or reduction of payments was contemplated, and the public also got wind of this.<sup>142</sup> Nevertheless, the actual announcement of default came as a surprise. The irade of October 6, 1875, published in the newspapers the next day, told the Porte's creditors that for five years they would get only one half of the interest due them, the other half to be replaced by new obligations carrying five per cent interest.<sup>143</sup> On the surface this partial default seemed the only sane method of attacking the problem. In its official releases the Porte promised such financial reorganization and economic development that in five years the interest and amortization charges could easily be met.<sup>144</sup> Nevertheless, a storm of protest arose at once. Ignatyev was generally accused of having instigated the default, with a malicious intent to aid the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. For a man who wanted to maintain Mahmud Nedim in office, this was a foolish move. Nevertheless, it is known that Ignatyev gloated over the financial weakness of the empire and, further, that he resented the influence of British and French bondholders. It may thus have been that Ignatyev thought he could defy the western powers at the same time as he guided the destinies of the empire through "Nedimoff." If this actually was his reasoning, it was a miscalculation.<sup>145</sup>

For the default was one of the penultimate steps toward the downfall not only of Mahmud Nedim, for the second time, and thus of Ignatyev's influence, but also of Abdülaziz himself. Already the famine and the Islamic feeling which called for strong measures

<sup>142</sup> Sublime Porte, Ministère des Finances, *Budget des recettes et des dépenses de l'exercice 1291 (1875-76)* (Constantinople, 1875); Elliott to Derby, #524, confidential, 7 September 1875; #525, 7 September 1875; FO 78/2386; Elliot to Derby, #581, 24 September 1875; #591, 26 September 1875; #617, confidential, 30 September 1875, and encl., FO 78/2387; *Levant Herald*, 24 September and 7 October (weekly edition) 1875.

<sup>143</sup> DuVelay, *Histoire financière*, pp. 326-334, with the official pronouncements; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 123-124.

<sup>144</sup> *Le Stamboul*, 7 October 1875. Cf. Jenks, *British Capital*, p. 320: "a very sensible moratorium."

<sup>145</sup> Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı suânat*, pp. 54-55; Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," p. 393; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 103; D. C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1929), pp. 78-80. Cherbuliez, "L'Angleterre et la Russie en Orient," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, x (1896), 65-66, absolves Ignatyev of all advance knowledge and implicates Elliot. Jenks, *British Capital*, p. 320, calls Ignatyev's advice "disinterested." Ignatyev's motives and actions are still obscure. Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 65, says that the British and French embassies reportedly were consulted and offered no objection.

against the Balkan rebels had aroused many Turks against the government and the sultan. Naturally the default irritated European bondholders, who would be less likely to support a defaulting government. More important for the immediate political situation, the default affected adversely a good many Ottomans who had invested in their government's bonds—not only Greeks and Armenians, but Turks as well, among the wealthier and influential official class. This was true both in the capital and in provincial cities.<sup>146</sup> Just after the announcement of default some passengers on a Bosphorus ferry with rather bitter irony offered half the ticket price in cash and five-year bonds for the remainder.<sup>147</sup> Such men would be unlikely to give continued support to the government of Mahmud Nedim, and perhaps would turn against Abdülaziz. They were thus, by the events of 1875, thrown together temporarily with common conservative Turks and with disciples of the New Ottomans, all of whom, for one reason or another, were discontented with the government. Leadership for the discontented would soon be supplied by Midhat and Hüseyin Avni, both of whom were by late fall out of the government.

<sup>146</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet*, pp. 131-132, n.113; Burnaby, *On Horseback*, II, 34-35; Baker, *Turkey*, p. 392; Raschdau, "Nachlass . . . Dr. Busch," p. 397, n.1; Edwin Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople* (New York, 1916), p. 52. Cevdet Paşa, in Mardin, *Cevdet*, charges that Midhat, Mahmud Nedim, and Ignatyev made use of advance knowledge of the default to sell off bonds and profit greatly. The charge is unproven, at least as regards Midhat. Cf. Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part I, 347, n.23; İnal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, pp. 396-397.

<sup>147</sup> *Levant Herald*, 9 October 1875.

## CHAPTER IX

### 1876—THE YEAR OF THE THREE SULTANS

As the autumn of 1875 wore on into winter, it became increasingly clear that both men and events were conspiring to effect some sort of political upheaval within the Ottoman Empire. Any government would have experienced great difficulty in solving all the problems that confronted the Porte. Mahmud Nedim's government proved quite unable to deal effectively with the problems of insurrection and finance and unable, above all, to allay the popular discontent sprung from Christian revolt, European diplomatic intervention, pan-Slav pressure, famine, economic distress, and the rising tide of Muslim feeling. By the spring of 1876 this general discontent, focussed on the Ottoman government, found leadership in strategically placed groups of civil officials, military leaders, and theological students whose temporary coalescence made possible the coup d'état of May 30.

Had the Turks acted vigorously at the very inception of the revolt to put it down, or had the consuls of the European powers found a solution in the fall of 1875, the whole course of events that ensued might have been altered. But such was not the case. The revolt spread into Bosnia, increased in ferocity, found succor from across the frontiers of Montenegro, Serbia, and Austria-Hungary, and received backing among pan-Slavs. European opinion generally sided with the rebels, and although none of the great powers wanted to precipitate a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, all became involved in discussions about the situation, while elements within the Austro-Hungarian and Russian governments sought a disposition of Bosnia-Herzegovina that would be favorable to one or the other of them.<sup>1</sup> The Muslim feeling which had been growing among Turks since the early 1870's began to express itself not only against the rebels, but against other Christians of the empire and against the European powers. Occasional outrages were committed against Christians, an undercurrent of opposition to Christians existed in various cities, including Istanbul itself,

<sup>1</sup> The diplomatic complications among the European powers may best be followed in William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1950); David Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year* (Stanford, 1936); B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880* (New York, 1937); R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics* (London, 1935).

and some papers in the capital began to accuse Europe of religious fanaticism.<sup>2</sup> Matters were not improved by an abortive rising of Bulgarian revolutionaries in September, which led the Porte to enroll Muslim irregulars in Balkan towns to be prepared for any such future risings.<sup>3</sup>

A possible diplomatic solution to the crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared on December 30, 1875, in the form of the Andrassy Note, worked out by the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister and approved by the other five great powers.<sup>4</sup> The Porte protested vigorously against receiving this reform program for the two provinces in the form of an identic or collective note, and was generally unhappy about foreign interference, saying to the British government with remarkably accurate foreboding that acceptance of such a note "would be fatal to [Sultan Abdülaziz's] influence over his subjects: and the discontent which would be produced by such a step would endanger his throne."<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, in an effort to avoid further foreign interference, the Porte accepted the proposed plan with slight reservations.<sup>6</sup> Had it been applied by the Porte with the backing of the six powers, further immediate trouble in the empire might have been forestalled. But the insurgents themselves rejected the Andrassy Note as affording insufficient guarantees for enforcement. They used such language as "Our blood cries for revenge!" and "Now or never."<sup>7</sup> Mahmud Nedim's government was thus, in the eyes of its public, saddled with a double failure: it had given in to outside Christian interference, and no beneficial results in Bosnia-Herzegovina had come from this weakness. The Porte was worried about public reaction, did not release the text of the Note to the press, and imposed prepublication censorship on all news stories concerning it.<sup>8</sup>

Such governmental action pointed up the new importance of public opinion in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the capital. There had always been in Ottoman history public opinion of a sort, which had

<sup>2</sup> Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), I, 203-219, 272-312; *Stamboul*, 2 and 5 October 1875; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #455, 23 December 1875; ABCFM, Eastern Turkey Mission I, #462, 27 January 1876.

<sup>3</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #551, 27 October 1875.

<sup>4</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5580.

<sup>5</sup> Harris, *Diplomatic History*, pp. 210-211, quoting Rasid to Musurus, 3 January 1876, FO 78/2527, and Derby to Elliot, 14 January 1876, FO 78/2448.

<sup>6</sup> *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5587.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, #5588-#5591.

<sup>8</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #568 and #569, 9 and 16 February 1876.

operated in political terms even to the point of sanctioning the deposition of some dozen sultans.<sup>9</sup> But by 1875 the growth of the press in Istanbul, the propaganda activities of the New Ottomans, and the growing familiarity of members of the elite groups with the European press and public opinion had given this force an added significance. Accounts of events in these years by contemporaries are full of references to *efkâr-ı umumiye*, public opinion. More than in 1859 at the time of the Kuleli incident, more than in 1867 when some of the New Ottomans planned a coup, the coup of May 1876 represented fairly a public opinion among Turks of the empire which was more and more turned against the government. As in both of the earlier years, opinions voiced were partly conservative, complaining about concessions to Christians and governmental weakness under pressure, and partly liberal, complaining of governmental autocracy. But they were invariably antigovernment. Such sentiments reached out into the provinces, bolstered by the economic distress. "I repeatedly heard with my own ears," wrote the *Times* correspondent in early 1876, "old Mussulmans in remote and peaceful villages of Asia Minor . . . say that 'the Herzegovinians were their best friends, as they were at war against the government, and Inshallah! it might be hoped they would hold out till they had altogether overthrown it.'"<sup>10</sup>

Mahmud Nedim was at first the prime target of the rising discontent. The Austrian ambassador thought him the only progressive Ottoman official who had energy and prestige, but this was obviously untrue.<sup>11</sup> The grand vezir was popularly criticized for his ineffectiveness, his connections with the Russian embassy, and for his attempted reforms.<sup>12</sup> At least by January of 1876 there were rumors of plots afoot to overthrow his government.<sup>13</sup> The criticism did not stop there, however, but went on to include Abdülaziz himself. This had been encouraged by the fact that Mahmud Nedim, as he had during his first grand vezirate, made a great parade of attributing to the sultan

<sup>9</sup> Cf. A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford, 1956), pp. 59-60; H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I, part 1 (London, 1950), 38.

<sup>10</sup> Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 295.

<sup>11</sup> Zichy to Andassy, 14 December 1875, HHS, Varia Turquie I, #96AG, quoted in Harris, *Diplomatic History*, p. 160, n.85.

<sup>12</sup> Ahmed Saib, *Vaka-i Sultan Abdülaziz* (Cairo, 1320), pp. 190-191; Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 149.

<sup>13</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #563, 12 January 1876, and III, #29, 18 January 1876. Cf. Elliot to Derby, #181, 10 February 1876, FO 78/2455.



the responsibility for governmental actions. The majority of people, says Cevdet, began to find courage to mutter slanders against the sultan himself.<sup>14</sup> Rumors about possible deposition of the sultan began to be current in the fall of 1875, though these were perhaps not so widely believed as other rumors that Abdülaziz's health was deteriorating.<sup>15</sup> The public regard for the sultan, in any case, declined noticeably through the winter of 1875-1876. Suspicions that Abdülaziz continued to spend large sums while the empire was in financial straits, and that he demanded payment of his Ottoman debt coupons in full when other bondholders received only half, added to his unpopularity. The whole financial situation was, in fact, becoming worse, not better. Salaries of government employees, including military men, were months in arrears, while the Porte accumulated enough funds to meet the half payment on the debt coupons due in January. The payment was met, but at the cost of mounting dissatisfaction especially in Istanbul, where government was the biggest industry. English workmen employed at the imperial dockyard actually went on strike to get their pay; Turks did not go that far, but grumbled. Meanwhile, despite the imposition of new taxes, the financial situation of the government declined to the point where the April coupon payment was defaulted in its entirety. Business generally was in a slump; many individuals were economically distressed.<sup>16</sup>

Mahmud Nedim's government was not behindhand in issuing the various sorts of reform edicts usual to such a period of tension. Fermans went out to provincial valis urging them zealously and impartially to administer justice and to see that all vilayet meclises were freely elected and that members were equally treated and were given freedom of expression.<sup>17</sup> An irade of October 2, 1875, remitted the

<sup>14</sup> Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Medeni hukuk cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa* (Istanbul, 1946), p. 133, n.114. Cf. ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #455, 23 December 1875.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, #550, 20 October 1875; Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 133, n.114; Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 236-238; *Levant Herald*, 18 February 1876.

<sup>16</sup> Raschdau, "Aus dem politischen Nachlass des Unterstaatssekretärs Dr. Busch," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 137 (1908), 397, n.1; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #29, 18 January 1876, and II, #365, 26 January 1876, #575, 5 April 1876, and Western Turkey Mission I, #462, 6 April 1876; *Levant Herald*, 11 January 1876; Elliot to Derby, #11, 4 January 1876, and #78, secret, 20 January 1876, FO 78/2454; #110, confidential, 26 January 1876, FO 78/2455; #226, 22 February 1876, and #240, 28 February 1876, FO 78/2456; Maynard to Fish, #36, 15 November 1875, USNA, Turkey 28.

<sup>17</sup> Texts in Benoît Brunswik, *La Turquie, ses créanciers, et la diplomatie* (Paris, 1875), pp. 101-103, 109-111.

extra two and a half per cent which had been added to the tithe on agricultural produce, as well as certain arrears in taxes; it repeated that vilayet councils were to have elected members truly representative of the local communities; and it promised that delegates from vilayet assemblies should come to Istanbul to make known their wishes on future reforms. The delegates were, however, not to assemble like a national chamber, but to come to Istanbul in separate groups.<sup>18</sup> A yet more sweeping ferman of December 12 promised tax reform, judicial reform, equality of all citizens of the empire in eligibility to public office, and full religious liberty.<sup>19</sup> Further lengthy and detailed instructions to provincial valis issued on February 21, 1876, again emphasized free elections to the provincial councils, recommended to the valis tours of provincial inspection and new regulations on prisons and police, and told them to apply the recent reforms. A sop to the minorities was offered by the provision that court decisions would, where necessary, be rendered into Greek, Armenian, "Bosnian," Bulgarian, and Arabic.<sup>20</sup>

These were all fundamentally restatements of reforms attempted in the Tanzimat period, incorporating the principle of Osmanlılık. The *Levant Herald* thought that, since the ferman of December 12 simply strengthened promises already made, it was not too ambitious for fulfillment.<sup>21</sup> Yet it is hard to take these reform edicts seriously, in view of the past record of Mahmud Nedim and of the fact that at this juncture he was simply trying to keep the great powers off his neck with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina by promising reforms for the empire as a whole. What is more, although these reforms were issued under the pressure of diplomatic events and with the encouragement of the British ambassador, Sir Henry Elliot, they owed even more to Mahmud Nedim's friend Ignatyev. Ignatyev's interest was simply to quiet the Ottoman Christians for the moment, since Russia was not ready to partition the Ottoman Empire; to keep his influence with Abdülaziz and Mahmud Nedim; to keep the initiative with regard to the Eastern Question in his own hands and out of Andrassy's; and to urge Turkish reforms "favorable to the future centrifugal develop-

<sup>18</sup> Text in *ibid.*, pp. 106-108; *Staatsarchiv*, 29 (1876), #5567.

<sup>19</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5575. Original French text as distributed in Elliot to Derby, #833, 14 December 1875, FO 28/2391.

<sup>20</sup> Text in Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-1888), v, 50-59; George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman* (Oxford, 1905-1906), I, 88-95.

<sup>21</sup> *Levant Herald*, 18 December 1875.

ment of the Slavs."<sup>22</sup> Since the public knew of Mahmud Nedim's closeness to the Russian ambassador, they tended to be sceptical of the grand vezir's moves.<sup>23</sup> His whole performance gives the impression of frenzied activity to stay in office, to ward off the powers, to appease the general domestic discontent, and to offer a little something to the Balkan rebels.

Mahmud Nedim did set up machinery for carrying out reforms which, if it had worked, might have improved the situation. An eight-man executive council, four Muslims and four Christians, was created to supervise the execution of the announced measures, and to it was added a control commission which would revive again the principle of travelling commissioners of inspection to check on provincial administration and hear complaints.<sup>24</sup> There is no evidence that the council or the control commission actually functioned. A yet more promising move was made in January 1876, when Raşid Paşa, the foreign minister, called an unprecedented interdenominational conference in which were represented Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Roman Catholics, and Protestants, to discuss ways and means of reform. These non-Muslims were so outspoken in their demands for complete equality, for genuine Osmanlılık, that the government was embarrassed, and no more was heard of such conferences.<sup>25</sup> Odian Efendi, already committed to Midhat's cause, was one of the most forthright, in his quality as representative of the Gregorian Armenians. Curiously, two Armenians did sit briefly as members of the council of ministers during Mahmud Nedim's vezirate.<sup>26</sup> This looked like a real step toward Osmanlılık, but the appearance was deceiving. Artin Dadian Efendi was only acting foreign minister briefly in November 1875, while the new appointee Raşid was coming back from his ambassadorship in Vienna.<sup>27</sup> This was chance. Abraham Paşa was made minister without

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Onou, "The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev," *Slavonic Review*, x (December 1931), 401-404; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 146-150; Harris, *Diplomatic History*, pp. 139, 163-165.

<sup>23</sup> Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal* (İstanbul, 1944-1956), I, 127-128, n.4.

<sup>24</sup> *Levant Herald*, 20, 21, and 23 December 1875; Elliot to Derby, #854, 23 December 1875, and #871, 30 December 1875, with encl., FO 78/2391; text in Aris-tarchi, *Législation*, v, 34-35.

<sup>25</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #30, 22 January 1876, and II, #457, 28 January 1876.

<sup>26</sup> Only one Christian had ever been elevated to that eminence before, and that was Krikor Agaton in 1868 as minister of public works.

<sup>27</sup> İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzamlar* (İstanbul, 1940-1953), I, 47, n.1; Elliot to Derby, #745, 12 November 1875, FO 78/2390.

portfolio in the last month of Mahmud Nedim's grand vezirate. But Abraham was the ex-agent of the khedive Ismail, was close to Abdülaziz, and was suspect to almost everybody. He hardly represented his millet.<sup>28</sup>



The total impact of Mahmud Nedim's second grand vezirate, stretching from August 25, 1875, to May 11, 1876, was thus to create more rather than less dissatisfaction with the Ottoman government. Almost all groups of Ottoman society, for one reason or another, seemed to oppose him and his policies. The men most likely to provide leadership for this opposition were the two who had left Mahmud Nedim's cabinet in the fall of 1875. One of these was Hüseyin Avni Paşa, who had presumably been a personal enemy of Mahmud Nedim ever since his exile from the capital by Mahmud Nedim during the latter's first grand vezirate in 1871. Though he had himself been grand vezir for fourteen months in 1874-1875, Hüseyin Avni was still ambitious of power, and even contemplated the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz. During a trip he took in 1875 to Vichy for the cure he is said to have spoken of a plot already afoot, in collaboration with Midhat, to overturn the government.<sup>29</sup> As minister of war in Mahmud Nedim's government Hüseyin Avni did not last long, forced out on October 2, 1875, evidently because of the personal antagonism between the two men and because Hüseyin Avni wanted much more vigorous measures taken against the Balkan rebels.<sup>30</sup> Thereafter Hüseyin Avni seems to have bent all his efforts to toppling Mahmud Nedim from power. He was named vali of Salonika to get him out of the capital, managed to get that appointment changed to Bursa, which was nearer the capital, and delayed his departure as long as he could.<sup>31</sup> When Hüseyin Avni's house in Istanbul burned in mid-December, rumors sped around the capital that the fire revealed a great store of arms laid up in his house and that these were destined for an

<sup>28</sup> *Stamboul*, 19 April 1876; Elliot to Derby, #396, confidential, 19 April 1876, FO 78/2457.

<sup>29</sup> Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), pp. 271-275. Several details of the story are garbled, but Mismar could not have made the story up out of whole cloth.

<sup>30</sup> Elliot to Derby, #618 and #619, both 2 October 1875; FO 78/2388; *Levant Herald*, 4 October 1875.

<sup>31</sup> *Stamboul* for December, passim; Elliot to Derby, #784, 25 November 1875, FO 78/2390, and #836, confidential, 19 December 1875, FO 78/2391.

insurrection.<sup>32</sup> Whatever the truth about his clandestine activities over the winter of 1875-1876, Hüseyin Avni's motives seem to have been, aside from particular enmities, a personal drive for power and a patriotic determination to crush the Balkan rebellion and thwart the increasing Russian influence. He was no constitutionalist, despite his association with discussions of constitutional government in 1873, and a Tanzimat man only in so far as army reform went. But his ability, his patriotism, and his political eminence might bring him a considerable following, especially among military men, should he attempt to lead a coup against the government.<sup>33</sup>

The other and politically more effective opponent of Mahmud Nedim was Midhat Paşa. Minister of justice since August, Midhat felt that Mahmud Nedim's conduct toward the rebels was too weak, offered them too many concessions, and that his proposed reforms would provide no cure for the financial and political weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the fall of 1875. Evidently a real argument took place in the council of ministers toward the end of November, whereupon an announcement in the press that Midhat was confined to his house by a slight indisposition was followed by another that he had resigned.<sup>34</sup> Resignation was unusual enough in the Ottoman system to cause public comment, but it was almost unprecedented for Midhat to write out his reasons for resignation in a memorandum to the Palace. This move was bound to have an impact on the public because of Midhat's relative popularity. Furthermore, the memorandum circulated in manuscript in Istanbul.<sup>35</sup> Midhat, in fact, wrote two letters of resignation, the first of which modestly asked Abdülaziz to release him from his burdensome office and give him one in internal administration more suited to his training as a provincial governor.<sup>36</sup> But when asked by the Palace for further explanation, or possibly to reconsider, Midhat painted a dark picture of the international and internal situation of the empire, implying his dissatisfaction with meas-

<sup>32</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #560, 22 December 1875; Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 128-132.

<sup>33</sup> Süleyman Paşa, *Hiss-i inkılâb* (Istanbul, 1326), pp. 9-10, 17; Ahmed Saib, *Vaka-i Sultan Abdülaziz*, pp. 167-168; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876; "Zapiski Grapha N. P. Ignatyeva (1864-1874)," *Izvestiia Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del*, 1915, I, 156-158; E. de Kératry, *Mourad V* (Paris, 1878), pp. 103-105.

<sup>34</sup> *Stamboul*, 29 and 30 November, 1875.

<sup>35</sup> Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 107.

<sup>36</sup> Text, dated 28 November 1875 (29 şevval 1292), in Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûnat* (Izmir, 1328), pp. 134-135; also encl. in Elliot to Derby, #831, 14 December 1875, FO 78/2391.

ures taken to deal with the powers, the rebels, the Christian subjects generally, and the financial crisis.<sup>37</sup> Quite possibly Midhat had gone farther than this in expressing his views in the council of ministers, for reports then current said he had compared the empire to a ship without captain or rudder, and had proposed a partly elective council to control budget and finances, as well as complete equality of all subjects before the law and a further decentralization and democratization of provincial rule.<sup>38</sup> Midhat, in fact, repeated privately to Elliot such views, and told the British ambassador that he wanted to go beyond first steps, to institute a senate which, nominated by the government at first, would become elective and exercise a constitutional control over the sultan. He shared, said Midhat, the general opinion now current that in view of Abdülaziz's character real improvement would be nearly hopeless without such control.<sup>39</sup>

Presumably from this period dates Midhat's intensive drive to secure a constitution for the Ottoman Empire. The statesman who earlier had spoken most clearly for constitutional government, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, had died just at the beginning of December 1875.<sup>40</sup> Midhat was now the most prominent of the few politicians who held such ideas.<sup>41</sup> It would be interesting to have a day-by-day account of Midhat's activities during the next five months, but unfortunately no such is available. Undoubtedly he employed his leisure, as he may have done during his previous eighteen months' unemployment before he became minister of justice, to win support for his ideas. He certainly was fairly close to the British ambassador, and this, in turn, may have given him added prestige among those who were concerned to combat Ignatyev's influence. It may also have given him hopes of British

<sup>37</sup> Text, also dated 28 November 1875, in A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Paşa, hayat-ı siyasiyesi*, vol. 1, *Tabsıra-i ibret* (Istanbul, 1325), 157, n.1; A. H. Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903), pp. 67-68 (here misdated 1874); encl. in Elliot to Derby, #321, confidential, 30 March 1876, FO 78/2456, probably as supplied by Midhat himself to Elliot.

<sup>38</sup> Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 158-159; Sandison to Elliot, #120, confidential, 5 December 1875, encl. in Elliot to Derby, #819, confidential, 6 December 1875, FO 78/2391; Elliot to Derby, #820, 10 December 1875, FO 78/2391.

<sup>39</sup> Elliot to Derby, #831 and #832, confidential, both 14 December 1875, FO 78/2391. Cf. Henry Elliot, "The Death of Abdul Aziz and of Turkish Reform," *Nineteenth Century*, 23 (February 1888), 279-280, which exaggerates Midhat's views slightly.

<sup>40</sup> Elliot to Derby, #812, 5 December 1875, FO 78/2391.

<sup>41</sup> Halil Şerif had similar views. It has been said, though the author cannot ascertain the facts, that Midhat, Halil Şerif, and Elliot worked up a constitutional draft in the winter of 1875-1876: (Cherbuliez), "L'Angleterre et la Russie en Orient," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, x (1896), 68.

support.<sup>42</sup> Midhat did have something of a personal following already, based on a reputation for honesty and good provincial administration, and demonstrated by the popular acclaim that had greeted his appointment as grand vezir in 1872. He would attract those affected by New Ottoman sentiments, those affected by salary arrears and economic distress, and those opposed to Mahmud Nedim and his catering to Abdülaziz's whims. Midhat also seems to have spent considerable effort to win support among the ulema for his views on the need for a constitutional check on the sultan, arguing that the constitutional method (*usul-u meşveret*, "the method of consultation") did not contravene religious law, but rather was in accord with it.<sup>43</sup>

What Midhat and those associated with him were contemplating was better known after the issuance on March 9, 1876, of an anonymous manifesto signed by "the Muslim patriots." Probably Midhat was the principal author of the document, though it may have been written by someone close to him.<sup>44</sup> It is likely that Odian Efendi, long an advocate of some form of constitutional government, was involved in the drafting; possibly Hüseyin Avni and Kayserili Ahmed Paşa, minister of marine, were informed about it.<sup>45</sup> Midhat was the only individual mentioned by name in the document, as an able administrator in the Danube vilayet and as the "enlightened and courageous head of the energetic and moderate party." The manifesto was sent to such European statesmen as Disraeli, Derby, Granville, MacMahon, Thiers, Gambetta, Bismarck, and Visconti Venosta in an effort to show them that further European intervention in Ottoman affairs would only exacerbate the internal situation. It was not, and could not

<sup>42</sup> *Stamboul*, 21 and 22 December 1875; George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople* (Boston, 1909), p. xx.

<sup>43</sup> Ahmed Saib, *Vaka-i Sultan Abdülaziz*, pp. 145-146; Clician Vassif, *Son Aïesse Midhat-Pacha* (Paris, 1909), p. 36. Cf. Ignatyev's reports of April 1876 on the discontent and Midhat's use of it: IŪ. A. Petrosian, "*Novye Osmany*" i bor'ba za konstitutsiū (Moscow, 1958), pp. 84-85.

<sup>44</sup> Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, p. 44, says Midhat drafted a reform memorandum, quite possibly this one or its basis; Ahmed Saib, *Tarih-i Sultan Murad-ı Hamis* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 173-174, attributes it to a group of liberals assembled around Midhat; *Stamboul*, 2 June 1876, attributes it to "the men at the head of the great liberal movement inaugurated by the softas"; Frédéric Macler, *Autour de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1917), p. 269, following an Armenian source, says it is attributed to Midhat and Odian; Andreas D. Mordtmann, *Stambul und das moderne Türkenenthum* (Leipzig, 1877-1878), II, 90-91, says that Odian, then undersecretary of public works, translated it into French; *Diplomatic Review*, 24 (July 1876), 161, says the document reportedly was drawn up by a Pole, but gives no name. This journal opposed a parliament such as the manifesto advocated.

<sup>45</sup> Mordtmann, *Stambul*, II, 90-91.

be, printed in the Ottoman Empire until there was a change in sultans, and appeared in public print only on June 2 after Abdülaziz had been deposed.<sup>46</sup> But the manifesto was sufficiently broadcast so that it must have become known not only to the government of Mahmud Nedim, but to wider circles in the capital also.

Many of the points made in the manifesto bore a close resemblance to those Midhat had been making already.<sup>47</sup> It began by pointing out that the reforms proposed by Europe would antagonize the Muslims by seeming to grant special privileges to Christians and to rebels, and that the promise of reforms would further antagonize the Christians because the wretched government of Abdülaziz and Mahmud Nedim would not carry them out. The manifesto then cited evidence of corruption and bad government and of the critical financial situation, laying the blame for all faults at the door of the autocratic system wherein the sultan had ultimately uncontrolled freedom. Muslims suffered from this as much as Christians. The remedy proposed was a consultative assembly, representative of all races and creeds in the empire, which should serve as a counterweight to the sultan. The assembly, it was recognized, could not function perfectly from its inception, and might begin with limited powers over internal affairs only. The eventual model would be the English form of government. Abdülaziz was called a "miserable madman," and his deposition considered a possible, though not an inevitable, necessity. Great stress was laid on the supposed religious prescriptions that the sultan, to be legitimately possessed of his power and place, must be accepted by the nation and take counsel of the nation. The whole tone of the document continued the emphasis of the Tanzimat period on Ottoman brotherhood. It seemed further to echo the constitutional demands of Mustafa Fazıl's letter of 1867. But Mustafa Fazıl's letter had implored the sultan himself to bring about such a change. Now, in 1876, the "Muslim patriots" despaired of the sultan and seemed to look more to their own efforts.

Rasid Paşa, foreign minister in Mahmud Nedim's government, was well aware of the opposition after the appearance of this manifesto, if he had not been before. When asked in March why further con-

<sup>46</sup> *Stamboul*, 2 June 1876, used its whole front page for the text of the manifesto; *Vakit* and *Basiret* also printed it in full, probably a day or two later: *Stamboul*, 6 June 1876.

<sup>47</sup> Text, in addition to *Stamboul* of June 2, is in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5642, and in Mordtmann, *Stambul*, II, 94-106.

cessions could not be made to Montenegro and the Bosnians, he replied that "if we made propositions to the Sultan tomorrow in this sense, in the evening we shall already be deprived of our positions and Midhat, Hussein and Derwisch Pascha, who are on the watch, come in here."<sup>48</sup> Hüseyin Avni was in Bursa as governor, but he may still have been in touch with Midhat, and may even have come closer to backing Midhat's liberal plans simply because of anger over his provincial exile. Just how the planning to overthrow Mahmud Nedim's government developed it is impossible to say. Midhat's memoirs, as edited by his son, are silent on this point.<sup>49</sup> "Counsel was being taken in Midhat's Konak," says his son in another place, "among a few patriots who did not yet despair of their country, as to the best mode of saving the empire."<sup>50</sup> Midhat's secretary may be more accurate in reporting that Midhat, during his period out of office in 1875-1876, often saw Hüseyin Avni, Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi, and Hayrullah Efendi, a prominent member of the ulema; was in touch with the erstwhile New Ottoman, Ziya Bey; and was also in touch with the heir apparent, Murad, who is said to have approved the reform memorandum drawn up by Midhat.<sup>51</sup> Midhat evidently proposed to Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi, who was a generally respected elder statesman now also out of office, that the two go together to the palace in an attempt to make Abdülaziz aware of the serious dangers confronting the state and to get him to change the personnel of the ministry. But Mehmed Rüşdi, always a cautious as well as a moderate man, thought the maneuver too risky.<sup>52</sup> Midhat may also have been in touch with various Greeks of the capital.<sup>53</sup> Whether he received from Sir Henry Elliot anything more than general moral support in this period must remain open to conjecture; Elliot's dispatches indicate a general knowledge of Midhat's political views, but no intimate connection.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Dr. K., *Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Serdar Ekrem Omer Pascha* (Sarajevo, 1885), pp. 269-270. Almost the same account in *idem*, *Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit* (Vienna, 1905), p. 46. Derviş Paşa was a general.

<sup>49</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 162-63.

<sup>50</sup> *Idem*, *Life*, p. 77.

<sup>51</sup> Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 36-44. Cf. Mahmud Celaledin Paşa, *Mirât-i hakikat* (Istanbul, 1326), I, 104.

<sup>52</sup> Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 37-39; İ. H. Uzuncarsılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdî Paşaların tevkişlerine dair vesika'ar* (Ankara, 1946), p. 53, giving Midhat's own later account.

<sup>53</sup> Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 80-82.

<sup>54</sup> Elliot has been pictured by some as an active participant in plans for the overthrow of Mahmud Nedim, which would, of course, decrease Russian influence in

Whatever plans were being developed for the overthrow of Mahmud Nedim must have received added impetus from events in the Balkans, news of which raised the pitch of Muslim, anti-Russian, and anti-government sentiment in the capital. Montenegro, late in April, was practically in an open state of war against the Porte, as support flowed across its border to the rebels; yet Mahmud Nedim's government still took insufficient measures to combat this aggression.<sup>55</sup> At about the same time news came to Istanbul that Turkish, Austrian, and Russian diplomatic documents published in Europe showed that Russia as early as 1870 had been arousing Montenegro and the Slav provinces.<sup>56</sup> Also in early May came the rising of Bulgar revolutionaries, pledged to terrorist methods. They had earlier planned to burn Istanbul and other major cities; in May they began to massacre Turks in the Bulgar area.<sup>57</sup> It is important to note that, despite the European sentiment about "Bulgarian massacres" which arose from the indubitably bloody repression of the revolt by Turkish irregulars, Turkish sentiment regarded the revolt as a massacre of helpless Turks by Bulgar rebels incited by Russia.<sup>58</sup> A measure of the Muslim excitement was the assassination on May 6 in Salonika of the French and German consuls—the unfortunate by-product of action by an excited

Istanbul. Cf. Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 82, 86-88; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, II, 134; Cherbuliez, "L'Angleterre et la Russie," pp. 67-69. The latter also charges H. A. Munro Butler-Johnstone, a conservative M.P. for Canterbury, with furnishing funds to arm the theological students in Istanbul: *ibid.*, pp. 70-71. Butler-Johnstone was one of those curious English Turcophiles of the Urquhart school who backed the Turks against Russia. He was a friend of such mavericks as Ali Suavi and Ahmed Vefik, and wrote in 1875 and 1876 articles advocating moderate Turkish reform based on the Koran, some of which were translated into Turkish. Cf. H. A. Munro Butler-Johnstone, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford, 1875), and *The Turks* (London, 1876); also *Diplomatic Review*, 24 (July 1876), 160-161. See, further, on Butler-Johnstone, Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, pp. 129-130; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 237.

<sup>55</sup> Gallenga, *Two Years*, I, 287-299; Elliot to Derby, #439, 28 April 1876, FO 78/2457.

<sup>56</sup> *Levant Herald*, 29 April 1876. The Russians said the documents were fabricated or altered; Elliot said he ascertained that at least some of them were "beyond all question generally, although not in all cases literally, authentic." Elliot to Derby, #433, 27 April 1876, FO 78/2457.

<sup>57</sup> Alois Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft* (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 249-293; V. K. Sugareff, "The Constitution of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee," *Journal of Modern History*, IV (December 1932), 572-580.

<sup>58</sup> Süleyman Paşa, *Hiss-i inkilâb*, p. 5; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 August 1876, quoting *Basiret*. The reports that reached Europe of Bulgar casualties resulting from Turkish countermeasures were also exaggerated and Russian-inspired, as one of Ignatyev's chief assistants admitted: Nelidow, "Souvenirs d'avant et d'après la guerre de 1877-1878," *Revue des deux mondes*, 6th period, 27 (1915), 331-332.

Muslim mob seeking to rescue from some Greeks a Greek Orthodox Bulgarian girl who had announced her intention of adopting Islam.<sup>59</sup> It was a crime, said Süleyman Paşa, director of the military academy, but also a sign that the Islamic millet was losing patience over constant humiliation of religion and the Muslim community, and showed that a religious and national zeal still existed among Muslims.<sup>60</sup>

The tension in İstanbul was almost visible in early May. It was feared that Muslim sentiment might erupt into outrages against the Christian inhabitants. Mahmud Nedim and Abdülaziz were more than ever unpopular. A rising might be directed against them. Gun merchants in the bazaar did a brisk trade, mostly with Muslims, but also with Christians.<sup>61</sup> Ignatyev contributed to the tension by hiring several hundred Croats or Montenegrins to serve as armed guards for his embassy. It was also rumored in the capital that Sultan Abdülaziz, fearing for his own safety, was about to request that thirty thousand Russian soldiers be sent to protect him.<sup>62</sup> The popular reaction was to accuse Mahmud Nedim of complicity, presumably in cahoots with Ignatyev. The Russian ambassador also was reported to have tried to fan religious feeling into open Muslim-Christian warfare in İstanbul itself, by hiring a few Bulgars to dress like softas, or Muslim theological students, and go about in Christian quarters threatening massacre.<sup>63</sup> Whether the rumors were true or false, the effect was the same. The government, fearing outbreaks and inflammatory moves, had already suspended all private telegraphic communication with the outside world. On May 8 it forbade news vendors to call out the headlines, and the next day announced preliminary censorship of all papers—a move which the conservative *Basiret* met with a sardonic issue of three blank pages and a fourth page of advertisements.<sup>64</sup> In fact, no outbreaks against Christians occurred in İstanbul, and sentiment there was directed principally against the government. Possibly Abdülaziz realized this, as possibly also did his mother, the Valide

<sup>59</sup> Documents on the affair in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5733-#5758.

<sup>60</sup> *Hiss-i inkılâb*, p. 5.

<sup>61</sup> Elliot to Derby, #467, 7 May 1876, #474 and #475, both 9 May 1876, #478, 10 May 1876, all FO 78/2457.

<sup>62</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 163-164; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb* (İstanbul, 1294-1295), I, 209.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 207-209; H. Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz* (İstanbul, 1949), p. 66; Kératry, *Mourad V*, p. 93.

<sup>64</sup> *Stamboul*, 5, 9, and 10 May 1876; *Levant Herald*, 9 May 1876; Ahmed Rasim, *İstibdadın hakimiyesi milliyeye* (İstanbul, 1924), II, 126, n.1.

Sultan. She sent an intermediary to see Midhat at his farm, asking his remedy for current problems. Midhat hinted, not too cautiously, at a constitution in his reply that the need was for administration based on law and the equality of Christians and Muslims; mere military measures would not suffice. But Midhat's prescription was too drastic for the Valide Sultan to suggest to "her lion."<sup>65</sup> Mahmud Nedim undoubtedly realized the threat to the government. He may have tried to get Midhat out of the capital.

Midhat was dangerous because of his reputation and influence among various segments of the population, and now especially among the theological students of the capital. The softas, whose numbers in İstanbul were variously estimated at five thousand to sixty thousand, were publicly and pointedly restless toward the end of the first week in May, buying weapons and threatening mass action.<sup>66</sup> They made themselves the spokesmen of Muslim discontent with a government unable to crush the rebels and fend off the great powers. They represented, in fact, the largest organizable group in the capital, since most soldiers were on campaign in the Balkans. In a way the softas represented public opinion as the Janissaries had at various times in the past. "The unity of the hocas deserved the thanks of the public," wrote a friend in İstanbul, just after the softa action, to Namık Kemal in exile on Cyprus.<sup>67</sup> It is possible that Mahmud Nedim himself attempted to work through the softas, or to assuage them by a bargain concerning the replacement of the current *seyhülislâm*, Hasan Fehmi Efendi, whom the students disliked, with a candidate whom they favored.<sup>68</sup> But it seems unlikely that the theological students could have sided with Mahmud Nedim more than provisionally, given his past record and his complaisance toward Ignatyev. Midhat was

<sup>65</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdî Paşalar*, pp. 53-54.

<sup>66</sup> Both the higher and the lower figures are Elliot's: to Derby, #475, 9 May 1876, FO 78/2457. ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #33, 16 May 1876, gives 10,000 to 40,000 in İstanbul; Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, p. 44, says "more than 10,000"; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 53, says "conservatively" 20,000; Kératry, *Mourad V*, p. 88, gives 30,000 to 40,000. Abdolonyme Ubcini, *La Turquie actuelle* (Paris, 1855), p. 238, had given 22,000 to 25,000 for the Crimean War period.

<sup>67</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part I, 616.

<sup>68</sup> Elliot to Derby, #543, confidential, 27 May 1876, enclosing Sandison to Elliot #41, confidential, 26 May 1876; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı sultânât*, p. 64. Derviş Paşa, ambitious of power, may also have been involved in attempted maneuvers with softas; Elliot, *loc.cit.*; K. G. Bolander, *Förspellet till Balkankrisen på 1870-talet* (Göteborg, 1925), pp. 119-120. Hasan Fehmi, in a prior term as *seyhülislâm*, had been responsible for causing Jemaleddin el Afghani's departure from İstanbul. Could Jemaleddin's influence have been felt among the softas in 1876?

much more their man. Midhat was certainly in close touch with a number of the leading ulema and possibly with some students also. He has been accused by his opponents of setting off the softa demonstrations against Mahmud Nedim by distribution of money in the medreses through the medium of Christaki Efendi, the banker of Prince Murad.<sup>69</sup> Midhat's secretary credits him at least with organizing the softa demonstrations, and Mahmud Nedim also attributed the disorders to Midhat.<sup>70</sup> But it is also possible that the demonstrations were partly spontaneous, as such softa demonstrations had also been in 1853 in another period of Russo-Turkish crisis.<sup>71</sup>

About May 8 or 9 the theological students began to go on strike. The stoppage of study spread from one medrese to another. Some of their professors helped to lead the agitation. In addition to buying arms, the softas organized large meetings at the mosques and heard inflammatory speeches about the weakness of the government in the face of rebellion and Russian influence. A committee was put together. After a mass meeting at the Fatih Mehmed mosque on Wednesday evening, May 10, a petition was drawn up asking Abdülaziz for stronger measures to save the empire and for the dismissal of Mahmud Nedim and the *seyhülislâm*, Hasan Fehmi. On Thursday morning another mass meeting in the Süleymaniye mosque reiterated the students' demands. Both the Palace and the council of ministers were in an agony of indecision, but that morning the dismissal of the two was announced. Meanwhile the streets and squares of Istanbul, especially in front of the Sublime Porte, were filled with five or six thousand softas. Christian merchants, fearing massacre, began to flee their shops, but they were reassured by the softas, and no violence ensued. The rumor spread that Midhat Paşa had been appointed grand vezir, and Halil Şerif foreign minister.<sup>72</sup> Midhat was the man the softas wanted, but the rumor proved false. In fact, while the Palace tried to make up its mind, the government was for a little over twenty-four hours without a grand vezir, and subject to possible mob rule. Again on Friday, May 12, softa bands packed the streets, until it was

<sup>69</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 104; Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 133, n. 114.

<sup>70</sup> Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, p. 44; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 93.

<sup>71</sup> Ubicini, *Turquie actuelle*, pp. 238-239; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 91.

<sup>72</sup> Hüseyin Nazım Bey to Namık Kemal, undated [mid-May 1876] in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part I, 616.

announced that Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi was appointed grand vezir and Hayrullah Efendi appointed *seyhülislâm*. Though these appointments did not fully satisfy the softas, they accepted them at least for the moment, and tension in the capital began to ease. "The past week was one of more excitement and fear than I have witnessed during a long residence in Turkey," wrote an American on the spot.<sup>73</sup> "That violent agitation of the public [i.e., the students] has saved the Islamic nation from a dangerous collapse," wrote at about the same time a man who was a friend of Namık Kemal and the son of a liberal member of the ulema.<sup>74</sup>



The new ministry was strengthened by the addition of Hüseyin Avni, at once brought back from Bursa to be minister of war. This was apparently Abdülaziz's own idea; Mahmud Nedim before his fall had tried in vain to warn the sultan that the throne had more to fear from the ambitious Hüseyin Avni than from anyone else.<sup>75</sup> But what the new ministry might accomplish was problematical, since Abdülaziz and palace officials regarded Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi as overcautious, a chronic complainer and a do-nothing, and a chameleon-like politician who passed his time courting public favor. Hayrullah Efendi they thought of as an intriguer and an ignorant man in the robes of an educated man. Abdülaziz believed that by the ministerial shifts he was appeasing public opinion, and said to Mehmed Rüşdi, "I appointed you because the people wanted you," in a way such as to indicate not that the sultan had regard for the public, but that the grand vezir was only temporarily in office to still the clamor.<sup>76</sup> Abdülaziz evidently wanted to reappoint Mahmud Nedim as soon as possible.

<sup>73</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #33, 16 May 1876.

<sup>74</sup> Hüseyin Nazım Bey to Namık Kemal, in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part I, 616. Accounts of the events of these days in *ibid.*, pp. 615-617; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 91-94; Mehmet Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûnat*, pp. 64-66; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 209-212; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani ve devr-i saltanatı* (Istanbul, 1327), I, 14-17; *Levant Herald*, 12 May 1876; Nelidow, "Souvenirs," pp. 313-318.

<sup>75</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 93. A plan to recall Hüseyin Avni to the ministry, and to get Midhat out of the capital by sending him in Hüseyin's place to Bursa, is, however, attributed to Mahmud Nedim himself two days before his fall by Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûnat*, pp. 65-66, and by Elliot, on indirect information from Abraham Paşa: Elliot to Derby, #543, confidential, 27 May 1876, enclosing Sandison to Elliot, #41, confidential, 26 May 1876.

<sup>76</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 94-96; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûnat*, p. 65; Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdi Paşalar*, p. 102.

In view of public opinion, this would have been a most foolish move, and Mahmud Nedim himself refused to consider another grand vezirate unless Mehmed Rüşdi and Hüseyin Avni and Midhat were banished from the capital. But this the sultan would not dare do now in view of the public temper and the influence of the three men.<sup>77</sup> Mahmud Nedim was really unpopular; nearly three years later deputies in the second session of the Ottoman parliament carried a resolution to try him for crimes and incompetence.<sup>78</sup> Instead, Midhat was added to the ministry after a week, though without portfolio. So was Halil Şerif shortly thereafter. But these constitutionalists were counterbalanced by the simultaneous addition of Derviş Paşa and Namik Paşa, who held opposite views.<sup>79</sup> Even with such changes it was doubtful that the ministers might accomplish much. The Palace still had no confidence in them. Abdülaziz was something of an unknown quantity at this point, and much of the communication with him either went through, or was stopped by, his mother. Mehmed Rüşdi was overhesitant of any action, and did not have much confidence in the outspoken activist Midhat. Midhat probably thought that he should himself be grand vezir. Hayrullah had more intelligence than his enemies gave him credit for and was reasonably liberal, but Hüseyin Avni was no liberal and was a self-seeker.<sup>80</sup> All the ministers were probably annoyed at Midhat's popularity, demonstrated when, just after Mahmud Nedim's fall, a group of softas acclaimed Midhat when they met him at Hayrullah's house. Midhat thereupon made a little speech to the students about the liberal and democratic bases of Islam.<sup>81</sup>

In general, the effects of the demonstrations and of the overthrow of Mahmud Nedim seem to have been two. The first was to increase and consolidate patriotic sentiment—or, put negatively, to increase anti-European, especially anti-Russian, sentiment. The *Levant Herald* printed on May 13 an article accusing Ignatyev of acting out a lie, for European consumption, by importing Croat guards for his em-

<sup>77</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 96; İnal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, p. 298.

<sup>78</sup> Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (unpublished thesis, School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, 1961), p. 303.

<sup>79</sup> *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876; Harris, *Diplomatic History*, p. 330.

<sup>80</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdî Paşalar*, p. 102; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri* (İstanbul, 1339), pp. 202-203; İnal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, pp. 336-337; Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 14-17; J. T. von Eckhardt, "Islamitische Reformbestrebungen der letzten 100 Jahre," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 104 (1900), 58-59.

<sup>81</sup> Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 47-48.

bassy to make it appear as if Christians in Istanbul were in danger. Though the government felt it had to suspend the paper, the editor was thereupon flooded with congratulations by Muslims and Christians, and the issue became a rarity, selling at premium prices.<sup>82</sup> A plan to allow a European group to control certain Ottoman revenues—customs, salt tax, tobacco tax, part of the tithe—in an effort to consolidate and regularize the Ottoman debt, might have been signed by Mahmud Nedim's ministry, but was now thrown in the wastebasket.<sup>83</sup> The Berlin Memorandum, a new project of Andrassy and the Three Emperors' League to settle the Bosnian question, was rather baldly condemned by the new Turkish ministry on May 21.<sup>84</sup> The Turks were, of course, stiffened in their attitude by the knowledge that Britain had not accepted the memorandum, but they looked on it not only as a danger to the Ottoman state, but as evidence of antihumanitarianism and of a new crusading mentality in Europe.<sup>85</sup> The other effect was to increase the drive for further controls over Abdülaziz, particularly his spending, and to bring closer to possible realization, therefore, either a constitutional regime or the deposition of the sultan, or both. In Istanbul in the last two weeks of May there was considerable speculation about a further political coup and about "constitution," which for most people had no particular meaning except that it was some sort of curb on the caprice of the sultan. The softas spoke for this idea. Their agitation was carefully not directed against the local Christians, with whom they were sometimes seen amicably walking, but against European intervention and their own ruler. Koranic texts were circulating to demonstrate that absolutism was a violation of Muslim law.<sup>86</sup> Certain leaders among the ulema prepared a draft

<sup>82</sup> *Levant Herald*, 13 May 1876; Elliot to Derby, #295, 15 May 1876, FO 78/2458; Gertrude Elliot, "Turkey in 1876: A Retrospect," *Nineteenth Century*, 64 (October 1908), 556-558. Though the English were, not too secretly, pleased at the article, the French ambassador was indignant at the attack on a diplomat: Bourgoing to Décazes, #66, AAE, Turquie 404.

<sup>83</sup> Charles Morawitz, *Die Türkei im Spiegel ihrer Finanzen* (Berlin, 1903), p. 57; Elliot to Derby, #352, 7 April 1876, and #374, 13 April 1876, FO 78/2457; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #580, 19 April 1876, and #587, 25 May 1876.

<sup>84</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5690.

<sup>85</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, p. 6.

<sup>86</sup> Elliot to Derby, #512, confidential, 18 May 1876; #528, confidential, 24 May 1876; #543, confidential, 25 May 1876; #536, most confidential, 25 May 1876—all in FO 78/2458; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #466, 18 May 1876, and #467, 25 May 1876.



of a *fetva* of deposition. "There was no doubt but what this request was general," said Midhat later.<sup>87</sup>

How general was any desire for the deposition of Abdülaziz must forever remain a matter of speculation. Though Ottoman sultans had been made and deposed in the past by military men, sometimes acting as agents of a wider popular feeling, deposition of a sultan was still a serious matter. There had been none in the empire for nearly seventy years, since Selim III was dethroned in 1807 by Janissaries rebelling against his innovations, and Mustafa IV deposed by other army units the next year. Yet Abdülaziz had of late certainly been subject to increasing popular criticism, especially in Istanbul. Midhat Paşa was concerned to represent any action taken to change the government as the popular will at work. What the situation in May of 1876 provided was a better opportunity to realize a change, with a large measure of popular support, than had heretofore existed. But the actual planning for the overthrow of the sultan was the secret work of a small group of men, not even with the general approval of the ministers and ulema, as Midhat later claimed.<sup>88</sup> Cevdet Paşa, for instance, who had become minister of education on May 8, had according to his own account no inkling of the deposition before it happened and disapproved of the deed.<sup>89</sup> Some of the small group who did plan the deposition had thought about it at least off and on since the time of Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi's grand vezirate in 1873.<sup>90</sup> When their intentions hardened it is impossible to say, but the likelihood is that it was not until May of 1876, except possibly in the case of Hüseyin Avni. It is also most probable that various individuals arrived independently at the idea that deposition was either necessary or desirable, and that before the last two weeks of May there was little concerted planning.<sup>91</sup> The principal men involved were Midhat, minister without portfolio; Hüseyin Avni, minister of war; and Süleyman, director of the military academy. Also involved were Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi, the grand vezir; Hayrullah, the *seyhülislâm*; Kayserili Ahmed Paşa, minister of marine; several other high-ranking army officers; Odian Efendi, adviser to Midhat and undersecretary of public works;

<sup>87</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşti Paşalar*, p. 54.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>89</sup> Ali Ölmezoglu, "Cevdet Paşa," *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, III, 117; Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir* 1-12, ed. by Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), pp. xxii-xxv; Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 257.

<sup>90</sup> See above, chapter VIII, pp. 294-295.

<sup>91</sup> This is the general impression given by Süleyman's *Hiss-i inkılâb*, which is probably the most circumstantial account by an insider.

Ziya Bey, the erstwhile New Ottoman and momentarily unemployed; Dr. Capoléone, physician to the heir apparent, Murad; and probably a few other individuals.<sup>92</sup> When the planning began, further, there seem to have been two divergent methods of approach.

One method was Midhat's. In his subsequent references to events Midhat tried to play down his own part in the deposition of Abdülaziz, ascribing to Hüseyin Avni the chief role.<sup>93</sup> But there seems no doubt that Midhat was one of the leaders and played an active part.<sup>94</sup> His method, however, seems to have been one of planning a deposition by some sort of popular action while keeping open alternatives to government reform that might produce a constitution or some sort of effective curb on Abdülaziz. Even before the overthrow of Mahmud Nedim, Midhat had warned the Valide Sultan's emissary that government under law, and equality of all Ottomans, were the only alternatives to more drastic measures. Within the last two weeks of May, after Midhat had become a minister, he repeated some such advice and warning in a memorandum written to the Valide Sultan at her request. In it he posited the necessity for freedom, equality, and ministerial responsibility.<sup>95</sup> At about the same time Midhat seems to have had an audience with the sultan in which Abdülaziz agreed to the necessity of reforms and blamed all evils on Mahmud Nedim. Thereupon Midhat wrote to Mehmed Rüşdi that if the Valide Sultan agreed and guaranteed such reforms, the plans already made might be modified. Please keep all this secret from Hüseyin Avni, added Midhat.<sup>96</sup> But nothing came of these overtures by Midhat to Abdülaziz and his mother. Midhat, therefore, continued to work for a change in sultans. He may have met with Hayrullah and a group of the ulema to plan this just before he became minister without portfolio, and

<sup>92</sup> Possibly including a Pole, Karol Brzozowski, said to be very close to Midhat and supposedly involved in the deposition: Adam Lewak, *Dzieje emigracji polskiej w Turcji (1831-1878)* (Warsaw, 1935), p. 245.

<sup>93</sup> This is the general impression in A. H. Midhat, *Life*, and *idem*, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, as well as the specific statement in Midhat's interrogation of May 8, 1881, when, of course, he was fighting Abdülhamid's charges against him: Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşti Paşalar*, pp. 53-55.

<sup>94</sup> Sometimes, later, Midhat used to drop remarks intended to show that he was the leader, says Cevdet, an unfriendly witness: Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 259.

<sup>95</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşti Paşalar*, pp. 53-54; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 164; *idem*, *Mirât-ı hayret* (Istanbul, 1325), p. 51.

<sup>96</sup> Text in A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 164-165, n.1; A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Paşa. Sa vie—son oeuvre* (Paris, 1908), p. 47, n.1. Cf. İnal, *Son sadrâzâmlar*, III, 337-338. The French edition gives an obviously erroneous date.

Mehmed Rüşdi may also have been approached.<sup>97</sup> Midhat was not inclined to a military coup d'état, but rather to basing a change in regime on the mass demands of softas and the Istanbul populace, meeting presumably in the Nuri Osmaniye mosque. Military action should only set the seal on the popular demand.<sup>98</sup> The ultimate object of all this was, in Midhat's mind, the establishment of constitutional government. He seems to have harbored no personal rancor against Sultan Abdülaziz. His reason for a change in sultans would be simply to secure better government, and evidently he was assured that the heir apparent, Murad, would be favorable to a constitutional regime. "It has been known for some time that the Prince would be ready to proclaim a constitution on the day of his accession," reported the British ambassador on May 25, "and he has certainly been in communication with some of its most influential advocates."<sup>99</sup> Midhat was not without some personal ambition, as even his partisan Elliot realized, and there was some irony in the fact that he who in 1859 had been, as second secretary of the Supreme Council, one of the inquisitors of the Kuleli incident conspirators should now himself be a conspirator.<sup>100</sup> But Midhat's motives here seem essentially pure.

It was otherwise with Hüseyin Avni Paşa, who represented the alternative method of approach to the deposition. In his view a military coup was the sine qua non. He had, of course, a considerable following in the army, whereas Midhat was more popular among civilians. Possibly this fact had its effect on Hüseyin Avni's thinking, since he wanted to be known as the leader of a successful coup and had strong political ambitions. After the coup he tried to make sure that history recorded him the sole leader.<sup>101</sup> In 1876 personal motives probably ranked equally with his patriotic aim of saving the empire from the rebels and from Europe; he seems to have been gnawed by a desire to get even not only with Mahmud Nedim but with Ab-

<sup>97</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 17-19, speaks quite circumstantially of this but cites no sources, and his date is garbled. Ismail Kemal says that about May 16 he had a letter from Odian Efendi concerning Midhat's plans to depose Abdülaziz: Sommerville Story, ed., *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London, 1920), p. 108.

<sup>98</sup> Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pachâ*, pp. 53-54, 61-62; A. H. Midhat, *Life*, p. 83; Kératry, *Mourad V*, p. 110; Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdü Paşalar*, p. 54; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 75.

<sup>99</sup> Elliot to Derby, #535, confidential, 25 May 1876, FO 78/2458.

<sup>100</sup> Elliot to Derby, #559, 31 May 1876, FO 78/2458; İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, IV (İstanbul, 1955), 190.

<sup>101</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 259.

dülaziz for his exile to a provincial governorship in 1871 and for subsequent slights of the same sort.<sup>102</sup> Probably the chance that Mahmud Nedim might again be brought to the grand vezirate, and that he might again be exiled from the capital as Mahmud Nedim was known to have demanded, excited Hüseyin Avni soon after May 12 to immediate planning for a deposition.<sup>103</sup> Hüseyin Avni then began sounding out a few officers.<sup>104</sup> He evidently did not speak so much of reforms as did Midhat. Hüseyin Avni was no wholesale westernizer, and even opposed the changes Süleyman had brought about to make the military academy more like St. Cyr, saying, "We aren't like Europeans, and don't need to copy them."<sup>105</sup> In the same vein, Hüseyin Avni was no partisan of constitution, but apparently went along with the concept for the sake of the success of the plot. Four days before the deposition Süleyman wrung from him a rather grudging promise that a "konstitusyon" or something like that would be adopted.<sup>106</sup>

Süleyman Paşa, director of the military academy, was also a partisan of a military coup, and had on his own initiative, evidently before any approach by Hüseyin Avni, begun to speak to various officers about a deposition.<sup>107</sup> But he was also, in addition to being a vigorous patriot, a strong supporter of a constitutional regime, and thus something of a bridge between the views of Midhat and Hüseyin Avni. Süleyman's own career had been purely military.<sup>108</sup> But his interests were not narrow, and, in addition to being an intense patriot and incipient nationalist, he had become a convinced reformer and something of a westernizer. For a period he had taught literature and history at the military academy. In 1876, at the age of thirty-eight, he had already been for a year or more director of the academy and a strong champion of westernized education, which took him so far as to urge on Hayrullah changes in the medrese curriculum, saying that the ulema needed more training in the mathematical and natural sciences. The progress of the Islamic millet depended on education, thought Süleyman.<sup>109</sup> He believed also in political reform, and was said to

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260, n.176; İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, pp. 337-338.

<sup>103</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, p. 96; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 73.

<sup>104</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 6-7; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, p. 166.

<sup>105</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Süleyman Paşa zade Sami, ed., *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi* (İstanbul, 1328), pp. 3-10; Amédée Le Faure, *Procès de Suleiman pacha* (Paris, 1880), pp. 20-21; İ. A. Gövsa, *Türk meşhurları ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, n.d.), p. 360.

<sup>109</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 14-16.

have been the leader of a New Ottoman cell.<sup>110</sup> By 1876, thoroughly aroused by Ottoman misgovernment, Balkan rebellion, and great power pressure, he had also become a convinced partisan of constitutional government as the salvation for faith, state, and fatherland. Four days before Abdülaziz was deposed, Süleyman, in conversation with Hüseyin Avni, said tersely that the event would lose all meaning if the next sultan were also despotic, that he would get the oath of loyalty only if he accepted "the method of consultation." To Midhat three days thereafter he indicated his desire that Murad should announce for constitutional government even before his accession.<sup>111</sup> Süleyman, like Midhat, was not motivated by personal enmity for Abdülaziz.<sup>112</sup> Süleyman was convinced that he himself represented national sentiment and, further, that the soldiers would patriotically support a change in regime and would not be held back by ties to the Palace. Of this he seems to have convinced Hüseyin Avni also.<sup>113</sup>

By Friday, May 26, the tentative plans made by these several individuals began to jell. That night Süleyman and General Redif Paşa, head of the military council, met with Hüseyin Avni at the latter's shore house to begin coordination of military measures. Midhat and Kayserili Ahmed Paşa, the minister of marine, were informed. The next day Süleyman and Hüseyin Avni continued their planning, while Hayrullah and Mehmed Rüşdi were brought up to date on the arrangements. It was decided to carry through the deposition on Wednesday, May 31. The meetings and planning continued over the next two days. Some of it must have aroused suspicion, for all the comings and goings could not be concealed. The daily *Stamboul* reported on Monday that Mehmed Rüşdi and Hüseyin Avni had spent a long time in conference at Midhat's town house.<sup>114</sup> There is some question as to whether Ignatyev, undoubtedly aware of an impending coup if not accurately informed in detail, warned Abdülaziz to take strong measures.<sup>115</sup> There is also a question as to whether Midhat or anyone

<sup>110</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>111</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 3-6, 13, 23-24.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23; Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 45.

<sup>113</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 6, 12-13, 48.

<sup>114</sup> *Stamboul*, 29 May 1876.

<sup>115</sup> Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 168; N. Jorga, ed., *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine* (Paris, 1923), #270, 24 May 1876. More improbably it has been asserted that Ignatyev planned to occupy Istanbul with Russian troops and rescue Abdülaziz with a Russian ship; perhaps there was a rumor to that effect: Amand von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Seraül und Hohe Pforte* (Vienna, 1879), p. 246; Felix Bamberg, *Geschichte der orientalischen Angelegenheiten* (Berlin, 1892), p. 460.

associated with him had already asked of, or secured from, Ambassador Elliot a promise that the English squadron which had just been sent to Besika Bay would be ready to come up to Istanbul in case of need.<sup>116</sup> At some point during these days Midhat must have abandoned his objections to a military coup, though he may still have hoped for popular demonstrations to accompany it. Midhat was at the same time asked to get in touch with Murad, which he did through Ziya, who saw Dr. Capoléone, who saw Murad. Murad was reported to be, quite naturally, fearful of the attempt if something went wrong. Something might have, for the suspicions of the Palace were aroused. On Monday, May 29, the time for the coup was, therefore, advanced by twenty-four hours and reset for the early morning of May 30. This change meant that, if Midhat still had plans to provoke a demonstration of the popular will, he had to abandon them now. There was time to prepare nothing but a military coup. Murad himself seems not to have been told of the change.<sup>117</sup>

May 29 was a stormy day. Rain fell without cease, streets were covered with water, trees were uprooted. The plotters, nevertheless, met at Hüseyin Avni's house that night to make their final arrangements. Midhat was challenged by a sentry for having no lantern, but was allowed to pass; the boatman he hired to take him there recognized him, but said that whatever he was doing out on such a miserable night must be for the welfare of the millet.<sup>118</sup> Then the plotters scattered. At about three in the morning of Tuesday, May 30, the palace of Dolmabahçe, where Abdülaziz was staying, was surrounded by two battalions under Süleyman's orders on the land side, while ships of the navy guarded the Bosphorus side. Another naval vessel was stationed off the Russian summer embassy farther up the Bosphorus, to prevent any move by Ignatyev. Süleyman then persuaded the fearful Murad to leave the apartments where he had been confined and to go with Hüseyin Avni to the ministry of war. All this took place a little

<sup>116</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, 1, 21; Washburn, *Fifty Years*, p. 104; Dwight E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), p. 25, n.59.

<sup>117</sup> Aspects of the planning are recorded, with differences and some conflicts, in Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 6-9, 14, 20-23; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şühânâ*, pp. 69-70; Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdü Paşalar*, p. 54; A. H. Midhat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872-1946* (Istanbul, 1946), p. 12; *idem*, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 166; Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 53-64; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 110-123; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 168. Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 73-80, offers a fairly good reconstruction.

<sup>118</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Hâtıralarım*, p. 13.

before dawn. Meanwhile Midhat and others convened at the war ministry. There Hayrullah read the *fetva* of deposition which had already been prepared, justifying the act on the grounds of Abdülaziz's mental derangement, ignorance of political affairs, diversion of public revenues to private expenditure, and conduct generally injurious to state and community.<sup>119</sup> The ministers present, including Mehmed Rüşdi, the grand vezir, took the oath of loyalty (*biat*) to Murad V. As dawn broke one hundred and one cannon from Kayserili Ahmed's ships in the Bosphorus announced to the capital the change in sultans. Abdülaziz was sent to confinement in the Topkapı palace. Murad then went to the Dolmabahçe palace, where a larger gathering took the oath of loyalty.<sup>120</sup> The bloodless revolution was completed. There had been no violence, not even an increase of tension between Christians and Muslims, although the significance of the cannonade was at first not clear. Until late morning many residents of the capital thought Abdülaziz had died or had been killed. Some thought the firing meant that Russian naval units had come into the Bosphorus.<sup>121</sup> Neither surmise was true.

Doubt was succeeded by great public jubilation, set off by the soldiers surrounding Dolmabahçe palace, who for two hours shouted long life to the new sultan and, significantly, long life to the millet (which to them probably still meant the Islamic millet, but also now with overtones of "nation"). Quotations on Ottoman bonds rose overnight by fifty per cent on the local market. Christians celebrated with Muslims; softas and Christian clergy went together to see Murad at Dolmabahçe. Turkish newspapers referred to the "Osmanlı nation" rather than to the Islamic millet alone. Osmanlılık was again in the air. Public demonstrations of joy continued at least through Friday, June 2, when Murad V's first visit to the mosque of Ayasofya provided a new occasion. Christians and Muslims cheered, while Murad bowed and acknowledged the acclaim like a western monarch. Softas climbed onto his carriage.<sup>122</sup> Aside from a general supposition that now things would

<sup>119</sup> Text in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 396-397; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876.

<sup>120</sup> *Stamboul*, 30 May 1876; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876; Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 42-43, 48-49; Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. xxii-xxv; A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 83-86; Nelidow, "Souvenirs," pp. 324-325; *Basiret*, 30 May, trans. in Elliot to Derby, #566, 1 June 1876, FO 78/2459.

<sup>121</sup> Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. 22-23; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 81-83; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #110, and III, #35, both 30 May 1876.

<sup>122</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 31; Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 58-59; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 88-91; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 June 1876; Neli-

be better, the public joy seems to have had two bases. One was the expectation that the change in monarchs would produce a more vigorous opposition to rebellion, to European intervention, and to Russia. This was symbolized by the friendship shown to Britain: "God Save the King" was played along with the Turkish imperial march when Murad visited Ayasofya, and Lady Elliot was cheered. The French ambassador wryly reported that Elliot did not hide his satisfaction at the turn of events; further, that the Turks, encouraged by Britain's rejection of the Berlin Memorandum and the increase in her naval forces in the Mediterranean, had begun to speculate on a revival of the old Crimean coalition. In fact, the Berlin Memorandum, which the five ambassadors had decided on May 29 to present to the Porte at noon the following day, was never presented because of the deposition. Ignatyev recognized that the deposition was a blow to his influence, and a gain for Elliot's, and complained that Murad was "a prisoner in the hands of an oligarchy of pashas."<sup>123</sup> The other basis for joy was the general expectation that a constitution would be proclaimed—meaning to most people a curb on the sultan's expenditures and on capricious administration. *Stamboul* baldly announced on May 30 that the ministers were expected to meet that evening under Murad's chairmanship and to proclaim a constitution. Two days later softas paraded to Midhat's house and cheered him, Murad, and a national assembly (*şura-yı ümmet*).<sup>124</sup> The deposition of Abdülaziz and Murad's accession seemed in fact to be, as Süleyman Paşa more than once called it—using a term the Turks had often applied to Mahmud II's destruction of the Janissaries in 1826—an "auspicious event" (*vaka-i hayriye*).



This judgment appeared to be confirmed by the official acts and documents that followed immediately on Murad's accession. Among Abdülaziz's effects in the palace were found millions of dollars' worth of Ottoman bonds, jewelry, and gold coin, which Murad turned over to the treasury, excepting for the customary distribution of considera-

dow, "Souvenirs," pp. 325-327; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission III, #36, 1 June 1876; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876.

<sup>123</sup> *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876; Bourgoing to Foreign Ministry, 30 May 1876, and Bourgoing to Décazes, #84, 7 June 1876, both AAE, Turquie 404; Harris, *Diplomatic History*, p. 324; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>124</sup> *Stamboul*, 30 May and 1 June 1876; cf. ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #35, 30 May 1876.

ble sums to civil and military officials as accession presents.<sup>125</sup> Abdülaziz's fantastic animal collections were opened to the public, and his palace entertainers were fired.<sup>126</sup> More important, Murad was portrayed as a kind of citizen king. The official announcement by the foreign minister said that he had become sultan "by the grace of God and the will of the people."<sup>127</sup> Murad's own accession *hat* of June 1, addressed to his grand vezir Mehmed Rüşdi, struck the same note: he ascended the throne "by the favor of the Almighty and the will of my subjects."<sup>128</sup> In his proclamation Murad ordered reorganization of the Council of State and the ministries of finance, justice, and public instruction. He gave up sixty thousand purses from his civil list.<sup>129</sup> He confirmed all the ministers in their positions. The *şeriat* was to be respected, but all subjects without distinction were to enjoy complete liberty. All this was to be for the benefit and defense of the fatherland, the state, and the nation (*vatan, devlet, millet*). These were the sentiments of Osmanlılık, of the Tanzimat period. All Ottoman subjects were grouped together, without singling out the Islamic millet, and all were part of the fatherland. The İstanbul newspaper *Sabah* [*Morning*] praised these words, saying that all patriots, even all humanity, would weep for joy because Murad put *vatan* before *devlet*.<sup>130</sup>

The accession *hat*, however, contained no word about a constitution. It emphasized, to be sure, the will of the people, and so sounded more like Midhat than like Hüseyin Avni; it said nothing about the military or the coup d'état. Yet a constitution seemed to be expected among many elements of the population, and Turkish newspapers in İstanbul kept up the demand for constitutional government with a parliament elected by the people.<sup>131</sup> It was also reasonable to expect that Murad was favorable to a constitution. He was thought to be a friend of constitutional government, and had so expressed himself to various visitors, including some foreigners. Murad had, as a matter of fact, en-

<sup>125</sup> Uzuncarsılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdî Paşalar*, p. 124; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 228; Elliot to Derby, #597, 8 June 1876, FO 78/2459; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876.

<sup>126</sup> *Stamboul*, 3 June 1876.

<sup>127</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5700.

<sup>128</sup> Text in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 401-403; official French version enclosed in Maynard to Fish, #69, 5 June 1876, USNA, Turkey 29.

<sup>129</sup> i.e., 300,000 Turkish pounds, one third of the total.

<sup>130</sup> *Sabah*, 2 June 1876, cited in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 744.

<sup>131</sup> ABCFM, *Western Turkey Mission* II, #469, 12 June 1876; Lazzaro (Salonika) to Maynard, 21 June 1876, encl. in Maynard to Fish, #86, 20 July 1876, USNA, Turkey 29.

joyed a little more freedom than any previous heir apparent since the introduction of the *kafes* system in 1603. He had learned some French, liked western music, had been to Europe in 1867, was allowed by his uncle Abdülaziz to have his own house outside the palace, had occasionally been able to leave his house to see Europeans, corresponded with some, and had become a Freemason. He had had contact with Namık Kemal and possibly others of the New Ottomans. His inclinations seem to have been generally liberal, and specifically in favor of improved secular education for all Ottoman subjects equally.<sup>132</sup> These inclinations and connections were known to his younger brother Abdülhamid and to Sultan Abdülaziz; the latter had restricted Murad's freedom over the past five years or so, which led Murad to overindulgence in alcohol.<sup>133</sup> Hüseyin Avni also disliked Murad's emphasis on equality of Muslims and Christians, accusing him of harboring Masonic ideas.<sup>134</sup> It is possible also that Murad had specific constitutional ideas. He is said to have had a French citizen, a lawyer living in the European quarter of İstanbul, draw up for him the draft of a constitution along lines which he had sketched.<sup>135</sup>

That a constitution should be promulgated immediately upon Murad's accession was, of course, beyond the realm of possibility, even though some seemed to expect this. The elaboration of such a document would certainly take several months. But it would have been quite possible to insert in the accession *hat* a declaration of intentions about a constitution. That this was not done was possibly owing to the shock and fatigue Murad had experienced in suddenly being taken at night by armed men from his apartments and declared sultan. Cevdet Paşa claimed to have seen signs of mental weakness as well as bodily fatigue on the Tuesday of the accession.<sup>136</sup> Midhat and Hüseyin Avni also noticed that Murad was upset, so they stayed in the palace for two nights after the accession, along with Mehmed Rüşdi and Hayrullah.<sup>137</sup> But the more probable reason was that the coali-

<sup>132</sup> Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, p. 35; Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Serail*, pp. 177-178; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 40-45, 62-72; Demetrius Georgiades, *La Turquie actuelle* (Paris, 1892), pp. 58-59; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 7-8; Edmund Hornby, *Autobiography* (London, 1928), p. 153; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 742-743, 751-752. See also chapter VI above, n.71.

<sup>133</sup> Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, p. 35.

<sup>134</sup> Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 139-140; Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 67-68.

<sup>135</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 11.

<sup>136</sup> Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. xxiv-xxv. Cf. Mehmed Memduh, *Hal'ler-iclaslar*, p. 132, cited in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 740, 744-745, n.1.

<sup>137</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 168-169; *idem*, *Life*, p. 88.

tion of conspirators, united only on the deposition, had begun to split apart. On Tuesday, May 30, after the ceremony of the oath of loyalty was finished, Midhat had produced the draft of an accession *hat* which stipulated constitutional government and ministerial responsibility. He showed it to Süleyman, who was pleased. But Mehmed Rüşdi and Hüseyin Avni were unwilling to go that far. Both opposed the draft. They joined Sadullah Bey,<sup>138</sup> former minister of commerce who had just been appointed palace secretary, in saying: "Our Sultan does not wish to form a national assembly. The knowledge and the training of our nation are not suitable for such a step. However, in order to eliminate the insecurity which prevails, he must bind the administration by strong laws, and must, for instance, reform financial matters. This is the desire of our Sultan." Thereafter Midhat's draft of the *hat* was altered, again presumably by Mehmed Rüşdi, as grand vezir, to eliminate any reference to constitution. Süleyman accuses the grand vezir of autocratic tendencies, Hüseyin Avni of hypocrisy, and Midhat of weakness in this confrontation.<sup>139</sup>

Yet a constitution was now seriously under discussion at the top level of Ottoman administration. During the nights of May 30 and 31, which Midhat, Hüseyin Avni, and Mehmed Rüşdi spent in the palace, Midhat argued with the other two. He had already prepared—when he had done so is not clear—at least a partial draft of a constitution, said to have been composed of only nineteen articles. In addition to desiring a mention of constitution in the accession *hat*, he wanted to make public his draft, so that the hopes of the populace would be kept up. Mehmed Rüşdi and Hüseyin Avni opposed him on both counts, and argued against some of the basic articles of his draft.<sup>140</sup> But on June 2 the manifesto of the "Muslim patriots" was published in Istanbul, and this undoubtedly served Midhat's aim of publicity to some extent.<sup>141</sup> Midhat and Halil Şerif were said to be considering as a model the Belgian constitution of 1831, which had been influential in many European states.<sup>142</sup> Süleyman Paşa was also impatient, and said to Hüseyin Avni that if no progress were made on reform, there

<sup>138</sup> Sadullah was the friend of Namık Kemal who in 1867 had assisted in the translation of Mustafa Fazıl's letter to Abdülaziz, which proposed a national assembly.

<sup>139</sup> Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 60-61; Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 45-46; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 117-118, 126.

<sup>140</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 170-172; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 126.

<sup>141</sup> See above, n.46.

<sup>142</sup> Bourgoing to Décazes, #84, 7 June 1876, AAE, Turquie 404.

was no point to the deposition.<sup>143</sup> Evidently a meeting of the council of ministers, at which Murad himself is said to have presided, was held in the palace a few days later, about June 3. Midhat again produced his draft and pleaded in eloquent language for a constitution. Mehmed Rüşdi spoke only of necessary administrative measures. Hüseyin Avni took a Bismarckian line, saying that violent and vigorous measures, not assemblies and discussion, were needed to save the Ottoman state. The ministers reached no conclusion.<sup>144</sup>

Before constitutional discussions could proceed, there occurred an event which cast a shadow on further reform attempts in Murad's reign. This was the suicide of the ex-sultan. Abdülaziz had been miserable in the old palace of Topkapı, and, on his rather piteous request to Murad, was transferred with family and servants to quarters at the Çırağan palace, a little up the Bosphorus from Dolmabahçe.<sup>145</sup> There on the morning of Sunday, June 4, Abdülaziz was found with the veins in his arms slashed and one artery severed. He died, by one account in his mother's arms, before medical help arrived. According to the generally accepted reconstruction of events, he had committed suicide with a pair of small scissors which he had asked for to trim his beard. His reason for doing so could only have been his already unstable mental condition, worsened by the shock and ensuing depression caused by his sudden deposition five days before.<sup>146</sup> After his body had been removed to the guardhouse nearby, nineteen of the most prominent physicians in the capital, including several attached to embassies of the great powers, examined the corpse and the room where Abdülaziz had been. Their unanimous conclusion, based on the nature and direction of the wounds and a view of the scene and the scissors, was that he had killed himself.<sup>147</sup> This apparently was also

<sup>143</sup> Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, p. 198.

<sup>144</sup> Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 111-112; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, pp. 37-39; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 142-143; Ahmed Saib, *Tarih-i Murad-ı Hamis*, p. 100, who seems to discuss both this and the June 8 meeting, with a wrong date. Could there have been only one meeting? Kératry seems the source for this one.

<sup>145</sup> Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, pp. xxiv-xxv; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 397-398, giving Abdülaziz's two notes to Murad abridged as one.

<sup>146</sup> Contemporary statements on the circumstances of Abdülaziz's death are Cevdet's, in Mardin, *Cevdet*, pp. 257-258; Mehmed Rüşdi's, in 1881, in Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdi Paşalar*, pp. 125-127; Mehmed Memduh's in *Mirât-ı şuhûnat*, pp. 80-81; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 125-129, based on Yusuf İzzeddin's and evidently other statements; *Le Stamboul*, 5 and 9 June 1876; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876. A. H. Midhat, *Hâtralarım*, pp. 227-229, adds later statements by contemporaries.

<sup>147</sup> Text of the doctors' signed report in French (presumably the original language) in *La Turquie*, 4 June 1876 Supplement; in Turkish in Ahmed Midhat,

the public view at first.<sup>148</sup> But soon people began to believe that Abdülaziz had been assassinated, probably by order of some of the ministers.<sup>149</sup> Ignatyev evidently helped to spread the rumor of murder, and his counsellor of embassy, Nelidov, was convinced that was the fact.<sup>150</sup> The investigation had, of course, been grossly mishandled. There was no coordination between Palace and Porte, the body had been moved before the physicians saw it, and Mehmed Rüşdi and others appear to have been delinquent in not taking charge of a more thorough investigation. There was, of course, no autopsy. If it was murder, those like Midhat and Hüseyin Avni who had led the coup against Abdülaziz, and who would have most to lose if the ex-sultan should again return to the throne, would be suspect. Midhat insisted, and there seems no reason to doubt him, that he was the last of the ministers to learn of Abdülaziz's death.<sup>151</sup> But suspicions persisted. In the phrase of a witty journalist, "Abdülaziz was suicided."<sup>152</sup>

Actually, the cause of reform was seriously set back by the death of Abdülaziz. Midhat had nothing to gain from such an unfortunate event, particularly as any suspicion of murder would, in turn, throw

*Üss-i inkılâb*, I, 398-400, misspelling some doctors' names; in English in A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 90-91. Further medical statements by Dr. E. D. Dickson, British embassy physician and one of the signers of the above report, in Elliot to Derby, #580, 5 June 1876, FO 78/2459; letter in *Stamboul*, 8 June 1876; letter to the *Lancet*, dated 23 June 1876, reprinted in *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876; article in *British Medical Journal* (July 1876), cited in Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, p. 36, n.1; cf. Elliot, "The Death of Abdul Aziz," pp. 285-287, citing Dr. Millingen, another of the signers, as well as Dr. Dickson. Another report dated more than twenty-four hours later and signed by five doctors, generally confirming the first report, is referred to by Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 134, n.1. Report of Dr. A. Marroin, French embassy physician, enclosed in Bourgoing to Décazes, #83, 7 June 1876, AAE, Turquie 404. The only doctor's statement the author knows of which affirms murder instead of suicide is one twelve years later by Dr. Mavroyeni, who was not one of the examining physicians in 1876. Mavroyeni was, significantly, physician to Abdülhamid II: Desjardin (Paul de Régle), *Au pays de l'espionnage* (Paris, 1902), pp. 42-44. "The Death of the ex-Sultan," *The Lancet* (10 June 1876), 872-873, says that the suicide conclusion of the nineteen doctors is medically unconvincing.

<sup>148</sup> Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. xxv.

<sup>149</sup> Washburn, *Fifty Years*, pp. 105-106; Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor* (London, 1877), I, 15-17.

<sup>150</sup> Elliot to Derby, #591 and #592, both 7 June 1876, FO 78/2459.

<sup>151</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 172; *idem*, *Mirât-ı hayret*, pp. 57-60; Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüştü Paşalar*, p. 88; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 132-133.

<sup>152</sup> Charikles, *Türkische Skizzen in Briefe an eine Freundin* (Berlin, 1877), p. 16. The suspicions were revived in 1881 under Abdülhamid II by charges that Abdülaziz had been murdered, and that Midhat, Mehmed Rüşdi, Hüseyin Avni, and Hayrullah had been involved. Probably the charges were baseless. See appendix D.

suspicion on the motives of the reformers.<sup>153</sup> But the impact of his uncle's death on Murad V was the gravest blow. Already shaken by the manner of his leaving confinement for the throne, he was now troubled anew by Abdülaziz's suicide. When the news reached him, he was at table; palace officials said he rose and vomited. Both Midhat and Mehmed Rüşdi, who saw him shortly thereafter, found him grief-stricken.<sup>154</sup> All dates assigned to the start of Murad's mental illness are the result of guesswork, but it may well be that this was the event which unsettled his mind the most.<sup>155</sup> The ceremonial girding of the sultan with the sword of Osman, which usually took place between five and fifteen days after accession, should have been scheduled within the week or ten days following Abdülaziz's death.<sup>156</sup> It was put off, evidently owing to Murad's mental condition. Though there was talk of it through the rest of June, the girding of Murad, the hope of the constitutionalists, never took place. Nor does he seem to have taken any effective part in government business.

The next discussion of a constitution was at a special and enlarged meeting of the council of ministers on Thursday, June 8, but Murad did not attend. In addition to the ministers, there came to the Bab-ı fetva (the *şeyhülislâm*'s office) Redif Paşa and Süleyman Paşa, two key military men in the deposition, plus two prominent members of the ulema, Kazasker Seyfeddin Efendi and the Fetva emini (commissioner of *fetvâ*'s) Halil Efendi. Mehmed Rüşdi pursued a conservative line, saying that the people of the empire were not yet capable of constitutional government; it would be better to content them by a show of empty privileges which would arouse their gratitude toward the government. Süleyman, who had been ordered by Hüseyin Avni not to speak unless military matters were under discussion, could not contain himself, but jumped up from his corner and said: "Your Excellency, the deposition did not take place in order to maintain the present absolutism. Every one undertook this sacrifice in order to assure the future of the nation. Those who did this had no personal animosity toward the deposed sultan and no special relationship to the

<sup>153</sup> Midhat later referred specifically to the bad public impression: Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüştü Paşalar*, p. 95.

<sup>154</sup> Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 133; Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüştü Paşalar*, pp. 126-127; Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. xxvi.

<sup>155</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Mirât-ı hayret*, p. 60. Cf. Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 744-745, n.1.

<sup>156</sup> Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, pp. 41-42.

present one. Please continue the discussion with this point in mind." But Mehmed Rüşdi was unmoved. When Namık Paşa, minister without portfolio, proposed a parliament like Britain's but composed of Muslims only, the grand vezir turned on him, saying, "Then you have become a Red."<sup>157</sup> He derided Midhat's and Halil Şerif's constitutional ideas as well. Further, said Mehmed Rüşdi, give the people something, and they ask for more. Look at the demands of the Cretans since they were given privileges.<sup>158</sup> Midhat advocated a national assembly, but did not criticize Mehmed Rüşdi vigorously at this meeting, evidently seeking to bring about some kind of unity. But this was a vain hope. Although both Server and Raşid Paşas spoke mildly for constitutionalism, the majority of those present remained silent, while several, including Cevdet and Seyfeddin, tried to reconcile differences. But at least three strongly backed the grand vezir, while Halil Efendi spoke out for government by the traditional elite. "Will you ask opinions and courses of action of a collection of ignorant leftovers from Anatolia and Rumelia?" When Midhat said that Süleyman had translated the French constitution, and proposed that he should read it, Halil rejoined that no national assembly, but simply a body of ulema, was needed as an advisory group.<sup>159</sup>

The meeting adjourned without reaching a conclusion. It revealed how the lines of conflict were drawn. Midhat and Süleyman, though unlike and even critical of each other in many ways, were united in favor of speedy action for a constitution.<sup>160</sup> Süleyman Paşa indeed, in the month of June, and perhaps before the meeting at the Bab-ı fetva, had hurriedly drafted a constitution of forty-five articles. Despite its

<sup>157</sup> Namık had been known in his youth as a liberal, fluent in French, and one of Raşid Paşa's men; later he was known as a conservative or reactionary Muslim, but he had indicated even before the deposition that he would support some kind of parliamentary control over the sultan, though probably a parliament of Muslims only. Cf. A. Henry Layard, *Autobiography and Letters* (London, 1903), II, 28-29; Elliot to Derby, #628, 3 October 1875, FO 78/2388, and #532, confidential, 24 May 1876, FO 78/2458.

<sup>158</sup> In 1867. See above, chapter V, pp. 158-159. The Christians in the Cretan assembly were asking new concessions in the summer of 1876: cf. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 August.

<sup>159</sup> The fullest account of this meeting, though written from his viewpoint, is in Süleyman, *Hiss-i inkılâb*, pp. 61-64, and most of it is repeated in Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 46-48. Mahmud Celaleddin, who was also there, reports the meeting in *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 126. Süleyman says that no record was kept. Cf. İnal, *Son sadrâgamlar*, I, 142-143; Gad Franco, *Développements constitutionnels en Turquie* (Paris, 1925), pp. 23-24.

<sup>160</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 712-713. Süleyman, like many others, found that Midhat had autocratic tendencies.

disorganization, it is of great interest in its combination of Muslim representation on a geographical basis with non-Muslim representation on a millet basis, in a proportion of two to one. Egypt, Tunis, Serbia, Roumania, and Montenegro would also have deputies. There is no evidence, however, that Süleyman's draft was either made public or discussed by the ministers.<sup>161</sup> Raşid and Server, each with European diplomatic experience, supported Midhat and Süleyman. Mehmed Rüşdi was backed by several speakers and by the inarticulate majority in his contention that a constitution was too radical a departure. Interestingly, most of the argument was on secular lines; only Kara Halil and Namık seem to have introduced religious considerations, while two members of the ulema (Cevdet and Seyfeddin) were moderates, as well as Safvet, who had also had European diplomatic experience. The meeting was erroneously reported the next day to have reached a unanimous decision to create a national assembly and a ministry responsible to it, and to have appointed Midhat to work out the details.<sup>162</sup> But the public went on discussing a constitution and a parliament, and probably expecting such reforms, which Turkish papers in the capital continued to advocate.<sup>163</sup>

Immediate elaboration of a constitution was unlikely, however, until the serious divergences within the council of ministers could be resolved. One of the antagonisms had remained unvoiced at the meeting, but was real enough. This was the opposition of Hüseyin Avni not only to a constitution, but to an increase in the influence of Midhat or of anyone but himself. Hüseyin Avni had since May 30 been the dominant figure in the ministry, posing as the strong man of the deposition and hoping to control both ministry and Palace. Some suspected him of wanting to be dictator.<sup>164</sup> He was a stronger personality than Mehmed Rüşdi, the grand vezir, and as minister of war had military power to back him. He had a more important position than Midhat, who had been without portfolio until early June, when he was given

<sup>161</sup> Text in Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 62-66, n.1.

<sup>162</sup> *Stamboul*, 9 June 1876. This may have been a story planted by Midhat partisans. *Démenti* in issue of 15 June 1876.

<sup>163</sup> Cf. the letter of Halil Ganem, a Syrian Christian and later deputy to the Ottoman parliament, in *Stamboul*, 8 June 1876; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #591, 14 June 1876; Edouard Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat* (Paris, 1882-1884), II, 158.

<sup>164</sup> Elliot to Derby, #601, 8 June 1876, FO 78/2459; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 133; *Stamboul*, 17 June 1876; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 169-170. It may have been of Hüseyin Avni that Raşid Paşa was speaking when he said to a Bulgar that the government was living in terror: Hajek, *Bulgarien*, pp. 294-295.



the presidency of the Council of State. Then, just a week after the ministers' meeting at the Bab-ı fetva, Hüseyin Avni was violently removed from the scene. A Circassian army officer, Hasan, broke in upon a meeting of the ministers held at Midhat's house on Thursday, June 15, and killed both Hüseyin Avni and Raşid Paşa, the foreign minister. Several others were wounded. Hüseyin Avni was Hasan's target, for the assassination was an act both of personal and political vengeance. Hasan's sister was the second of Abdülaziz's "wives," and Hasan evidently wanted to avenge his sister and the fallen sultan. He may also have believed that Hüseyin Avni had murdered Abdülaziz. In addition, Hasan had been aide-de-camp to Abdülaziz's son, Yusuf İzzeddin, whose hopes of succeeding directly to the sultanate had now been dashed with his father's deposition. Hüseyin Avni had ordered the Circassian out of İstanbul to duty in Baghdad; instead of going, Çerkez Hasan had slain the war minister.<sup>165</sup> But it appeared to some that Midhat might have planned the murder to rid himself of a dangerous rival, since the attack had occurred at his house and he himself was unhurt.<sup>166</sup> This suspicion appears to be unfounded. Yet the fact was that, after Hüseyin Avni's death, Midhat was the strongest personality in the ministry, and might now dominate the more vacillating Mehmed Rüşdi. Sultan Murad was so sick and bewildered at this point that he was not even told of the event.<sup>167</sup> News of a second violent death within two weeks could only unsettle the sultan's mind further. The murder was unsettling enough for the ministers.

Other developments, with one exception, boded ill for further serious work on a constitution. The exception was the recall from exile of Namık Kemal and other New Ottoman associates. Ziya Bey, who had been back in İstanbul since 1872, was on May 30 appointed Sultan Murad's first secretary. He made it his first business to persuade

<sup>165</sup> Accounts written by, or based on information from, those present: Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı suûnat*, pp. 96-99; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 183-186; Elliot to Derby, #634, 17 June 1876, FO 78/2459 (from Mehmed Rüşdi); Nelidow, "Souvenirs," pp. 328-330 (from Mehmed Rüşdi and Kayserili Ahmed); Schweiger-Lerchenfeld, *Seraîl*, pp. 145-160 (assertedly from Midhat). Detailed accounts also in Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 172-193; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 105-113; *Levant Herald*, 5 July 1876; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, pp. 153-158, including Hasan's statement. Hasan's sister had died three days before, apparently from an attempted abortion: Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, table 48 and n.3; Elliot to Derby, #631, 16 June 1876, FO 78/2459.

<sup>166</sup> Washburn, *Fifty Years*, p. 106; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #471, 16 June 1876.

<sup>167</sup> Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı suûnat*, p. 100.

Murad to release Namık Kemal and the others from their *résidence forcée*. Because of this exhibition of his influence, and probably because of Mehmed Rüşdi's fear that he might dominate Murad, Ziya was after one day shifted to be deputy minister of public instruction. But the exiles returned, Namık Kemal bringing with him his desire for a parliamentary regime and his burning love of fatherland. In the ensuing summer his *Vatan yahut Silistre* was often played.<sup>168</sup> Otherwise, things looked worse. Muslim fanaticism seemed to be on the increase. The government went back to the process of curbing the press, suspending five İstanbul papers in June.<sup>169</sup> By the end of June, Serbia and Montenegro were openly at war against their sovereign, Murad V, even though Prince Milan of Serbia protested that he believed in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>170</sup> So the Turks were thrust into a situation in which Slavic principalities supported Slavic rebels in the Balkans and the Serb army was commanded by the pan-Slav Russian general Chernyaev, who had previously fought the Muslim khanates in Central Asia. The Turks, therefore, began to rouse themselves for a real struggle, which began to look like a religious as well as a national war. There were some Armenian and Greek volunteers for the campaign against Serbia.<sup>171</sup> But it was more characteristic that the Muslim theological students should volunteer, and also be out arousing the countryside. They were now on vacation, and their public agitation seemed less and less directed toward constitutional reform, more and more toward propagating the doctrine of holy war.<sup>172</sup> A vezirial proclamation in Arabic, posted in Antep (Aintab), called for a "warring of the whole family of Islam" against the "seekers of evil" who sought to ruin "the foundation of the state and of the faith of our government." The reserves were being called up in the name of Islam.<sup>173</sup> This was hardly the atmosphere for calm deliberation on a constitution.

<sup>168</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 1, 728; *Stamboul*, 5 and 14 June 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 July 1876 (Ausserordentliche Beilage); Mehmed Kaplan, *Namık Kemal* (İstanbul, 1948), p. 97.

<sup>169</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #470, 15 June 1876, and #592, 21 June 1876; *Stamboul*, 9 June and 3 July 1876; Elliot to Derby, #649, 20 June 1876, FO 78/2459.

<sup>170</sup> Langer, *European Alliances*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>171</sup> *Levant Herald*, 15 July 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19, 29 July and 3 August 1876; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 193-196.

<sup>172</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #593, 28 June 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* 9, 13, 14 (Beilage), 19 (Beilage), 20 (Beilage), 21 July 1876.

<sup>173</sup> Text in translation in Maynard to Fish, #86, 20 July 1876, USNA, Turkey 29.

Midhat was, nevertheless, going forward with his plans, with some encouragement from the British ambassador.<sup>174</sup> Midhat had on June 22 a meeting at his house of some of the most influential of the fanatical ulema, and said they had agreed to the necessity of a representative council, partly nominated and partly elected, to control finances. They agreed also that Christians could not be excluded from it. He was not aiming at the impossible, Midhat told Elliot, and would compromise if needed to carry the ministry along. His main problem he foresaw as the administration of equal justice without abolishing the religious courts.<sup>175</sup> Midhat evidently continued to work on a revision of his draft of a constitution.<sup>176</sup> An opportunity to present it came when a grand council of notables (*meclis-i umumi*) was convened at the Sublime Porte on Saturday, July 15, to consider the difficulties caused by Austria's closing the harbor of Klek.<sup>177</sup> Including the ministers, a number of ulema, about seven Christians, and other notables, this gathering of seventy-six heard Mehmed Rüşdi outline the precarious position of the empire in its struggle for life. Persuaded either by Midhat or by the worsening situation, or both, the grand vezir spoke of the need for reorganization of the government. Midhat presented his revised constitutional draft, the basic principles of which the council is reported to have approved, though it remanded to a commission of the Council of State under Midhat's presidency the task of making further emendations. If the reports were true, the grand council's decision marked a radical departure from the past. Among the basic principles were complete equality of Christians and Muslims, eligibility of Christians for all offices including that of grand

<sup>174</sup> Ignatyev regarded Elliot as the instigator of Midhat's plans: Ignatyev to Kartsov, 29 June 1876, quoted in Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 169-170. Early in 1876 Elliot had said to Abdülaziz that there ought to be some constitutional control over the government: Elliot to Derby, #492, 12 May 1876, FO 78/2458.

<sup>175</sup> Elliot to Derby, #664, confidential, 24 June 1876, FO 78/2460. Namik Paşa meanwhile expected his parliamentary program, excluding Christians until they had proved their loyalty, to be adopted: Elliot to Derby, #679, confidential, 28 June 1876, FO 78/2460.

<sup>176</sup> *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 and 4 July 1876. The latter issue reports a meeting of ulema at the Bab-ı fetva which approved Midhat's plans.

<sup>177</sup> Klek was the only Adriatic port through which the Turks could supply their forces in Herzegovina by sea. Gorchakov and Andrassy in their secret meeting at Reichstadt on July 8 agreed that it would be closed. Cf. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 140, n.2, and 170. I am here assuming that the *meclis-i umumi* described in A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 182, is that of July 15, and that it was not in late August as reported by Franco, *Développements constitutionnels*, p. 24, who repeats Midhat's account.

vezir, a chamber of elected deputies—sixteen from Istanbul and four from each vilayet, a ministry responsible to the chamber, the admission of Christian testimony against Muslims in the courts, and security of tenure of judges and civil officials. A copy of Midhat's draft was to be furnished to each of the royal princes and to other persons. Another grand council was to be called later to consider the further revisions.<sup>178</sup>

It does not appear that a second grand council was convened. Instead, the rise of passions and the exigencies of the war against Serbia and Montenegro led the ministers to publish on August 3 an order forbidding public discussion of a constitution. Under the pressure of events, said the order in explanation, even the government could not find time for proper consideration of the constitutional question.<sup>179</sup> Shortly thereafter Midhat received from a group of softas a letter attacking the concepts of constitution and parliament and upbraiding Ziya for trying to justify those concepts with Koranic quotations. So long as England, France, and Russia did not give a proper share in government to the numerous Muslims of their empires, the softas were indisposed to let Christians—whom their ancestors had conquered—participate in Ottoman government.<sup>180</sup> Midhat was said to have received at the same time a letter threatening him with the fate of Hüseyin Avni should he persist in his constitutional plans. Something of a stopgap measure was the reorganization about August 15 of the Council of State under the presidency of Midhat. Whereas Mahmud Nedim had curtailed its functions, Midhat expanded them again under four sections: administrative, judicial, public works, and reform.

<sup>178</sup> *Levant Herald*, 17 July 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, and 29 July 1876; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 182, which reports a second meeting at the Bab-ı fetva with no further details. Additional details on the July 15 meeting from the Russian archives and press are in Petrosian, "Novye Osmany," pp. 103-104. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 August 1876, gives additional principles for the constitution, said to have been cut by Midhat from 140 to 70 articles, and adds that supposedly it will be in force in two weeks. The whole dispatch seems exaggerated. About four weeks later it was reported that a committee of five Muslims and three Christians, chaired by Server Paşa, minister of public works, had been appointed to examine the constitutional draft: *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 and 24 August 1876. I do not know what, if anything, the committee accomplished.

<sup>179</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 30 (1877), #5775. Cf. *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 and 11 August 1876; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 280-281.

<sup>180</sup> Text in *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 August 1876, and Maynard to Fish, #89, 10 August 1876, USNA, Turkey 29.

Christians were quite liberally represented in the membership of the sections.<sup>181</sup>

Conditions continued to grow worse for any calm discussion of reforms. As volunteers thronged the recruiting offices in Istanbul, as reserves were called up in the interior, as Egyptian contingents arrived by ship, as Tatar and Kurd and Tunisian leaders enrolled and supported volunteers, the atmosphere was at once that of a national and a religious war. The ministry tried its best to play down the religious, and play up the Ottoman, aspect, and would not let the newspapers speak of a jihad. Public subscription lists for aid to the wounded were opened, one of them headed by Midhat's wife—a new departure in public action for women of the empire. Many Turks—and even Armenians, excited by exaggerated reports of risings of their brethren in the Caucasus—began to think of the war effort as directed essentially against Russia rather than against Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>182</sup> The undoubted religious overtones weakened any sense of Osmanlık and heightened tensions within the empire, although overt incidents, aside from some plundering by Zeybek and Circassian irregulars, were few.

Mehmed Rüşdi's government also encountered in the summer and fall of 1876 financial difficulties inherited from the time of Mahmud Nedim, but now aggravated by the burden of war costs. Interest payments on the Ottoman debt were again postponed in July.<sup>183</sup> The government's appeal to its subjects for contributions and loans assumed in some vilayets the aspect of a forced loan.<sup>184</sup> These measures did not suffice, and by early August the government had come back to the old and dangerous method of financing its needs by the issue of paper money. *Kaimé's*, supposedly backed by the civil list and by income from coal mines, were printed in Paris; in August two million Turkish pounds' worth were issued, and another million in November. The paper currency began at once to depreciate, reaching by December a discount of twenty-four per cent and going much lower thereafter.<sup>185</sup> Meanwhile unusual heat followed by unusual rains de-

<sup>181</sup> *Levant Herald*, 15 August 1876, listing names; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 and 23 August 1876.

<sup>182</sup> *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23, 26, 28, 29 July and 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 17 August 1876; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #474, 1 August 1876, and Eastern Turkey Mission I, #212, 26 July, and #213, 13 September 1876.

<sup>183</sup> *Levant Herald*, 13 July 1876.

<sup>184</sup> *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 and 14 (Beilage) July 1876.

<sup>185</sup> A. Du Velay, *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie* (Paris, 1903), pp.

stroyed much of the grain harvest in western Anatolia, while in other parts the drafting of men and beasts for military service left fields untended and crops unharvested.<sup>186</sup> The agricultural situation was not so bad as it had been in 1874, but the economic and military difficulties that plagued the government tended to postpone constitutional discussion.



One problem that the ministry faced was, however, greater than any of the foregoing. This was the incapacity of Sultan Murad V. The Ottoman system demanded a sultan at its head, even to consider and promulgate a constitution which might limit the powers of that sultan. Murad had been the hope of the reformers. But from the earliest days of his reign he had evidently been able to take little part in public business. His girding had been deferred, and he seemed never to have recovered sufficiently from the shock of events to go through with the ceremony. Rumors that he was in poor health had circulated since the start of his reign, although until mid-August these rumors were just as consistently denied. Dr. Capoléone, Murad's personal physician, said that by July 11 he was convalescing satisfactorily from the shock of Abdülaziz's death, complicated by a carbuncle, boils, ague, and fever.<sup>187</sup> But by mid-July there were rumors that his abdication or deposition would be forthcoming soon, and such reports continued throughout the next month.<sup>188</sup> One rumor added that Abdülhamid, Murad's younger brother, would assume a regency. These reports too were consistently denied. Nevertheless, Dr. Max Leidesdorf, a Viennese specialist whom Queen Victoria had consulted, was called to Istanbul to see Murad. He arrived on August 10, and after thorough examination reported on the 13th that Murad was in a bad mental and nervous state, but in fairly good physical condition. His prognosis was that, with proper measures, a cure might be effected in about three months.<sup>189</sup> Although Ottoman statesmen

354-356; Maynard to Fish, #111, 18 December 1876, USNA, Turkey 30; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 (Beilage) and 22 August 1876.

<sup>186</sup> *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4, 6, 23 July 1876; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 176.

<sup>187</sup> Elliot to Derby, #730, confidential, 11 July 1876, FO 78/2460.

<sup>188</sup> *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22, 30, 31 July, and 3, 5, 9 August 1876.

<sup>189</sup> His report is in İsmail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, "Beşinci Sultan Murad'ın tedâvisine ve ölümüne ait rapor ve mektuplar, 1876-1905," *Belleten*, x:38 (April 1946), plate 33, and Turkish translation, pp. 326-328. A portion was published in *Levant Herald*,

sometimes later referred to his "madness," the probable truth seems to be that Murad had really suffered a nervous breakdown, induced by his confinement under Abdülaziz, his excessive drinking, the shock of being taken by soldiers to his sudden accession, and the further shocks of Abdülaziz's suicide and the Çerkez Hasan murders. Though in time he might recover, he could not for the immediate future be an active head of state.<sup>190</sup>

Since the sovereign could not receive ambassadors, take part in public functions, lead the war effort, or act as arbiter in discussions of the constitution, the ministers were faced with the critical decision as to whether they should await Murad's convalescence or seek another sultan. It is not clear how early in Murad's reign the ministers, or some of them, began seriously to consider deposing Murad. Evidently there were some palace officials and military men, with whom Cevdet, the minister of justice, may have been associated, who sought an increase in their personal influence by replacing Murad with Abdülhamid.<sup>191</sup> But a second deposition would be an extremely serious matter. Midhat and Mehmed Rüşdi evidently came reluctantly to the conclusion that it was a necessity, because of the stagnation in government, and the grand vezir even went to the extreme of consulting Elliot on August 25 at his summer embassy on the wisdom of the change.<sup>192</sup> Possibly before this interview, possibly even before Dr. Leidesdorf's visit, the ministers are said to have sent Midhat to Abdülhamid to see if the latter would consent to act as regent until Murad should be cured.<sup>193</sup> There was, however, no Ottoman prece-

<sup>190</sup> August 1876. Uzunçarşılı also gives earlier physicians' reports on Murad, pp. 323-325. Cf. also *Levant Herald*, 11, 14, 19 August; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 August 1876. There is some question as to whether Dr. Leidesdorf in a second report, or privately, said Murad was incurable: Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 71-72; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 116.

<sup>191</sup> Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, pp. 69-70; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 September 1876.

<sup>192</sup> See the charges in A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 94-96; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 September 1876.

<sup>193</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabssira-i ibret*, p. 183; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şuinat*, p. 102; Ahmed Saib, *Tarih-i Murad-ı Hamis*, pp. 252-304; Elliot, "The Death of Abdul Aziz," pp. 291-292.

<sup>194</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 93-94; Ahmed Saib, *Tarih-i Murad-ı Hamis*, p. 302; Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, p. 48; Georges Dorys, *Abdul Hamid intime* (Paris, 1901), p. 31. Cf. Albert Fua, *Abdul Hamid II et Mourad V* (Paris, 1909), p. 32, on Midhat's supposed plan to have Abdülhamid tell his brothers at a banquet that he was regent only, during Murad's illness, and Abdülhamid's portrayal of the banquet as a plot to murder him: Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdi Paşalar*, pp. 2, n.1, 98, 154-157.

dent for a regency except that confided briefly to Âli Paşa in 1867, and a provisional sultan raised the question of who was the supreme imam in Islam. Abdülhamid would have none of it, and wanted medical certification that Murad was incapable of ruling. He was anxious for the throne, but not on a conditional basis. Circumspectly, Abdülhamid sought to advance his chances through contacts with influential men. He even sent an Englishman he knew to tell Elliot that he was determined on economy, would stop abuses, and, moreover, had studied the British blue books and parliamentary debates on Turkey and agreed with much that was said there.<sup>194</sup>

Abdülhamid was, in fact, willing to make extensive promises to get the throne. Midhat went again to see Abdülhamid at his residence in Musluoğlu, and returned to the council of ministers with Abdülhamid's word to abide by three conditions—that he would promulgate the constitution without delay, that he would act in governmental matters only with the advice of responsible advisers, and that he would reappoint as palace secretaries Sadullah, Ziya, and Namık Kemal Beys.<sup>195</sup> In this manner the ministers hoped to protect themselves from such a resurgence of Palace influence as had taken place in the last five years of Abdülaziz's reign. There were for years rumors current that Abdülhamid had made one further promise, and indeed had made it in written form—to abdicate should Murad completely recover his health. This seems quite unlikely, in view of Abdülhamid's attitude about the regency. In any case, no documentary proof has ever come to light.<sup>196</sup>

The result of Midhat's interview with Abdülhamid was satisfactory enough to him and to the grand vezir so that they went ahead to work out the details of deposing Murad. Meetings of the ministers were held on August 28 and 30. Between them, Mehmed Rüşdi and

<sup>194</sup> Elliot to Derby, #915, very confidential, 27 August 1876, FO 78/2462; Alderson, *Ottoman Dynasty*, pp. 52-53, 70; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 96. The stories in Fua, *Abdul Hamid II*, pp. 29-31, seem exaggerated.

<sup>195</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 97-98; Ahmed Saib, *Tarih-i Murad-ı Hamis*, p. 303; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 95-98. Petrosian, "Novye Osmany," p. 105, citing Mehmed Ziya, *Yenikapı Mevlevihanesi* (Istanbul, 1329), pp. 184-185, says the meeting was arranged by the Mevlevi şeyh Osman Efendi. Midhat had evidently been in touch with Osman for some time: Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 104. A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Pacha*, p. 64, says that the ministers decided that if Abdülhamid refused the conditions they would offer the throne to his younger brother Mehmed Reşad, and that Midhat's wife was to probe the latter's attitude on reforms! Story, *Ismail Kemal*, p. 117, says that Midhat on August 27 actually read to Abdülhamid a draft of, or the bases of, the constitution.

<sup>196</sup> See appendix E.

Midhat conferred with Hayrullah, the *seyhülislâm*. Two *fetva*'s were drawn up to justify the deposition, of which the more strongly worded was chosen, apparently at Abdülhamid's wish. It spoke of Murad's confirmed insanity.<sup>197</sup> As a medical basis for the *fetva*, Mehmed Rüşdi is said to have obtained from six İstanbul physicians, four of them attached to embassies, a certificate that they had reported on Murad's health and concluded that his complete recovery was not to be expected.<sup>198</sup> An extraordinary meeting of the ministers was convened at the Porte on Wednesday, August 30, at which Mehmed Rüşdi and Midhat spoke strongly for deposition. Their views were upheld, despite some opposition from Rıza Paşa, general in command of the arsenal, who said that Murad might recover. Abdülhamid was sent a message that the ministers had decided on the change in sultans—but, as Mehmed Rüşdi cautiously said, it was not done by the ministers' decision, but by consensus of the community and authority of the *seriat*. Invitations to a grand council to be held the following morning were sent to all civil, religious, and military notables. In order to minimize the chance of open opposition, the council was to meet not at the Porte, but in the old Dome Chamber of the divan, at the Topkapı palace, where soldiers and stacked weapons would be on hand.<sup>199</sup>

There on Thursday, August 31, Mehmed Rüşdi spoke to the assembled notables of the discouraging medical reports on Murad's health and of the ministers' discussion the day before. His voice trembled, and he wiped his eyes with a handkerchief. Midhat, more vigorously, said that the government could not operate without a sultan, the final resort in all matters, and called for the reading of the *fetva*. Hayrullah handed it to Kara Halil, the commissioner of *fetva*'s, who read it. The council rather passively accepted the whole proceeding, and then Abdülhamid received the oath of loyalty.<sup>200</sup> The change in sultans was accomplished with no disorder whatsoever, but neither was there any rejoicing beyond the officially ordered fireworks, il-

<sup>197</sup> *Le Stamboul*, 29 August 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 August and 2 September 1876; Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı suûnat*, p. 105.

<sup>198</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, 1, 98. Text of the supposed report in A. H. Midhat, *Life*, p. 98, with the dubious date of August 31. Possibly this is a predated version of a later version dated September 20, printed in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, 1, 437-438, or even of an October 20 report. Cf. manuscript texts of the latter two in Uzunçarşılı, "Beşinci Sultan Murad'ın tedâvisine . . . ait rapor . . .," plates 35 and 36, and pp. 332-333.

<sup>199</sup> Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı suûnat*, pp. 102-103.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105; *Levant Herald*, 31 August 1876. Official notification to powers in *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5792.

lumination, and twenty-one gun salutes five times a day for three days.<sup>201</sup> The same atmosphere carried over to the girding of Abdülhamid, which took place just a week later. It looked as if Abdülhamid were anxious to avoid the postponements Murad had encountered and to tighten his grip on the throne. The pageantry on September 7 was colorful, as Abdülhamid II on his white charger moved in procession up from the Golden Horn to the mosque of Eyüb between files of guards and of Count Szechenyi's model fire brigade. But the crowds were orderly and self-contained. The contrast to the jubilation at Murad's accession was marked. Portents of disaster were noted at the time: the Galata bridge sank four feet and almost collapsed; the cable in the tunnel of the Galata-Pera funicular tramway snapped.<sup>202</sup>

The fact was that Abdülhamid was quite an unknown quantity at his accession. He was almost thirty-four years old, but had lived a life of confinement and retirement. His face had an Armenian cast to it, and it was sometimes rumored that he was the son of an intruder into Abdülmecid's harem. As much good as bad was said of him. He was thought to be economical, orderly, healthy, more pious and more sober than Murad, hard-working. Some considered him to be fanatical and reactionary. Those whom he received in audience in the first year of his reign generally, however, carried away an impression of an intelligent, well-intentioned, fairly liberal sovereign.<sup>203</sup> What his rule might be like was anyone's guess. An American long resident in İstanbul recorded a shrewd estimate the day before the girding. Abdülhamid "is said to have explained his policy thus: Now, my policy is to obey the ministry. After I have learned what is needed, I shall change my policy and make the ministry obey me."<sup>204</sup>

It was some time before Abdülhamid's inaugural *hat* appeared,

<sup>201</sup> *Levant Herald*, 1 September 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 September 1876.

<sup>202</sup> *Levant Herald*, 8 September 1876; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 121-130; Nelidow, "Souvenirs," p. 339; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 and 14 September 1876.

<sup>203</sup> Elliot to Derby, #962, September (n.d.) 1876, FO 78/2463, and #1321, confidential, 29 November 1876, FO 78/2467; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5, 6, 14 September 1876; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 326-327; Hermann Vambéry, *Ueber die Reformfähigkeit der Türkei* (Budapest, 1877), pp. 50-51; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 165-167; Charles de Moüy, *Lettres du Bosphore* (Paris, 1879), pp. 250-251; Léouzou le Duc, *Midhat Pacha* (Paris, 1877), p. 112; Paul Fesch, *Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul Hamid* (Paris, 1907), p. 190, n.; Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, pp. 207, 406.

<sup>204</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #603, 6 September 1876.

which was quite in contrast to the publication of Murad's two days after his accession. Meanwhile the new sultan demonstrated some independence of mind by appointing to palace positions men of his own choice, who were not favorable to Midhat. To some of these appointments the ministers entered no objections. But Abdülhamid broke one of his three promises by naming Küçük ("Little") Said Bey and Lebib Efendi as his secretaries instead of Sadullah, Ziya, and Namik Kemal. The grand vezir protested and stayed home for some days on pretense of illness; he is said even to have tendered his resignation, which the sultan refused to accept.<sup>205</sup> The sultan's *hat*, which had been held up not only by differences among the ministers, but by emendations which Abdülhamid wanted to make, finally was read on September 10.<sup>206</sup> It laid greater stress than had been usual for some years on the necessity of strict observance of the religious law. It promised in general terms improvements in the administrative bureaucracy, in education, in provincial government, and energetic measures against the Balkan rebels. It confirmed all ministers in their offices. It also promised in vague terms a grand council or general assembly (*meclis-i umumi*), which might mean anything or nothing. This was a far cry from what Midhat wanted. He had himself drawn up the first draft of the imperial *hat*, in which the sultan was made to promise the adoption of constitutional government, that the grand vezir would bear the title of prime minister, that schools would be established to which all Ottoman subjects would be admitted, that palace expenditures would be sharply reduced, and that the slave trade would be prohibited in the empire and all palace slaves freed.<sup>207</sup> Abdülhamid had safeguarded his own privileges, had reduced much of Midhat's specific language to generalities, and had, in particular, cast doubt on his own preaccession pledge of the speedy introduction of constitutional government.<sup>208</sup> The lines for a struggle over the constitution were being drawn.

<sup>205</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, pp. 104-106; Elliot to Derby, #977, 8 September, and #980, confidential, 9 September 1876, both FO 78/2463; Story, *Ismail Kemal*, p. 122; Kératry, *Mourad V*, p. 209; A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 103-105.

<sup>206</sup> Text in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 281-285; *Levant Herald*, 12 September 1876; *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5800.

<sup>207</sup> Text of Midhat's draft in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 285-291; A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 106-109, showing Abdülaziz's excisions, as does Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 115-119. Some of Midhat's points had been rumored to be in the final draft: *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 September 1876, which here attributes them wrongly to Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, grand marshal of the palace.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. the rather sycophantic justification of the sultan's changes in Ahmed Midhat,

It is impossible to know what might have been the situation in the Ottoman Empire if Murad's health had not weakened. But it is quite conceivable that a vigorous sultan, committed to working out a constitution as Murad was, would have seen such a project to completion by the early fall of 1876. A parliament might have met regularly thereafter; it might have helped both to educate and to transform the empire. In view of the man who succeeded him, it is not too much to say that Murad's deposition after a short three months was a tragedy for his people as much as for himself—much as was the death of the liberal Friedrich III of Germany after a three-month reign in 1888, and his succession by the very different Wilhelm II. Abdülhamid II was a capable and strong-willed sultan, but his ideals were different from Murad's. He could not, in the difficult international situation arising from the Balkan rebellions, at once replace all his ministers or flatly go back on all his promises. But his accession *hat* and his palace appointments showed, at least, that he was reluctant to go ahead speedily with a constitutional regime which had already been a matter of public discussion for six months, and of official deliberation for three. When finally Abdülhamid was to consent to it, his action was more a maneuver in international politics than a result of conviction. Meanwhile Midhat, still influential within the ministry, bent every effort throughout the fall of 1876 to deliver the constitution whose birth pains added to the troubles of an already harassed government.

*Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 169-178, and the quite opposite viewpoint in A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 109-112.

## CHAPTER X

### THE CONSTITUTION OF 1876

One auspicious event ushered in the reign of Abdülhamid II—a resounding Turkish victory over Chernyaev and the Serbs on September 1. This led to an armistice of ten days, followed by renewed fighting which culminated in the virtual disintegration of the Serb army after another Turkish victory at the end of October. Though the Ottoman armies were now in a position to advance on Belgrade itself, the fruits of victory were denied them by great-power action. The Russians, patrons of the Serbs, had already been probing for an armistice and an international conference. Now, on October 31, they suddenly confronted the Porte with a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to accept a six- to eight-week armistice or suffer a break in diplomatic relations. The Porte, unable to count on Britain's backing because of sentiment there over the Bulgarian massacres, yielded on November 1. The British government had, in any case, been trying to arrange a conference on the Balkan question, which it formally proposed on November 4. Confronted with an unusually violent speech by the tsar, by his order on November 13 for the mobilization of six army corps, and by the agreement of the six powers to Britain's proposal, the Porte also bowed on November 18 to the demand for a conference. This was to meet late in December in Istanbul and to be preceded by a preliminary conference among the powers, but without the Turks, to concert on a reform program.<sup>1</sup>

Naturally the great-power pressures, especially the Russian truculence, heightened the Ottoman patriotic sentiment and the religious sentiment that had been developing over the past year. The tsar wrote that "there is no longer any effective government in Turkey. The men in power are overwhelmed by the fanatical masses used to murder and pillage."<sup>2</sup> The tsar must have known that he was not telling the truth about the Porte. Yet he was partly right about the masses. During the fall of 1876 patriotic and anti-Russian feeling among Turks continued to mount. Victories over the Serbs served only to

<sup>1</sup> On the diplomatic aspects see B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 196-243; William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1950), pp. 95-109.

<sup>2</sup> To Francis Joseph, 23 September 1876, quoted in Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 208.

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intensify the Turkish war fever, which affected the capital and all parts of Anatolia, especially those near the Russian frontier, where the Turks were building their military strength.<sup>3</sup> The Turkish press in Istanbul began to breathe war, and to defend the Bulgarian massacres, even as a new investigating commission under Sadullah Bey was sent out to the Bulgar area. *Ittihad* [Union] praised Islam as the religion of the sword. *Basiret* went too far in arousing Muslim fanaticism and preaching military preparedness, so that the Porte suspended it briefly.<sup>4</sup> A little of the fanaticism spilled over to create incidents between Christians and Muslims within the empire, as when police at the Sublime Porte beat some Armenian editors whose newspapers had carried stories of Turkish cruelty against Armenian notables in Trabzon. But the Porte tried hard to avoid and to repress all such incidents, in the interest of maintaining Ottoman unity.<sup>5</sup> Its task was easier than might be supposed, since many Armenians of the empire were in 1876 anti-Russian, owing to tsarist rule over their brethren, while many Greeks were also anti-Russian because of Russian support for Serb and Bulgar territorial and separatist political ambitions.<sup>6</sup> Yet the anti-Russian spirit helped also to create a nascent pan-Turkism and to invigorate pan-Islamic feeling. These currents were strengthened by interest in the reported exploits of Yakub Beg—even by hopes that he would help the Ottomans; by the presence of Circassian and Turkoman refugees from Russia in the Ottoman Empire; and by addresses of support from Indian Muslims. The anti-Russian war spirit also carried overtones of Anglophilism and hopes of help from the British.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor* (London, 1877), I, passim; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 and 10 September 1876.

<sup>4</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #606, 4 October 1876; *Levant Herald*, 17 October 1876; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 and 26 September 1876.

<sup>5</sup> Antonio Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), II, 340-342; A. D. Mordtmann, *Stambul und das moderne Türkenthum* (Leipzig, 1877-1878), II, 43-46. The Porte, besides suspending the papers, obliged the editors to go with an investigating commission to Trabzon, the source of their supposedly false news: *Levant Herald*, 27 October 1876. Cf. the similar punishment meted out by Mustafa Kemal to editors: Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, Okla., 1956), pp. 152-157.

<sup>6</sup> L. Raschdau, ed., "Die Botschafterkonferenz in Konstantinopel und der russisch-türkische Krieg," *Deutsche Rundschau*, 141 (1909), 22; Burnaby, *On Horseback*, I, 246, and II, 12-14; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #383, 10 November 1876.

<sup>7</sup> Burnaby, *On Horseback*, I, 169-170, 178-180, 235, 244-245, 248-252, and II, 20-22, 173-174; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 205-241; *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 and 27 September 1876; *Levant Herald*, 17 October 1876.

It was in this situation of diplomatic pressures and exaggerated feelings that Midhat had to try to bring the constitution to birth. The diplomatic distractions were a hindrance. The heightened feelings hurt calm debate. The European diplomatic intervention generally worked against the issuance of a constitution; Sir Henry Elliot alone among the diplomats took it seriously. But there were also advantages in the situation. Midhat could portray himself and the constitutionalists to all Ottoman subjects as spokesmen for an Ottoman pride that rejected foreign interference and that insisted on a home-grown constitution as an act of national independence.<sup>8</sup> He had some of the same advantages which Reşid Paşa had in the crisis of 1839 when Reşid secured the agreement of a new sultan and hesitant conservatives to the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane. The crisis situation of 1876 likewise gave Midhat arguments for action and speed, as well as for a display of national unity in progressive reform.

Midhat's desire for a constitution was not, however, simply a matter of the moment. He has often been attacked, especially by those who accept Salisbury's judgment of him in 1876, as shifty, dishonest, vain, and a bigger liar than Ignatyev.<sup>9</sup> Another English diplomat described him at the same time as "one of the most cruel and unscrupulous men in the Turkish Empire."<sup>10</sup> The implication of all this is that Midhat's constitutionalism was fraudulent. These charges may be dismissed as themselves fraudulent, except for the charge of vanity. What is true about Midhat is that he was no man of destiny, no genius in statecraft; that he was best at provincial administration where he was in complete control of a restricted area; that his actions were sometimes hasty or arbitrary; that he began more tasks than he could successfully complete; that he was so blunt and outspoken as to lack a much-needed diplomatic finesse. His contemporaries recognized these traits.<sup>11</sup> At the same time they recognized his ability, energy, sincerity, and clarity of expression. Namık Kemal, who did not always agree with Midhat and who acknowledged Midhat's limitations

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Charles de Moüy, "Souvenirs d'un diplomate," *Revue des deux mondes*, 4th period, 157 (1900), 621.

<sup>9</sup> R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question* (London, 1935), pp. 122-123; *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* (Berlin, 1922-1926), II, #271.

<sup>10</sup> Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, p. 122, quoting White to MacColl.

<sup>11</sup> İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrâzâmlar* (İstanbul, 1940-1953), pp. 398ff.; Süleyman Paşa zade Sami, ed., *Süleyman Paşa muhâkemesi* (İstanbul, 1328), p. 102.

in political learning, praised his sincerity and greatness of heart, his power of giving good advice, and his inclination to and experience in consultation with others. He was no genius, but who else might save the empire?<sup>12</sup>

What specific ideas Midhat may have had about constitutionalism in the years when he was vali in the Tuna province are not certain, though he is said to have begun thinking about a constitution in the middle 1860's.<sup>13</sup> By 1872, when he was briefly grand vezir, he seems to have envisioned a responsible ministry and some kind of national representation in an assembly. In 1873, with Şirvanizade Mehmed Rüşdi, he had discussed a chamber of deputies and the equality of all Ottoman subjects under the law.<sup>14</sup> From the fall of 1875 on, Midhat had been constantly occupied with constitutional schemes. The available evidence indicates that he went ahead cautiously, either from a recognition of the difficulties inherent in bringing a parliament to the heterogeneous and illiterate empire, or from a need to persuade more conservative and reluctant colleagues. To Elliot in December he spoke of a senate, first to be nominated and later elected, which would have control over the sultan. The manifesto of March 9, 1876, advocated a consultative assembly of all races and creeds having at first power over domestic affairs only. With the accession of Murad he had managed to make the constitutional issue a matter of official discussion, and shortly thereafter had persuaded a group of influential ulema to accept an assembly of all creeds, partly nominated and partly elected. The *meclis-i umumî* of July 15 had accepted in principle Midhat's constitutional proposals, this time including a chamber that was entirely elective. Abdülhamid II had come to the throne only after promising Midhat that a constitution, presumably the one already under consideration, would be speedily promulgated. It cannot, therefore, be charged that Midhat came to the idea of a constitution only in the fall of 1876 as a dodge to avoid more serious reform proposals by the six great powers. This remains true even though he, as well as Abdülhamid, was willing to use the proclamation of the constitution as a diplomatic weapon.

<sup>12</sup> Namık Kemal to Abdülhak Hâmid, 10 March 1877, in F. A. Tansel, *Namık Kemal ve Abdülhak Hâmid* (Ankara, 1949), p. 51. Namık Kemal is replying to Abdülhak Hamid's strictures on Midhat as average in political knowledge, and untrustworthy.

<sup>13</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Paşa, hayat-ı siyâsiyesi*, I: *Tabsıra-i ibret* (İstanbul, 1325), p. 170.

<sup>14</sup> See above, chapter VIII, p. 294.



Midhat's philosophy of constitutionalism is nowhere synthesized in one place, and probably was not very profound. His primary aim was certainly to preserve by a constitutional regime the independence and integrity of the empire, by revitalizing its government and creating a true equality among its subjects. He seems, like Âli and Fuad before him, to have thought that this would curb separatist nationalisms. A more practical and immediately necessary objective was to limit the power of the sultan, especially with regard to capricious spending. Midhat wanted to restore the control of Porte over Palace—to regain the situation of Âli's time.<sup>15</sup> But he wanted to go beyond Âli with the establishment of a national chamber, which would be a check on the Porte as well as on the Palace. He seems to have had a certain confidence, probably based on his experience as vali, in the good sense of men from the provinces.<sup>16</sup> The best exposition of his views is contained in an article published by Midhat in 1878 in two European journals.<sup>17</sup> This may be suspect, since he was then, as an exile in the West, justifying his drive for a constitution in 1876. But there is no reason why, with the exception of certain propositions concerning Russian actions and Bulgaria, it should not represent the opinions which Midhat actually held in 1876. The whole document exhibits a certain naïveté, especially as regards minority nationalisms and the causes therefor. It attributes the separatist movements principally to Russian influence, but, apart from that, to bad government which, however, weighs as heavily on Muslims as on Christians. The remedy is true Osmanlılık, a "fusion" of the peoples of the empire, and a constitutional regime to insure that the needed reforms and progress of all peoples of the empire are achieved. In some places Midhat's article sounds much like Âli's memorandum of 1867, especially when it deals with equality and "fusion." Midhat further jus-

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Mahmud Celeleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat* (İstanbul, 1326), I, 126; Midhat to Derby, 17 December 1876, in A. H. Midhat, "English and Russian Politics in the East," *Nineteenth Century*, 53 (1903), 71.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. memorandum of 5 June 1877 in Tenterden Private Papers, FO 363/5/769, cited in Harold Temperley, "British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, IV (1933), 182.

<sup>17</sup> Midhat Pasha, "The Past, Present, and Future of Turkey," *Nineteenth Century*, III (1878), 981-993; *idem*, "La Turquie, son passé, son avenir," *Revue scientifique de la France*, 2nd series, VII (1878), 1149-1154. It was published also in Turkish in 1879 as *Midhat Paşa Hazretlerinin "Memalik-i Osmaniyyenin mâzî ve hal ve istikbalî" unvanıyla neşir buyurdıkları makaledir ki gazetelerden naklolunmuştur* (İstanbul, 1295).

tifies the feasibility of his constitutional proposal by attempting to show that Islamic governmental theory rests on essentially democratic bases, having always recognized the principle of "national sovereignty," and, further, that Islam and the Turks have traditionally been tolerant of other religions.<sup>18</sup> Midhat also seems to have thought of a parliamentary regime, as have others in the Near East both then and later, as the mysterious secret of the political success and economic prosperity of western nations.<sup>19</sup>

Midhat has on occasion been charged with aiming in fact at republicanism. Enemies of his said that three days after Murad's accession Midhat had spoken, in a discussion with other officials, of creating a republic.<sup>20</sup> Such accusations were repeated from time to time, even long after Midhat's death.<sup>21</sup> Midhat denied the accusation, which was brought up again in his interrogation and trial in 1881.<sup>22</sup> It is quite likely, however, that he had toyed intellectually with the idea of republicanism, just as had Namık Kemal. Midhat may have spoken about republicanism without much caution on some occasions, for he tried out a wide range of ideas on all sorts and conditions of men. Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdi said that he had heard secondhand reports to this effect from lower-class people.<sup>23</sup> Midhat had at some point a correspondence with Gambetta in which they discussed republican government.<sup>24</sup> But it is just as unlikely that Midhat actually thought that the Ottoman Empire could be transformed into a republic in 1876, or at any early date. Despite his tendency to theorize, he was also a practical man in trying to get things done and in searching for agreement on a constitution. As he said in the *meclis-i umumî* that decided on Murad's deposition, "This state cannot be governed without

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Midhat Pasha, *Question d'Orient. Adresse des positivistes à Midhat-Pacha* . . . (Paris, 1877), pp. 16-19, reprinted also in Clician Vassif, *Son Altesse Midhat-Pacha* (Paris, 1909), pp. 103-106, which puts forth some of the same concepts on Islam and on Osmanlılık.

<sup>19</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 170.

<sup>20</sup> İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdü Paşaların tevkiplerine dair vesikalar* (Ankara, 1946), pp. 98, 152-154.

<sup>21</sup> Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri* (İstanbul, 1339), pp. 208-209; Şiddiq al-Damlüji, *Midhat Bâshâ* (Baghdad, 1952-1953), pp. 93-94; Ernest Dawn, "Ideological Influences in the Arab Revolt," in *The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip K. Hitti* (London, 1959), p. 237, quoting the memoirs of Abdallah.

<sup>22</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdü Paşalar*, p. 98; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 243.

<sup>23</sup> Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdü Paşalar*, pp. 152-154.

<sup>24</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Hâtıralarım, 1872-1946* (İstanbul, 1946), p. 135. His wife burned these letters on Midhat's death.

a Padishah.<sup>25</sup> His aim in 1876 was an elected parliament, a responsible ministry under a prime minister, a sovereign with powers somewhat limited, and equality of all Ottoman subjects. All these things a constitution would prescribe.

Midhat's views fell into a climate of opinion which was half-ready to receive them. This was not only because of the exigencies of the domestic and international situations. It was also owing to Islamic tradition as it was then construed by some, to precedents in representative government already tried in the empire, and to a public discussion of constitutionalism and parliamentary government in the fall of 1876, promoted by Midhat and his supporters. The arguments from Islamic doctrine and tradition in support of parliamentarism, whether historically true or false, were again advanced as they had been nearly a decade earlier by Namık Kemal and Hayreddin. Midhat himself used these arguments. Islamic society was fundamentally democratic, Islamic doctrine defended liberty, the caliphate was essentially elective. The Koran advised that the ruler act upon consultation, and said that God would reward those whose affairs were directed by consultation among themselves.<sup>26</sup> Hayrullah Efendi published a letter in which he emphasized the need of interpreting the Koran and the traditions in the light of reason.<sup>27</sup>

So far as Ottoman precedent was concerned, there was, of course, an older tradition of a sort of representation in the process of legislation. Reşid Paşa in 1856 had described it as a combination of public opinion, sanction of the şeriat, and imperial fiat, coupled with the calling of a general assembly (*meclis-i umumî*) if necessary.<sup>28</sup> This assembly was representative in a way, but only of the elite, and only

<sup>25</sup> Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûânat* (İzmir, 1328), p. 104. Cf. the statement of 1850 in Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, trans. by Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I, 57: "The word 'Republic' alarms them [the Turks] because they believe it to be synonymous with disorder and anarchy—not the idea itself, which is the foundation of the Mussulman's social system." Isolated examples may be found of interest in a "rimpublic," as a local Anatolian official named it in 1880: Valentine Chirol, *Fifty Years in a Changing World* (London, 1927), pp. 104-105. On the word *cumhuriyet* ("republicanism" or "republic") see Bernard Lewis, "The Concept of an Islamic Republic," *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, IV:1 (1955), 3.

<sup>26</sup> Sura 3:153 and 42:36.

<sup>27</sup> In *Hakikat*, 14 December 1876: ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #487, 28 December 1876; E. de Kératry, *Mourad V* (Paris, 1878), pp. 296-307. Cf. a *fetva* by the chief müfti of Tunis in 1877 on the virtues of intersectarian consultation by rulers, described in Heap (Tunis) to Hunter, #237, 1 May 1877, USNA, Tunis 11.

<sup>28</sup> Cevdet Paşa, *Texâkir* 1-12, ed. by Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), p. 80.

of the elite in the capital at any given time.<sup>29</sup> Conservatives in 1876, opposed to the Tanzimat decrees, seem to have wanted the *meclis-i umumî* to be called often as a check on the bureaucracy of the Porte.<sup>30</sup> But since 1839 the representative principle had been increasingly apparent in the new Tanzimat institutions usually cutting across sectarian lines, paying at least lip service to the doctrine of Osmanlılık. Reşid had organized provincial councils in the 1840's which were partially representative. Just after the Crimean War a number of non-Muslims had been included in the Supreme Council to represent their millets. The millet reorganizations of the 1860's had introduced a fairly democratic electoral and representative principle among the Armenians, and a modified version of this among the Greek Orthodox. The vilayet law of 1867 had reconstituted the local and provincial meclises on a more representative and partially elective basis, and had established provincial assemblies. The Council of State became in 1868 more representative than its predecessor had been. There was thus a foundation of experimentation with representative and elective institutions on local and provincial levels, plus a small start toward representation on a national level. None of the Tanzimat institutions were yet truly representative, and all worked indifferently, yet many Ottoman citizens had had some experience of them. None of the councils, except in the millets, were truly legislative (rather than advisory), and none effectively limited the sultan's powers. Parliamentary procedure had, however, already made its appearance in the internal regulations of the Council of State and of its ancestor, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances.<sup>31</sup>

In addition, four tributary provinces of the empire—two Muslim and two non-Muslim—had had advisory or legislative assemblies since the 1860's. The Tunisian constitution of 1861 had been suspended three years later, but Egypt, Serbia, and Roumania still had their national assemblies. It is not clear what effect the existence of these assemblies had on Turkish thinking in 1876, but there may have been some. So early as 1867 both Mustafa Fazıl and Namık Kemal had referred to these parliamentary precedents in arguing for an Ottoman

<sup>29</sup> Cf. the list of categories to be invited to the *meclis-i umumî* on Murad's deposition in 1876: Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şûânat*, p. 103.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. text of such a petition from Edirne in *Diplomatic Review*, 24 (July 1876), 172, said on p. 160 to be representative of many such petitions.

<sup>31</sup> On these developments see above, chapters I, III, IV, V, VII.

parliament.<sup>32</sup> Particularly the Egyptian assembly, indirectly elected, which had met from 1866 on, may have been influential, though Namık Kemal was sarcastic about the pusillanimity of its deputies.<sup>33</sup> The first open criticism of the khedive's government by a deputy came only in 1876.<sup>34</sup>

Public discussion of constitutional government was not new in 1876. Men like Namık Kemal, Ziya, Ali Suavi, Mustafa Fazıl, Halil Şerif, Hayreddin, and Mustafa Celaleddin had inaugurated such discussion in the preceding decade. In 1876 Hayreddin's book on needed reforms, advocating a parliament, was circulating (evidently reissued) in Istanbul, and Hayreddin expressed the hope that it would serve to clarify the thinking of Muslims "who are not abreast of the needs of the time."<sup>35</sup> Ziya was now more concerned with official discussion of the constitution than with journalism, and Ali Suavi, returned from exile only on November 3, was not much in sympathy with Midhat's aims. Mustafa Fazıl had died in 1875, Mustafa Celaleddin had been killed fighting the Montenegrins in 1876, and Halil Şerif seems to have published nothing at this point. Namık Kemal, however, though he was appointed to the Council of State on September 18, found time to write a series of articles in October for *İttihad*, vigorously defending constitutionalism and the conformity of parliamentary government with religious law.<sup>36</sup>

Public discussion was taken up by others, and the Istanbul press was active in reporting what news it had of the official deliberations on the constitution that took place in the fall of 1876, and in examining all aspects of parliamentary government. There were proponents and opponents of constitution both on religious grounds and on the grounds of political expediency.<sup>37</sup> Süleyman Paşa lamented that of

<sup>32</sup> Mustapha-Fazıl Pacha, *Lettre adressée à Sa Majesté le Sultan* (Paris, n.d.); Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal* (Istanbul, 1944-1956), I, 212, n.25; *Hürriyet*, #4 (29 September 1868), in İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar," *Tanzimat*, I (Istanbul, 1940), 847.

<sup>33</sup> See above, chapter VI and n.188.

<sup>34</sup> On the Egyptian assembly see Jacob Landau, *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt* (Tel Aviv, 1953), pp. 8-20; Georges Douin, *Histoire du règne du Khédive Ismaïl* (Rome, 1933), I, 294-313; Angelo Sammarco, *Histoire de l'Égypte moderne* (Cairo, 1937), III, 135-141, 413-416.

<sup>35</sup> Hayreddin (Tunis) to Selim Faris (Istanbul), 2 August 1876, quoted in A. Demeerseman, "Indépendance de la Tunisie et politique extérieure de Khérédine," *IBLA*, 21:83 (3rd quarter 1958), 277.

<sup>36</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 17 and 633 on the appointment, 109-129 reproducing the articles.

<sup>37</sup> Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkişâb* (Istanbul, 1294-1295), II, 178-179.

Istanbul's population of about six hundred thousand there were only some five or six thousand politically conscious Muslims who might support Midhat's views—the other elements being either foreigners, members of minority millets, or Muslims who were illiterate, conservative, or uninterested. Of the politically conscious, some were so unrealistic as to think the Turks could ape the French revolution of 1789, and that problems would be solved by singing the "Marseillaise," by condemnation of autocracy in the coffeehouses, and by shouting long life to Midhat.<sup>38</sup> Yet there was serious discussion, often in simple language aimed at the common man.

*Vakit* on October 27 carried an effective dialogue of questions and answers to explain the nature of a parliament, that it was compatible with the şeriat and tradition, and that Christians as well as Muslims should be members.<sup>39</sup> At about the same time Esad Efendi, a member of the ulema who was selected by Süleyman Paşa to be a teacher in the military school at Kuleli and who was also secretary of the maritime commercial tribunal in Istanbul, published a pamphlet entitled *Constitutional Government*, likewise in dialogue form.<sup>40</sup> Esad set out to prove that Muslim government was constitutional because it was based on religious and civil law, but that when it turned by error to autocracy the people required a watchdog assembly to check on the administration. Christians should be admitted to the parliament, and also to military service, as a matter of practical necessity. "In this we separate religion (*din*) and nation (*millet*)." Further, parliamentary government is the basis of order and wealth, as English experience has shown. Esad's whole approach was to prove that constitution and parliament were within the Islamic and Ottoman tradition, and that an elective assembly was the best insurance against arbitrary government. He gave little attention to the legislative function of a parliament. This pamphlet, says Süleyman, is a sample of the discussion carried on in these days by public speakers and in printed form.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 75-77.

<sup>39</sup> Given in Azimzade Hakki, *Turkiyede meclis-i meb'usan* (Cairo, 1907), pp. 99-110; extracts in Paul Fesch, *Constantinople aux derniers jours d'Abdul Hamid* (Paris, 1907), pp. 282-285.

<sup>40</sup> Esad Efendi, *Hükümet-i meşrute* (Istanbul, 17 şevval 1293). This is reprinted in Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 79-88. On Esad's career see Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 59, n.14. Cf. chapter VIII, above, n.28.

<sup>41</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 78. Esad's pamphlet, though authorized by the ministry of public instruction, was shortly seized by the police: *Levant Herald*, 10 November 1876. One suspects the hand of Abdülhamid in the seizure. Fesch, *Constantinople*, p. 274, notes another discussion of a parliament in *Hakikat*. Quite

In this atmosphere of diplomatic tension, war fever, and expectancy Midhat worked to get a constitutional draft accepted and promulgated. For nearly four weeks after the accession of Abdülhamid nothing was done. The influential Damad Mahmud Paşa, commander of the arsenal, and a number of ministers and palace officials, were opponents of the whole concept.<sup>42</sup> But the diplomatic situation led to the calling of several grand councils to discuss reform proposals by the great powers and terms for Serbia. One met on September 12, another just two weeks later, another on October 2.<sup>43</sup> These meetings of the *meclis-i umumî* gave Midhat a chance to propose again his constitutional plan, as a means of avoiding outside intervention in matters of reform. At the meeting of September 26, about seventy notables agreed that a constitution establishing an intersectorian parliament should be drafted. It was variously reported that there would be an assembly of seven hundred and twenty members, which resembled a proposal by Küçük Said Bey, or of one hundred and twenty members of whom three fourths would be elected, which sounded like Midhat's project.<sup>44</sup> Though this suggests that at least two of the constitutional drafts were publicly known in rough outline, the recommendation of the grand council to Abdülhamid probably did not go so far as to advocate one specific plan. The sultan's reply, in an irade of September 30, ordered the establishment of a commission of ulema and civil officials to draft a constitution to be submitted to the ministers and the sultan. The irade laid considerable emphasis on reconciling representative institutions with the *seriat* and with Ottoman customs.<sup>45</sup>

The *meclis-i umumî* of October 2, about one hundred and twenty strong and including leading Christians, confirmed the decision on

by coincidence a constitution for the Protestant millet was under discussion at the same time, and the Porte commission which reviewed it was unable to understand its democratic form, with no chief priest: ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #614, 29 November 1876.

<sup>42</sup> Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, "93 meşrutiyeti," *Belleter*, VI:21/22 (January-April 1942), 53.

<sup>43</sup> *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20, 28, 30 September; *Levant Herald*, 28, 30 September and 3 October; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 195-196; Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (Washington, unpublished thesis for the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, 1961), pp. 25-27; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mîrât-ı hakikat*, I, 188-190; Elliot to Derby, 27 September 1876, in *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5831.

<sup>44</sup> *Levant Herald*, 28 and 30 September 1876.

<sup>45</sup> Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 196. Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, p. 27, gives October 7, as does Baykal, "93 meşrutiyeti," pp. 55-56. It is hard to fit this date into the sequence of events.

a constitution, and reportedly advocated both a lower chamber and a senate.<sup>46</sup> Thus the diplomatic crisis pushed the constitutional question off dead center. The reply of the Ottoman Empire to the powers' proposals for special regimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be a reform of the imperial government as a whole. By October 12 work on the constitutional project was far enough along so that Safvet Paşa, the foreign minister, could officially inform all Ottoman representatives abroad that an elective assembly and an appointive senate had been adopted in principle, and that plans were being elaborated by a commission under Midhat Paşa's chairmanship. Now the Porte and the sultan were publicly committed to the adoption of parliamentary government, which Safvet's circular telegram said clearly that Abdülhamid had granted.<sup>47</sup>

The commission had held its first session on October 6.<sup>48</sup> It was composed of twenty-four men, to which number four more were added on November 2.<sup>49</sup> Sixteen were civil officials, ten were members of the ulema, and two were generals of the army. The membership included some of the most intelligent partisans of constitutional government. Midhat Paşa was the chairman.<sup>50</sup> Ziya, undersecretary for education, and Namık Kemal, one of the later appointees, were both influential. Two other members—Server Paşa, now minister of public works, and Seyfeddin Efendi, one of the ulema—had spoken for constitution in earlier grand council discussions. Odian Efendi, for years a close adviser to Midhat and one of the authors of the Armenian millet constitution, was certainly among the more influential on the commission. In addition to Odian there were five other Christians, of whom Alexander Karatheodori was undersecretary for for-

<sup>46</sup> *Levant Herald*, 3 and 5 October 1876.

<sup>47</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5862. The circular also promised improvement in the vilayet law and its administration.

<sup>48</sup> The date is not certain. Most accounts furnish none. Baykal, "93 meşrutiyeti," p. 56, and Recai G. Okandan, *Umumî âme hukukumuzun ana hatları* (Istanbul, 1948), I, 138, both give September 24, which is before the commission was ordered to be appointed. Assuming that this is Old Style, the date then becomes October 6. Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 106, n.2, gives Oct. 7.

<sup>49</sup> Lists of members in Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 56, 75-80, and variant by İhsan Sungu, *ibid.*, II, part 2, 106, n.2. See the careful corrections to the lists in Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 44-45. Cf. partial lists in *Levant Herald*, 20 November 1876, and in Léouzon le Duc, *Midhat Pacha* (Paris, 1877), p. 136.

<sup>50</sup> Many accounts name Server Paşa as chairman, but this is clearly an error, which arises probably from the fact that Server was chairman of the previous commission to review the constitutional draft, in Murad's reign. See above, chapter IX, n.178.

eign affairs and Vahan undersecretary for justice. Most prominent among those who might create difficulties were Cevdet, who was quite out of sympathy with Midhat, and Namık, who had earlier expressed himself as favorable to a parliament of Muslims only. So far as one can tell, it was a collection of able men. In addition, others seem to have participated in some of the later sessions, including two strong backers of Midhat, İsmail Kemal Bey and Süleyman Paşa, the latter just returned from the campaign against the Serbs.<sup>51</sup>

Much of the commission's work was done in committees, of which the chief was an editing or drafting committee presided over by Ziya Bey. Its members included Namık Kemal, Savas Paşa, a Greek who was director of the Galatasaray *lycée*, Chamich Ohannes Efendi, an Armenian who was on the Council of State, Abidin Bey, commissioner of the bourse, and Ramiz Efendi, one of the ulema. Their daily sessions resulted in lithographed proposals which, along with those of other committees, were circulated to members of the full commission. The latter met four times a week at the Sublime Porte, or sometimes at the houses of Midhat and Server, and made its decisions by majority vote.<sup>52</sup>

When the commission began its work there were already a number of constitutional drafts and projects available for its use. Abdülhamid later said that some twenty projects had been submitted to him.<sup>53</sup> Süleyman Paşa's draft constitution, although very disordered, may have been one of those considered. So also may the draft which Said Bey, chief palace secretary, had made after a French model. It provided for a 750-man assembly, a senate, and a council of state; Said later described it as a "perfect" or "complete" constitution.<sup>54</sup> And, of course, there was Midhat's draft. Said's was certainly much better

<sup>51</sup> Sommerville Story, ed., *The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey* (London, 1920), pp. 137-138; Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 56 and n.2.

<sup>52</sup> *Levant Herald*, 20 November 1876; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, pp. 199-200. Minutes of the commission and its committees would be, if extant, extremely interesting. For some further details see Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, p. 29. See Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 57, for a similar committee structure as of January 1877.

<sup>53</sup> "Sultan Hamid'in hatıratı," *Yeni Sabah*, 9 December 1949, quoted in İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*, IV (İstanbul, 1955), 293.

<sup>54</sup> Text in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 333-355. Which French constitution Said used is not indicated. His draft provided for a monarch, but is often said to have been based on the constitution of the French Republic [First? Second? Third?]. Mehmed Said Paşa, *Hatıratı* (İstanbul, 1328), I, 14. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1951), p. 130, n.9, points out that the French *charte* of 1830 had been published in Turkish as early as 1839.

organized than Süleyman's, and more complete than Midhat's. Other contrasts are also instructive. Said, for example, uses article one to assert that sovereignty resides in the monarch. Süleyman is concerned to state in his first article that the Ottoman state is constitutional and independent. Midhat's article one proclaims the integrity of the empire and the inalterability of its boundaries, as well as that its government is based on the şeriat. Namık Kemal later said that the commission used no one of these drafts as its basis, but proceeded *ab initio*; further, that Said's draft did not even come to the commission. Since Namık Kemal was appointed to the commission only after it had done four weeks' work, he may not be accurate here. It is plain, however, that the commission confined itself to no single source of inspiration, and that certainly some of its members cast about widely for suggestions. Namık Kemal reported that the commission considered a wide range of existing constitutions, many commentaries on them, and consulted at least a thousand volumes.<sup>55</sup>

It seems likely that Midhat's draft had, nevertheless, considerable influence, both because Midhat had been the chief proponent of a constitution and because he was commission chairman.<sup>56</sup> By the fall of 1876 Midhat's draft, which at the time of Murad's accession was quite sketchy, had undergone considerable enlargement and change, undoubtedly affected by discussions in the preceding summer. A little before Murad's deposition the Midhat draft consisted of sixty-three articles divided into seven chapters; Namık Kemal, at Midhat's request, had read it to the London *Times* correspondent in İstanbul.<sup>57</sup> This is very close to Midhat's draft of about sixty (unnumbered) articles and eight chapters that Ahmed Midhat reproduces. In late October, just before he became a member of the commission, Namık

<sup>55</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 90-92. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 197, says that Midhat's draft was the basis, an assertion that called forth Namık Kemal's refutation. It is natural to think that the Belgian constitution of 1831 served as a model for drafting the Ottoman. This is asserted in Gotthard Jäschke, "Die Entwicklung des Osmanischen Verfassungsstaates . . ." *Die Welt des Islams*, V:1/2 (1917), 38; Friedrich von Kraeletz-Greifenhorst, *Die Verfassungsgesetze des Osmanischen Reiches* (Vienna, 1919), p. 2; Erich Pritsch, "Geschichtliche und systematische Übersicht nebst Anmerkungen zur Verfassung," *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, 26/27:2 (1924), 165; Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 356. This may be true in part, but the only contemporary statement to this effect that the author has noticed is a French embassy report of June 7, 1876, that Midhat and Halil Şerif went so far as to talk of the Belgian constitution. See above, chapter IX, n.142.

<sup>56</sup> Text of his draft in *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 321-333.

<sup>57</sup> Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 282. The date is not specific, but the context indicates August of 1876.

Kemal gave to the public, through his articles in *Ittihad*, a verbatim transcription of many articles of Midhat's draft, and strongly defended it. His numbering of the articles indicates that the draft had undergone yet further modifications.<sup>58</sup>

There are a considerable number of similarities between the final product and Midhat's draft. The latter still had gaps in it—as Ahmed Midhat bitingly observed, it provided for no senate, nor did it elaborate the judicial, financial, or provincial organization.<sup>59</sup> But Midhat may well have considered that provincial organization was taken care of by the 1867 law and later amendments. It is interesting to speculate whether the absence of a senate (a Council of State was provided for) was an effort by Midhat to throw all power into a unicameral legislature without a senatorial check. The 120-man chamber of deputies which his draft provided for was to be two thirds elected in the vilayets and one third appointed by the government, which was in line with Midhat's thinking since December of 1875, but not quite so radical as the entirely elected chamber of July 15. Midhat's draft, although it stated in terms very like those of the final constitution that the sultan's person was sacred and he could not be held to responsibility, was far less insistent on the prerogatives of the sultan than was the final product. By contrast, Midhat would give more power to the council of ministers, which in his draft became the competent authority to deal with all important internal and external affairs, its decisions to be sanctioned by imperial irade. Presiding over the council would be a prime minister (*baş vekil*) in the European style. The office of grand vezir was specifically declared abolished. The prime minister, to be named by the sultan, would, in turn, select the ministers, who would then be appointed by the sultan. The provision for a prime minister was a key element in Midhat's proposal and was soon to cause him trouble, especially as some suspected him—probably rightly—of wanting to hold that office himself. Midhat's draft also provided that all subjects without distinction were to be called Osmanli, though Turkish was to be the official language. (Here called "Türki," not "Osmanli.")

Some of the major decisions in the commission must have come before October 12, when Safvet sent his circular to ambassadors

<sup>58</sup> Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 119-124, reprinting his articles. Namık Kemal omitted all references to Midhat's provision for a prime minister, probably so as to avoid further criticism.

<sup>59</sup> *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 199.

abroad announcing an elective chamber and an appointive senate. Midhat's chamber, with one third of its members appointed, had already been abandoned. Some of the ulema evidently raised anew the proposition that Muslims only should sit in the chamber, but Midhat's contrary view prevailed on this point.<sup>60</sup> The details of discussion in the commission and its committees are not clear.<sup>61</sup> Ahmed Midhat, an unfriendly witness, makes fun of the commission's work, saying they did not really understand what they were about.<sup>62</sup> This cannot be true, though the members had to grope for the organization best suited to the empire, and opposing views had to be compromised. Sultan Abdülhamid seems not to have been an obstructionist at this stage, but to have wanted some kind of constitution to emerge.<sup>63</sup> Cevdet Paşa and Midhat did get into some bitter arguments over particular points as the proposed articles came from the drafting committee, section by section. There is no reason to think that Cevdet at this stage opposed a constitution altogether, but on certain articles, possibly those concerned with the sultan's prerogatives, he disagreed strongly with Midhat, and seems to have lost in the commission.<sup>64</sup> Midhat was certainly far less of a traditionalist than Cevdet. The diplomatic situation gave Midhat some advantage, since he was known to have found favor with Elliot, and the Turks did not want to antagonize a great power that might furnish help against Russia. This became particularly important after the Russian ultimatum of October 31 and the subsequent Russian mobilization. Ignatyev was persuaded that the sudden ultimatum, leading the Turks to think that Russia had decided on war, allowed Midhat and the radicals to gain the upper hand.<sup>65</sup>

Meanwhile important opposition to a constitution which would allow Christians to sit in the parliament, and which would curtail the sultan's powers, had developed outside of the commission in mid-October. This was accompanied by rumors that Murad had recovered his health and was entitled to the throne. But the heart of the con-

<sup>60</sup> Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 30-31.

<sup>61</sup> No minutes have been published. The author does not know whether they exist. Nor have any consecutive accounts by participants been published.

<sup>62</sup> *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 197-198.

<sup>63</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 220.

<sup>64</sup> Cevdet's account from his *Texâkür*, #18, quoted in Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Medenî hukuk cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa* (İstanbul, 1946), pp. 141-143, n.121, including Mardin's comments.

<sup>65</sup> Alexander Onou, "The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev," *Slavonic Review*, x (1931), 405.

spiracy, if such it was, was a group of high-ranking ulema, among them Gürcü Şerif Efendi, who on May 10 had hoped to become *şeyhülislâm*, and Muhyiddin Efendi, once the teacher of Yusuf İzzeddin. The government acted with considerable courage, arresting and exiling a dozen or so either to Aegean islands or to their native towns. The movement thus never got out of hand. It may have had ramifications in the Bulgar area, and some Christians were apprehensive of a massacre. The constitutionalists had saved themselves, but by arbitrary action without judicial proceedings. Although exile of officials without trial had not been unusual in Abdülaziz's reign, a contemporary official pointed out that such had not been the case with the Kuleli affair conspirators in 1859 and that a bad example was being set by a presumably reformist ministry.<sup>66</sup>

A few days after the suppression of these recalcitrant ulema the Porte issued, with Abdülhamid's sanction, a provisional electoral law. This law of October 28 had been worked out by the commission on the constitution even before the draft of the constitution itself was completed; for Midhat urgently wanted to start elections, even to have the chamber meet, before the constitution was promulgated, in order to confront the powers with a *fait accompli*.<sup>67</sup> There was neither time nor machinery to prepare for direct popular elections. Therefore, the provisional law was built squarely on the vilayet law, using the administrative meclis members in each *kaza*, *sancak*, and vilayet as an electoral college to vote directly for deputies to the parliament from each vilayet.<sup>68</sup> The law itself noted that these meclises were already "the results of popular suffrage," and a member of the constitutional commission said that the electoral law was very liberal.<sup>69</sup> But the various meclis members were, of course, themselves the result of indirect election in which Porte-appointed provincial officials played a part. *Kaza* meclis members were elected at two degrees, *sancak* meclis members at three, and vilayet meclis members at four,

<sup>66</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 193. Accounts of the movement in *Levant Herald*, 23, 26 and 28 October 1876; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #609, 25 October 1876, and #483, undated; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 184-185; Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 33-35; documents in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 291-297.

<sup>67</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 193-194; Baykal, "93 meşrutiyeti," pp. 63-65.

<sup>68</sup> Text of law in Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane* (Constantinople, 1873-1888), V, 306-309.

<sup>69</sup> Benoît Brunswik, *La réforme et les garanties*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1877), p. 85.

the meclis at each level serving as an electoral college to choose twice the needed number for the next higher level, from which officials selected half.<sup>70</sup> Only at the very bottom of the hierarchy did the people vote directly for electors who chose the *kaza* meclis. This complex system was a far cry from popular election, but it was workable. For Istanbul, the October 28 law provided a popular vote of all property owners for an electoral college, in which there was no participation of officials.<sup>71</sup> This method, which resembled also the Armenian millet electoral system for the capital, was the closest to direct popular election of any of the 1876 arrangements. Midhat's hopes for enough speed to gather the chamber together before the constitution was promulgated were deceived; the electoral law itself set March 13 as the opening date. But in at least one vilayet elections were under way by early December.<sup>72</sup>

Toward the end of November the commission had completed a constitutional draft of one hundred and forty articles, which included Midhat's desideratum of a prime ministry instead of a grand vezirate. The draft was submitted unofficially to Abdülhamid by Midhat.<sup>73</sup> It was expected that the constitution would be proclaimed within a few days.<sup>74</sup> Arrangements were pushed for the meeting of the parliament, as Midhat and other ministers inspected the Istanbul University building which, unused for its original purpose, was to be converted for the parliament's occupancy.<sup>75</sup> It looked as if the Porte, which on November 18 had yielded to the demand for a great-power conference on the Balkans, would have its constitution, though not a parliament in session, well before the conference should meet. Instead, a new struggle began to take shape as men opposed either to the whole concept of a constitution, or to the draft as it then stood, made themselves heard. Some represented palace officials, a clique afraid of losing influence under the new dispensation. Some were ministers, especially Cevdet and Mehmed Rüşdi. And Abdülhamid now embarked on a course of hesitation and obstruction which revealed

<sup>70</sup> This revision of the original electoral process, which is described in chapter V above, had been made by a law of 30 December 1875: text in Aristarchi, *Législation*, V, 85-87.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *Levant Herald*, 30 January 1877.

<sup>72</sup> In Edirne: *Levant Herald*, 7 December 1876.

<sup>73</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 221; A. H. Midhat, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, p. 183; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani ve devri-i saltanatı* (Istanbul, 1327), I, 165.

<sup>74</sup> Elliot to Derby, #1299, 22 November 1876, FO 78/2467.

<sup>75</sup> *Levant Herald*, 20 November 1876.

him fearful of losing imperial prerogatives, reluctant at the same time to antagonize any influential group of statesmen, and yet again desirous of using the constitution to thwart the diplomats. He may also still genuinely have wanted some sort of constitution in order to appear in the eyes of his own people to be a reformer. The struggle went on in the palace, in the commission, and in the council of ministers.

Abdülhamid followed a process of asking various ministers and officials for their views on the draft, probably to play one against another. Namık Paşa expressed stubborn opposition to the draft. Mehmed Rüşdi, who had not been a member of the constitutional commission, now reverted to his original hesitations about the whole matter. To the sultan he said that the articles enumerating the sovereign's powers should be struck out, since by such enumeration those powers were limited. He objected to the creation of an office of prime minister, advising, instead, retention of the old grand vezirate, and direct appointment of all ministers by the sultan. In fact, Mehmed Rüşdi declared that only the critical international situation disposed him to a constitution of any sort. Palace officials, seeking to preserve their own influence, backed up the grand vezir's arguments, and insinuated that Midhat, greedy for power, wanted to be himself a prime minister-dictator.<sup>76</sup> At about the same time Süleyman Paşa, still an ardent constitutionalist, returned from the Serb war and was granted an audience with the sultan on November 22. Süleyman argued vigorously for the promulgation. Abdülhamid, very possibly wary of the general who had played an important role in deposing Abdülaziz, paraded his good intentions to Süleyman, declared himself pleased with the audience, and put Süleyman on the constitutional commission which was then working on the internal regulations for the two houses of parliament.<sup>77</sup>

Midhat was as impatient as Süleyman, urging the dangers of delay, but Mehmed Rüşdi considered Midhat imprudent, saying, "The law he has written in haste will devour his head first."<sup>78</sup> According to Namık Kemal, the grand vezir now favored, instead of a constitution, a statement of general principles like the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane. The sultan, said Namık Kemal further, was insincere in his whole attitude toward the constitutionalists, desiring only a strength-

<sup>76</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 221.

<sup>77</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>78</sup> Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, p. 200.

ening of the imperial prerogatives.<sup>79</sup> Quite possibly Abdülhamid was trying to use the grand vezir to thwart Midhat. The sultan never went so far as to refuse the constitution. But his answer to Midhat's unofficial communication of the draft was a letter to Midhat of November 26 indicating that he wanted the council of ministers to revise the draft in order to safeguard the sovereign rights and to make it accord with the customs and needs of the people. Midhat's reply two days later was to admit that a majority of the articles required modification, but to urge speed in promulgating the constitution so the demands of the coming great-power conference would not have to be accepted. We can put into execution our own reforms in three or four days, said Midhat.<sup>80</sup> Midhat had already the evening before been at the palace with Süleyman and the war minister Redif—a visit that may have been worrisome to the sultan since these three, now that Hüseyin Avni was dead, were the most important surviving members of the group that had overthrown Abdülaziz. But what they discussed is not known.<sup>81</sup> At some point in this process the draft constitution was altered to eliminate the prime ministry and restore the grand vezirate, with power of appointing the ministers remaining in the sultan's hands.

At the very end of November, or the start of December, the draft then went to the council of ministers, as Abdülhamid had ordered. Here the sessions were often stormy. Mehmed Rüşdi, although evidently reluctant to attack Midhat directly because of Midhat's favor with the British ambassador, pushed others to the attack. Among them was Cevdet Paşa, who in Midhat's view was swinging the grand vezir to oppose the constitution. "I cannot find two or three persons to help me in the council," complained Midhat. His arguments with Cevdet descended to personalities, Midhat deriding Cevdet's knowledge of European law, and Cevdet retorting that Midhat's French was not so good as that of an ordinary shoemaker.<sup>82</sup> A good many changes were made in the draft by the ministers, including reduction

<sup>79</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 57. Cf. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 198-202, impugning Namık Kemal's sincerity and defending that of the sultan.

<sup>80</sup> Texts in A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 328-330; *idem*, *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903), pp. 113-114; *idem*, *Midhat Pasha. Sa vie—son oeuvre* (Paris, 1908), pp. 79-80, all with divergent dates.

<sup>81</sup> *Basiret*, 29 November 1876, quoted in Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 56, n.2.

<sup>82</sup> İnal, *Son sadrâzamlar*, p. 345, quoting an account by Vefik Bey, Midhat's son-in-law; *Mardin, Cevdet*, pp. 10, n.7, 142-144, n.121.



of the total number of articles, largely through rearrangement and consolidation.<sup>83</sup> Evidently the council of ministers accepted Mehmed Rüşdi's argument that the enumeration of the sultan's powers would be an unconscionable limitation on his authority, for the council excised these articles at the beginning of the draft and substituted a preface stating general principles like those of the 1839 *hat*. Namık Kemal objected strenuously to this, arguing that this was the work of anticonstitution men, and that the Ottoman dynasty and state would suffer if the ruler's prerogatives were not firmly fixed in the constitution itself, as was the case in other constitutional states. This was paralleled by his desire to see that the ministers should not be in a position to dominate the government entirely, as had been the case in Âli's time; therefore, the sultan's prerogatives must be clearly set forth to counterbalance the Porte's authority. On both of these subjects he wrote memoranda to the palace.<sup>84</sup> It may have been on these matters that a subcommittee of the constitutional commission—chaired by Süleyman, with Namık Kemal, Ziya, and Abidin as members—met two or three times after the ministers had made their revisions in the draft.<sup>85</sup> The council of ministers, however, had already approved their revised constitutional draft at a special meeting on December 6. The next day the document was submitted, this time officially, to Abdülhamid. Its promulgation was expected before the week was out.<sup>86</sup>

Yet more delays supervened. There was further discussion in the palace, perhaps occasioned by Namık Kemal's memoranda, on the royal prerogatives laid down in the constitution. Particular argument also went on over the right of the sultan to exile those who endangered the security of the state. It may be that such a clause had been proposed earlier, and it is not clear whether the ministers in the first week of December had discussed it, or what their decision was. But this was evidently the principal matter over which Abdülhamid now delayed further, even as time pressed—for the great powers' diplomats were about to gather in conference in İstanbul on December 11, Lord Salisbury had already arrived on the 5th full of anti-Turkish prejudice, and Ignatyev had already prepared his maximum

<sup>83</sup> For some details on changes see Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>84</sup> İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, pp. 343-344, n.3; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, II, part 2, 88, 90-91, 98.

<sup>85</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 6, 57, n.2.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58; *Levant Herald*, 7 December 1876.

and minimum plans for rearranging the Balkans.<sup>87</sup> For about ten days no news came from the palace. Someone in the palace—Küçük Said, chief palace secretary, has most often been accused—had proposed an additional clause to article 113 (which dealt with a state of siege) which would allow the sultan to exile supposedly dangerous persons.<sup>88</sup> Damad Mahmud Paşa insisted on its insertion. The sultan debated this for three nights with him and the two Saids, swinging this way and that, for İngiliz Said, the sultan's chief aide-de-camp, vigorously opposed the clause. Abdülhamid's final decision was to demand the power of exile.<sup>89</sup> He would not take the constitution without the additional clause, said the sultan.

After ten days or so Midhat went to the palace to make inquiry, on the insistence of Ziya and Namık Kemal. He returned with the news that the constitution was accepted, but that the dreaded clause had been added to article 113. Ziya and Namık Kemal exploded at this. They had had experience of exile before. They said that this clause vitiated the whole constitution and, further, would destroy its value in the eyes of Europe.<sup>90</sup> Others, by no means radical, like the Porte's chief secretary for palace correspondence, Mahmud Celaleddin, agreed with them: the men of the palace had sold Abdülhamid a bill of goods, said Mahmud.<sup>91</sup> To the demands of Ziya and Namık Kemal that the clause be rejected, Midhat answered that they were behaving childishly; if he acted thus, the constitution would be further delayed and perhaps would never come to be. Possibly the chamber of deputies could later right the wrong. Midhat and his two supporters were estranged over this issue, Ziya even suspecting Midhat of wanting to exercise the power of exile himself.<sup>92</sup> Theoretically the two erstwhile New Ottomans were right, but in the circumstances Midhat's decision was politically the only thing to do, unless the sultan himself could be persuaded to abandon the clause.

It may have been in an attempt to persuade Abdülhamid to do

<sup>87</sup> Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 234-237.

<sup>88</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 222; İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, p. 345. Said himself denied the charge: Said, *Hatıratı*, II, part 2, 243-244, n.1.

<sup>89</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 222; unpublished memoirs of Eğinli (İngiliz) Said Paşa, quoted in H. Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz* (İstanbul, 1949), pp. 182-184.

<sup>90</sup> İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, pp. 344-345; Tansel, *Namık Kemal*, p. 29.

<sup>91</sup> *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 222.

<sup>92</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 58, n.3; Tansel, *Namık Kemal*, p. 29; İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, pp. 345-346.

this that Süleyman Paşa, after conferring with Namık Kemal, again boldly requested an audience of the sultan. But it is more likely that, as his own account states, Süleyman was concerned simply with terminating the endless delay. In any case, probably on the 16th or 17th of December, Süleyman had a lengthy talk with Abdülhamid, during which he argued heatedly for the immediate promulgation of the whole constitution, including those articles which enumerated the sultan's powers. Abdülhamid protested that he did not oppose the constitution—that he was, in fact, himself a constitutionalist—but that the draft presented by Midhat did not sufficiently harmonize the rights of the sultanate and those of the subjects. He asked Süleyman, Küçük Said, and İngiliz Said to go over the draft again and prepare him a memorandum. This they did that same night, in the palace. Their report approved the constitution, but in the form which it had before the changes made by the council of ministers.<sup>98</sup> Certainly not all the ministerial changes were undone, but the sultan's powers, enumerated, must have been restored at this point; they appeared in the definitive text of the constitution, especially in article 7. That night or the next morning Sultan Abdülhamid consented to the proclamation of the constitution, and so informed the office of the grand vezir. By December 18 the news was published in Istanbul that the sultan had approved the constitution, although the date for its promulgation was not yet known.<sup>94</sup> The constitutionalists appeared to have won. Whether it would be an enduring victory was still to be seen.



On December 19, 1876, Midhat Paşa was appointed grand vezir.<sup>95</sup> Mehmed Rüşdi had resigned because of old age and sickness, said the official announcement. But he had probably never been fully trusted by Abdülhamid, because of his role in the deposition of Abdülaziz; and the presence of a contingent of Egyptian troops which Mehmed Rüşdi had told the khedive could winter in Istanbul made the sultan fear their possible use in his own overthrow. It is quite possible also that Abdülhamid, now that he had made up his mind

<sup>98</sup> Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 12-14, n.2, and 58-62; Şehsuvaroğlu, *Sultan Aziz*, p. 182. Possibly this report was made a few days earlier.

<sup>94</sup> *Levant Herald*, 18 December 1876.

<sup>95</sup> Hat of appointment in *Stamboul*, 20 December 1876, and *Levant Herald*, 21 December 1876, which gives the date as 18 December.

to the constitution, wanted Midhat at the helm as a symbol of reform, and to use Midhat's international reputation as a weapon against the coming diplomatic conference. The appointment was a blow at Ignatyev, who had called Midhat a brigand, a filibuster, and a madman.<sup>96</sup> Abdülhamid was undoubtedly wary of Midhat too, but he could hardly overlook him in the circumstances, and might use him. "Let us make him grand vezir once, and then let him fall from fortune," the sultan is reported to have said.<sup>97</sup>

Midhat was eager to proclaim the constitution as soon as he was in office, hopefully with the objectionable clause of article 113 removed. In the latter aim he was unsuccessful.<sup>98</sup> In the former he succeeded almost at once, after two minor obstacles were overcome. The first was that the official translation of the constitution into French had to be checked and confirmed.<sup>99</sup> The other was a final meeting—perhaps ordered by Abdülhamid because of a new attack of cold feet—to consider the whole document again. This took place on December 21 or 22.<sup>100</sup> Possibly some last-minute alterations were made in the draft. Cevdet Paşa provided the fireworks. Since a wise sultan had ascended the throne, he declared, there remained no need to promulgate a constitution. Midhat's vigorous reply was that since the deposition of Abdülaziz had been motivated by the sacred purpose of proclaiming a constitution to prevent autocratic rule, he would at once resign from the grand vezirate if the other ministers shared Cevdet's view and hesitated to confirm the proclamation of the constitution.<sup>101</sup> Midhat thereby successfully beat down Cevdet's move.

On Saturday, December 23, at about one o'clock in the afternoon, the constitution was formally promulgated. The ceremony, for which hasty preparations had been made, took place in the open square to the seaward side of the Sublime Porte. Despite fairly heavy rain, a

<sup>96</sup> Elliot to Derby, #1373, 19 December 1876, FO 78/2468.

<sup>97</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 222-223; İnal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, p. 117; Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, p. 62, who gives Süleyman's audience with Abdülhamid much credit for causing the change.

<sup>98</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 223.

<sup>99</sup> *Levant Herald*, 18 December 1876.

<sup>100</sup> It is not clear what sort of a meeting this was. A. H. Midhat, *Tabssra-i ibret*, p. 188, explicitly calls it a *meclis-i umumî*, though the remarks quoted indicate it might have been the council of ministers only. *Levant Herald*, 22 December 1876, calls it a meeting of the constitutional commission. A. H. Midhat, *Life*, p. 117, calls it explicitly a council of ministers, and says it met at Damad Mahmud Paşa's house.

<sup>101</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabssra-i ibret*, p. 188, n.1. See comments in Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 143, n.121; Mardin doubts that Cevdet could have opposed the constitution entire.

large crowd gathered, the people pushing and jostling one another with umbrellas. Said Bey, first secretary of the palace, arrived with a velvet pouch containing Abdülhamid's official decree of promulgation and the text of the constitution. He handed this to the grand vezir Midhat Paşa, who, in turn, reverently handed it to the chief secretary of the Porte in charge of communications to the palace, Mahmud Celaledin, who read the *hat* aloud. The sultan did not grace the ceremony with his presence, and he was said to be slightly indisposed. Perhaps the words which he had been obliged to sanction hurt him. His *hat*, however, was unequivocal. It described the constitution as compatible with the sacred law, and a natural continuation of the reforms begun by his father, Abdülmecid. It said that the aims of the constitution were the welfare of all Ottoman peoples, who should without distinction enjoy the blessings of liberty, justice, and equality, and the safeguarding of the government from arbitrary domination by one or more individuals. The *hat* outlined briefly the process by which the constitution had been elaborated and the main headings of that document, and finally ordered the grand vezir to see that the constitution was made effective in all parts of the empire and that the laws needed to implement it were worked out at once.<sup>102</sup> Midhat then spoke briefly in thanks to the sultan for the important act of promulgation. This will inaugurate, said Midhat, a new era of enduring prosperity.<sup>103</sup> Writing some forty or more years later, the last official historian of the Ottoman Empire, Abdurrahman Şeref, said that the vibration of Midhat's voice still rang in his ears. After the former müfti of Edirne prayed for long life for Abdülhamid, a salute of one hundred and one guns announced the promulgation to the populace.<sup>104</sup>

The booming of the guns sounded also in the hall where the Constantinople Conference (often called by Turks the Tersane or Admiralty Conference, after its place of meeting) was holding its first plenary session. Safvet Paşa, the foreign minister and first Ottoman delegate to the conference, arose to explain the significance of the

<sup>102</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5984; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 209-212; *Levant Herald*, 26 December 1876. Ahmed Midhat, II, 383-385, gives also the text of an initial draft of the *hat* by Midhat which was not quite so flowery and laid less stress on the role of the sultan and the dynasty.

<sup>103</sup> Text in *Levant Herald*, 26 December 1876.

<sup>104</sup> Descriptions of the ceremony in *Levant Herald*, 23 and 26 December 1876; Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri*, pp. 200-201; Mahmud Celaledin, *Mirât-i hakikat*, I, 224; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 206-207; *Stamboul*, 26 December 1876; Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 71-74.

salute. He spoke eloquently of the new reform measure, which meant that the empire needed no foreign suggestions.<sup>105</sup> This theatrical coup failed to arrest the deliberations of the powers. That Midhat should have thought it would stop the conference is inconceivable, for he knew that all, even the British, were committed to the deliberations. Were the six powers, furthermore, to toss aside the reform proposals for the Balkan provinces which they had worked out in nine preliminary meetings without the Turkish delegates, and were now about to present to them? Of course this did not happen. The initial diplomatic significance of the constitutional promulgation is that it gave the Turkish delegates strong ground on which to stand in refusing the powers' proposals as they were advanced—a position which caused the powers to whittle down the proposals.

In Istanbul outside the conference hall, the constitutional proclamation provoked a greater enthusiasm. Of course there were the formal visits of congratulation to the sultan in his palace by the ministers and other officials, and that night houses and shops were illuminated.<sup>106</sup> A more significant visit was that paid the next day by Midhat to the Greek and Armenian patriarchs, as a gesture to help bind all the peoples of the empire in a common bond of Osmanlılık and to show that under the new constitutional regime men of all creeds would be treated equally. Such a visit by a grand vezir was unprecedented in Ottoman history, and probably all the more appreciated by the millet heads, since traditionally it was they who visited Ottoman officials. "We consider you the resuscitator of the Ottoman Empire," said the Greek patriarch in reply to Midhat's words of friendship.<sup>107</sup> Meanwhile on the evening of December 23 groups of young liberals among the Turks had paraded the streets, some going to Midhat's house and to the palace to shout long life to the grand vezir and the sultan. They were joined by groups of softas, some just back from the war against Serbia, and by some of the military academy students. A parade of brokers and money-changers from Galata also indulged in similar demonstrations.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Protocol of 23 December 1876 session in *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5949.

<sup>106</sup> Mahmud Celaledin, *Mirât-i hakikat*, I, 224.

<sup>107</sup> Midhat's speech to the Greek Orthodox, and patriarch's reply, in A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Pasha*, pp. 97-98. Cf. Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 213-214; A. H. Midhat, *Life*, p. 131, which says he also visited the grand rabbi; Théodore Blancard, *Les Mavroyéni* (Paris, 1909), II, 70 and n.1.

<sup>108</sup> *Levant Herald*, 26 December 1876; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 208;

Part of this enthusiasm was for constitutional government; part was simply an expression of patriotic opposition to all foreign interference. But of enthusiasm among much of the literate elite of the capital, both Turkish and non-Turkish, there can be little doubt. The next day *Vakit* summed up the sentiment in an article which began, "Yesterday was for all Osmanlis the beginning of happiness."<sup>109</sup>

Throughout the empire as a whole the reaction to the news that a constitution had been proclaimed was, in general, one of scepticism, indifference, or lack of comprehension. In each provincial capital the vali had the imperial *hat* read publicly. Sometimes the notables in the vilayet capital then returned an address of thanks to the sultan. Only in Edirne does real enthusiasm seem to have been engendered, and this was more for defiance of the powers than for parliamentary rule.<sup>110</sup> In some quarters there was fear that the constitution simply represented new concessions to Christian pressure. Ottoman officialdom seems to have understood the import of the constitution and the difficulties which would arise in applying it. The people as a whole, ignorant and tradition-minded, understood little. Three instances may serve as illustrations. In Ankara a telegram arrived on December 25 with news that the constitution was proclaimed and that official rejoicing should begin. The vali, greatly sceptical that political liberty could be achieved without time for more education and the development of greater tolerance, complied with the orders. He read the telegram to the public, an imam pronounced "Amen," and the one cannon in Ankara was fired one hundred and one times despite fears that it might burst. The vali's son opined that roads and railroads were more important than fifty constitutions. As yet the text of the constitution was unknown in Ankara. Two months later the Ankara vilayet newspaper carried a long article in praise of the constitution as a check to administrative chaos, a block to Russian intervention, and a guarantee of free expression and participation in government which would produce good men to help save the empire.<sup>111</sup> In Tripoli in Africa the promulgation, on January 6, produced a salute of guns, some feeble illumination by oil lamps, and a vast indifference except

*Stamboul*, 26 December 1876; Moüy, "Souvenirs d'un diplomate," p. 627; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 224.

<sup>109</sup> Quoted in Azimzade Hakkı, *Türkiyede meclis-i meb'usan*, p. 125.

<sup>110</sup> Fesch, *Constantinople*, p. 235.

<sup>111</sup> Burnaby, *On Horseback*, I, 120-127, an eyewitness account; *Stamboul*, 27 February 1877, reprinting the Ankara article.

among the Marabouts, who feared that a constitution which diminished the power of the sultan might also lessen their own influence among the people.<sup>112</sup> In Beirut the vali read the imperial *hat* in Turkish and Arabic to representatives of all sects, and asked an old *seyh* to close with prayer. The latter, using a stereotyped formula, prayed for Abdülhamid's victory, that Allah might "destroy the infidels, tear them in tatters, grind them in powder, rend them in fragments, because they are the enemies of the Mohammedans." Then the müfti pulled at the *seyh*'s collar and whispered, whereupon the *seyh* concluded, "O Allah, destroy the infidels because they are the enemies of the Moslems, the Christians, and the Jews."<sup>113</sup>

Of the minority peoples, the Jews could but rejoice in the constitution, for they had no nationalist ambitions, and the Armenians in general seem to have greeted it with pleasure because they conceived that it might mean more liberty for them, and they had been unable to get the powers to consider their lot. Their beloved former patriarch, Mgrdich Khrimian Hairig, wrote rhapsodic praise of the constitution as ushering in an era of justice, and an Armenian poet praised Midhat's deeds and ideals.<sup>114</sup> Greeks, particularly in Istanbul and Edirne, seem to have welcomed the constitution partly for its own sake, and partly because they hoped it would thwart the Bulgarian separatism which the great powers tended to favor.<sup>115</sup> Other Balkan peoples, however, exhibited no jubilation. The Slavs who had taken up arms against the sultan could hardly look forward with pleasure to reintegration into the empire, even a constitutional empire. The Bulgars did not want equality and fusion, but separation.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>112</sup> Jones (Tripoli) to Hunter, #8, 12 January 1877, USNA, Tripoli IX.

<sup>113</sup> Henry H. Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (New York, 1910), II, 449. Other examples in Burnaby, *On Horseback*, I, 194; *Levant Herald*, 9 January 1877; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkulâb*, II, 214-217; Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 74-78; İÜ. A. Petrosian, "Novye Osmany" i bor'ba za konstitutsiinu (Moscow, 1958), pp. 115-116, citing Russian consular reports.

<sup>114</sup> Fesch, *Constantinople*, pp. 235-237; A. O. Sarkissian, *History of the Armenian Question to 1885* (Urbana, 1938), pp. 51-56; *Aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens* (Constantinople, 1917), p. 13. Some Armenians in the interior were more sceptical: Burnaby, *On Horseback*, I, 194. This was partly because on December 13 a great fire had destroyed shops in Van, whereupon looting and attacks on Christians followed; Turkish soldiers were suspected of arson: ABCFM, Eastern Turkey Mission I, #464, 22 December 1876; Burnaby, *On Horseback*, II, 238-239.

<sup>115</sup> Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 244.

<sup>116</sup> ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #618, 27 December 1876; Nicolas Iorga, ed., *Correspondance diplomatique roumaine* (Paris, 1923), #508, 28 December 1876. Ismail Kemal thought otherwise: Story, *Ismail Kemal*, p. 133.

In Roumania, when Prince Charles got a copy of the constitution on December 28, there was an explosion of protest at the implication in articles 1 and 7 that Roumania was no more than a privileged province which could not for any cause be detached from the Ottoman Empire.<sup>117</sup>

Article 1 of the constitution was, in fact, legitimately frightening to Prince Charles, for it reaffirmed emphatically one of the reasons for which Midhat and others had worked so hard for the promulgation. This was simply the preservation of the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Article 1 stated that the empire was composed of its present territories, including the privileged provinces, making a unit "which can at no time and for no cause whatever be divided." Here was an answer for the Balkan nationalists and the great powers. For this indivisible empire the constitution went on to provide the powers of the sultanate, a bill of rights for the people, a council of ministers, each of whom was responsible for his ministry, an appointed senate, an elected chamber of deputies, an independent judiciary, parliamentary control of the budget, considerable provincial decentralization, and obligatory primary education for all Muslims.<sup>118</sup> Many of the provisions would have to be elaborated by further legislation before they would become effective. Even so, the constitution did not pretend to place the Ottoman government under full popular control. It was a product of compromise and of the times. It did set up a framework under which steps in that direction might be taken, yet the framework itself had easily identifiable flaws and loopholes.

In the first place, the sultan retained great powers. Some of them were specifically listed, but none was specifically denied him. He appointed the ministers, appointed the members of the senate, convoked and prorogued the parliament. His legislative authority rested not only on this power of appointment, but on the fact that his irade was required before any bills became law, and no time limit was set for

<sup>117</sup> *Aus dem Leben König Karls von Rumänien* (Stuttgart, 1894-1900), III, 85-86; *Levant Herald*, 9 January 1877, quoting *Correspondance de Roumanie* of 6 January.

<sup>118</sup> Texts of the constitution are widely available: Turkish in Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkılâb*, II, 355-383; also in the new characters in A. Ş. Gözübüyük and S. Kili, *Türk anayasa metinleri* (Ankara, 1957), pp. 25-38; French in the official translation in *Constitution Ottomane* (Constantinople, 1876) and *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5948; English in *American Journal of International Law* (1908), Supplement, II, 367-387.

the veto power implied by this provision. He sanctioned the acts of ministers. He had the exclusive authority to expel individuals considered dangerous to the state. The sultan was also declared to be caliph, non-responsible for his acts, and his person to be sacred. Sovereignty, in short, still resided in the sultan, and not in the nation. Other flaws in the constitution, from the standpoint of democratic processes, were not far to seek. The ministers were responsible for their acts, but not directly to the chamber, though they could be interpellated. Only the ministry could introduce legislation; suggestions originating in the chamber had to pass through the grand vezir to the sultan and the Council of State before they could be presented as bills. Though the budget was voted by the parliament, the ministry had extraordinary spending powers if the chamber were not in session or if a completed budget had not been voted. Normally the parliament was to be in session only each winter, from November 13 to March 13. So far as the central administration and the legislative process were concerned, therefore, the constitution of 1876 created what might be described, in unorthodox terms, as a limited autocracy.

Other aspects of the constitution afford less room for criticism. Much of the judicial regulation remained to be worked out, but the constitution provided clearly for security of judicial tenure, public trial, and no administrative interference with the courts. It maintained the dichotomy of religious and civil courts, which could hardly have been abolished by one stroke in 1876. The individual rights and civil liberties of Ottoman subjects were generally well stated—individual liberty and freedom from arbitrary punishment, freedom of religion and of privileges accorded the millets, freedom of the press "within the limits of the law," freedom of commercial (but not of political or other) association, the right of petition, security of property and domicile, taxation according to law and the individual's means. Many of these principles had been stated before in the Tanzimat pronouncements from 1839 on, but never all together nor so explicitly.

Probably the most beneficial aspect of the constitution was its emphasis on the equality of all Ottoman subjects—again an extension of the Osmanlılık doctrine characteristic of the Tanzimat period. The enumeration of civil liberties was subject to no qualifications as to race or creed. To be sure, Islam was designated the state religion, and the sultan of all Ottomans was also named caliph of all Muslims

and defender of the faith. To this extent the constitution exhibited a split personality. But millet distinctions were as far as then possible conscientiously eliminated. All subjects of the state were without exception to be called "Osmanli," and the expression "Ottoman subjects," which had begun its official career in 1839, recurred throughout the text of the constitution, sometimes with the additional phrase "of whatever religion or sect." All Ottoman subjects were stated to be equal before the law, to have the same rights and duties, and to be equally admissible to public office according to merit. Each member of the chamber of deputies, further, was to consider himself the representative not only of the district that elected him, but of all Ottomans. Only in the lower provincial echelon of the kaza was the millet distinction retained—for electoral councils to supervise charitable funds and the resources of widows and orphans of each religious community. One qualification curtailed somewhat this Ottoman equality—the provision that those admitted to public office, as well as those elected to the chamber of deputies, had to know Turkish, the official language. This would work a hardship on some of the Balkan peoples, and probably just as much of a hardship on the Arab subjects of the empire. An interesting commentary on the literacy level as well as on the linguistic heterogeneity of the empire was the further provision that at the end of four years deputies would have to be able to read Turkish, and to write it as far as possible.

It is obvious that almost the entire constitution was western in inspiration. This was a big step—perhaps too big—in the direction in which Mahmud II had started Ottoman political development. There are many parallels to be found between the 1876 constitution and the Belgian constitution of 1831. But the former did not go nearly so far as the Belgian, which stated flatly that "all powers derive from the nation," which had an elected upper house, which allowed the two chambers initiative in legislation along with the king, and which limited the king to the powers enumerated. In several ways the 1876 constitution was closer to the Prussian of 1850, which gave the monarch greater powers and which had an appointed upper chamber. Still, the inspiration was western.

The Ottoman constitution of 1876 has been subject to merciless criticism, both at the time of its creation and since. Some of the criticism has been unfair and grotesque. That the constitution was not simply a diplomatic maneuver contrived to get rid of the Constanti-

nople Conference will already have been abundantly clear. It was the product of a long process of deliberation, and of interest among Turks extending back at least to 1867, as well as of the Tanzimat developments from 1839 on. Treitschke wrote sarcastically, but with partial truth, that the Turks had finally drunk of the constitutional poison which affected such peoples as whisky affected redskins.<sup>119</sup> Freeman thundered in Olympian rage that all Turkish reform documents were varieties of waste paper; the Midhat constitution was "simply a mockery, a delusion, and a snare, a net spread in the sight of birds who ought to be too wise to be caught by it."<sup>120</sup> MacColl wrote that "in reality, Midhat's Constitution is a crafty contrivance for concentrating the government of the Turkish Empire in the hands of the Pashas which means, taking them all in all, of about two hundred of the most unmitigated scoundrels on the face of the earth."<sup>121</sup> Such criticisms as the latter two may be dismissed out of hand. But others are serious, and point generally to the sultan's extensive powers and to the lack of effective control over legislation by the elective chamber.

The critics, either western Europeans or modern Turks, tend to compare the 1876 constitution to a theoretical ideal, or to British parliamentary government after the second Reform Bill, or to the Third French Republic. In theory, they are right. Recai Okandan, for instance, after a devastating review of the individual provisions of the constitution, concludes that "the system which we have termed constitutionalism was in reality a confirmation and reaffirmation of the principles of absolutism."<sup>122</sup> But these comparisons may be misguided. Comparison should perhaps be made not to the more advanced political regimes of western Europe, but to the Russian Empire, which had neither constitution nor parliament, or to Prussia before 1850, or to Austria-Hungary, or to Napoleon III's regime before the "Liberal

<sup>119</sup> Heinrich von Treitschke, "Die Türkei und die Grossmächte," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, 37 (1876), 688.

<sup>120</sup> Edward A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe* (London, 1877), pp. 268-269.

<sup>121</sup> Malcolm MacColl, "Midhat Pasha on Turkish History and Reform," *Gentleman's Magazine*, 243 (1878), 49.

<sup>122</sup> Okandan, *Umumi âme hukukumuzun ana hatları*, I, 144-174, quotation on p. 168. For other representative analyses and criticisms see Franck Rouvière, *Essai sur l'évolution des idées constitutionnelles en Turquie* (Montpellier, 1910), pp. 91ff.; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 288-293; Eugene Schuyler's comments in Maynard to Fish, #126, 30 January 1877, USNA, Turkey 31. The latest and best-balanced analysis is in Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, pp. 46-70.

Empire." By such standards the constitution of 1876 appears reasonably good.

Certainly the constitution was imperfect. Yet, even as regards the legislative process, it created a system that offered much hope. Despite the sultan's great powers, the constitution prescribed a meeting of parliament once a year; if it were dissolved, it would have to meet again in six months. The deputies of the chamber, each of whom represented fifty thousand males, had four-year terms, were paid a salary and travel expenses, enjoyed freedom of speech in the debates and other parliamentary immunities. The whole import of these provisions was a recognition of the right of the nation to be heard, through its representatives. They might not be heeded by the sultan and the Porte, but they would be heard. Some of the theoretically objectionable provisions of the constitution were defensible on the grounds that they prevented that violent break with the past which Āli and Fuad had always feared would mean the death both of reform and of the empire itself. It can indeed be argued that the constitution, far from being too absolutist, expected too much from the deputies, given the Ottoman tradition and lack of parliamentary experience. But there was a background of experience in various meclises to build on; and the constitution, even though it had been worked out by a top-level commission instead of by a prosperous and well-educated bourgeoisie demanding political voice, as had been the case in the West, met the popular feeling that there ought to be a shift away from the sort of arbitrary government Abdūlaziz had exercised. Safvet Paşa's circular explaining the constitution maintained, with an overenthusiasm dubiously designed for diplomatic consumption, that it introduced "the reign of liberty, justice, and equality, that is to say, the triumph of civilization."<sup>123</sup> This was too much. But now at least the constitution was there, the sultan formally committed to it. This was, all elements of the situation considered, a remarkable achievement. A means for further political development had been provided. The test, as with the vilayet law earlier, would be how men used the opportunity.



While preparations for elections and for the first meeting of the parliament were progressing, Midhat used the constitution as a diplomatic weapon against any program which the conference of

<sup>123</sup> Text in *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5952, 26 December 1876.

powers, still sitting at the admiralty offices in Istanbul, might try to impose. The conference was now proposing a division of Bulgaria into two provinces, East and West, whose governors should be approved by the powers. There would also be a European commission to supervise reforms. Such arrangements Midhat, despite his known partiality for provincial decentralization, was unable to accept; he saw in them a derogation of Ottoman sovereignty and the beginning of dissolution.<sup>124</sup> Instead, he demanded that the Porte be given a year's grace to inaugurate its new system; after that he would allow the powers to inquire into the effectiveness of reforms. Midhat's general opposition to the conference proposals was backed up by Ottoman opinion which, in part his own creation, in fact would endanger any form of acceptance.<sup>125</sup> It has been said that Abdūlhamid II would have yielded to the proposals of the conference had he not feared deposition by his ministers.<sup>126</sup> Probably this was just a means of trying to gain favor with the powers. There is no reason to suppose that the sultan really wanted European intervention any more than did Midhat.

Midhat's counterproposal included a device which at first seems inconsistent with his inflexible opposition to foreign intervention. It was, simply, that the great powers through the conference then assembled should take formal cognizance of the Ottoman constitution and so guarantee it. The application of the constitution by the Porte would, in turn, be sufficient guarantee of reforms for the Balkan Christians, in place of the conference proposals. Midhat had been toying with such an idea even before he became grand vezir, at least in the form of getting British support for the constitution.<sup>127</sup> Said Bey claimed to have had the same idea independently, and to have suggested it to Midhat.<sup>128</sup> It may have been the concept of Odian Efendi, for he served in many instances as Midhat's idea-man. In any case, Odian, who was also one of the constitution's authors, was sent to Paris and London during the Constantinople Conference. Abdūlhamid and the ministers approved his secret mission, which was ostensibly

<sup>124</sup> Elliot to Derby, 30 December 1876, *Staatsarchiv*, 31 (1877), #5956.

<sup>125</sup> Chaudordy to Décazes, 10 January 1877, *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5987.

<sup>126</sup> Story, *Ismail Kemal*, p. 136; Salisbury to Derby, 18 January 1877, *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5969; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 246, n.1.

<sup>127</sup> Midhat to Derby, 17 December 1876, in A. H. Midhat, "English and Russian Politics in the East," pp. 71-73; *idem*, *Souvenir de mon exil volontaire* (Geneva, 1905), pp. 83-86.

<sup>128</sup> Said to Midhat, 11 January 1877, in A. H. Midhat, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 335-336; *idem*, *Midhat Pacha*, p. 109.

to talk about European loans and the 1875 moratorium, but in reality to convince the Porte's old allies of the Crimean War that the Ottoman Empire could not accept the servitudes demanded by the conference.<sup>129</sup> Following Midhat's lead, Odian proposed that the powers acknowledge the constitution as guarantee enough of good administration in the Balkans, if the Porte guaranteed to the conference that it would be applied. But when Odian advanced this as a "personal suggestion" to Disraeli, the British prime minister, on January 8, and to Derby, the foreign secretary, two days later, he met a stone wall. Derby refused even to discuss a recognition of the constitution by the powers, and referred Odian to the conference as the proper forum.<sup>130</sup> The conference delegates likewise turned down the proposition. Nothing came of the idea, though both Sir Henry Elliot and his successor Sir Henry Layard thought that Europe should have supported the constitution.<sup>131</sup> Midhat still held the same view in 1878—that the powers could legitimately exercise a collective surveillance over the carrying out of the constitution's provisions, thus checking independent Russian action.<sup>132</sup> Evidently he had in mind not the state of affairs of 1856, wherein the powers forced Âli and Fuad to adopt a reform program, but something more analogous to Reşid Paşa's action in 1839 of getting European backing for a home-grown reform program and the integrity of the empire in which it was to be applied. It is interesting to speculate whether Midhat in 1876 considered the proposed guarantee simply a means to secure diplomatic support against foreign, especially Russian, intervention, or whether he had already developed such suspicion of Abdülhamid that he wanted the powers' guarantee to run against any unconstitutional acts of the sultan. The latter is less likely, but the truth is unknown.

Since the constitution had failed to arrest the proposals of the Constantinople Conference, Midhat had to turn to other methods. The final proposal of the six powers involved special regimes and administrative reforms for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the two Bul-

<sup>129</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Tabssra-i ibret*, pp. 191-193; *Levant Herald*, 18 January 1877.

<sup>130</sup> Derby to Salisbury, 10 January 1876, *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5965.

<sup>131</sup> Henry Elliot, "The Death of Abdul Aziz and of Turkish Reform," *Nineteenth Century*, 23 (1888), 294; Temperley, "British Policy," pp. 175-176, 182-183. On the whole mission of Odian see Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, "Midhat Paşa'nın gizli bir siyasî teşebbüsü," in *Türk Tarih Kurumu, III Türk Tarih Kongresi*, . . . 1943 (Ankara, 1948), pp. 470-477.

<sup>132</sup> Midhat Pacha, "La Turquie, son passé, son avenir," *Revue Scientifique* (1878), pp. 1153-1154.

garias. Some of this was acceptable to the Ottoman ministry, but they would not agree to the demand that governors for these provinces be approved by the powers, and that international control commissions supervise the application of reforms.<sup>133</sup> Abdülhamid had earlier rejected an idea advanced by Midhat that the best answer to the powers would be for the Porte itself to name some Christian valis.<sup>134</sup> The only remaining answer to the powers, since they would negotiate with the Turks no further, seemed to be outright rejection of their plan. Midhat took this course, hoping at least for English support. Elliot's attitude, and his "long intimacy" (Elliot's phrase) with Midhat, and the presence in Istanbul of the rabidly Turcophile M.P., Butler-Johnstone, who pretended to be Prime Minister Disraeli's confidential agent, gave him some basis.<sup>135</sup> Midhat did not think that he would find Britain allied with the Ottoman Empire if it came to war against Russia.<sup>136</sup> He did hope for diplomatic support. One result had come from Odian's mission to London—O dian's conviction, based on conversation with Derby, that if the Porte torpedoed the Constantinople Conference, the British would take no action. This Odian telegraphed to Istanbul about January 17, which was one day before a *meclis-i umumî* was convened there to consider the plan of the great power conference.<sup>137</sup>

Obviously Midhat wanted an expression of popular or national opinion to back his rejection of the powers' plan. It would be impossible to convene the parliament, as provided for under the constitution, soon enough. Therefore, an exceptionally large *meclis-i umumî* of some 237 or more notables, including representatives of the non-Muslim millets, was convoked on January 18. To this grand council Midhat outlined the powers' proposals, his objections, and the dangers of war

<sup>133</sup> Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 246.

<sup>134</sup> Said Bey to Midhat, 23 December 1876, in A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Pacha*, pp. 87-88.

<sup>135</sup> Elliot to Derby, #1396, 28 December 1876, FO 78/2468; Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, pp. 124, 135-136; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 236-237; Dwight E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), p. 49, n.10. On Butler-Johnstone see above, chapter IX, n.54; also *Diplomatic Review*, 24 (1876), 44-50, 160-161; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 181-182; *Stambul*, 18 December 1876. He was raising money at this point for Turkish soldiers in the field. Butler-Johnstone was, in Istanbul, the guest of Ali Suavi, himself newly arrived there; Ali Suavi was, curiously, no friend of Midhat: Clician Vassif, *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 131-133.

<sup>136</sup> Midhat to Musurus, 10 January 1877, in A. H. Midhat, "English and Russian Politics," p. 76.

<sup>137</sup> Hohenlohe (Paris) to Bismarck, 4 February 1877, *Grosse Politik*, II, #275.



which might pit the weakened Ottoman Empire against Russia if the conference plan were rejected. In a remarkable demonstration of patriotic unity, the notables spoke almost with one voice for rejection. The Greek and Armenian patriarchs and the Bulgar exarch had stayed away, pleading illness, which was the only diplomatic position they could assume. But the vicars of the first two came and voted for rejection. Only the head of the Protestant Armenian millet, along with Prince Halim of Egypt and a few others, advised caution and acceptance.<sup>138</sup> Sultan Abdülhamid approved the decision of the grand council to reject the powers' demands and to retain independence of action for domestic reform.<sup>139</sup> Safvet Paşa, at the next conference session, informed the powers of this decision. He assured them that most of the points of their program were acceptable, but that the initiative must come from the sovereign Ottoman Empire, which could not be subjected to external compulsion.<sup>140</sup> On January 20 the conference broke up, never to reassemble, and the plenipotentiaries left Istanbul as soon as possible, to show their displeasure.

There could be no doubt that such public opinion as existed in the Ottoman Empire, apart from the Slavic provinces, backed the stand of the grand council and the ministry. Opposition to foreign, especially to Russian, intervention was strong, and was encouraged by the Porte when it published during the Constantinople Conference a collection of alleged Russian diplomatic documents proving pan-Slav intrigues in the Balkans.<sup>141</sup> The martial spirit which had been developing since the summer of 1876 had by now reached considerable proportions. A good many Turks expected war with Russia. False reports that Russian armies had crossed the Pruth were published in Istanbul even during the Constantinople Conference. As the conference closed, a

<sup>138</sup> Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 139-142; *Levant Herald*, 19 January 1877, giving the figure of 260 notables; Danişmend, *Kronolojisi*, IV, 295-296, giving reported figures of 240 or 300, including 60 non-Muslims; A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Pasha*, pp. 103-106; *idem*, *Tabsira-i ibret*, pp. 189-190; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 246, n.1; Fesch, *Constantinople*, pp. 253-254; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 180; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 295-301; Salisbury to Derby, 18 January 1877, and Derby to Salisbury, 19 January 1877, *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5969-#5970.

<sup>139</sup> Said to Midhat, 21 January 1877, in A. H. Midhat, "English and Russian Politics," p. 74.

<sup>140</sup> Safvet's summary of the situation, dated 25 January 1877, in *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5990.

<sup>141</sup> G. Giacometti, *Les Responsabilités de la guerre* (Constantinople, 1877). Cf. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, pp. 244, 681. The Porte was shortly reported also to be preparing a diplomatic Red Book of its own: *Stamboul*, 19 February 1877.

delegation of Hungarian students arrived in Istanbul to honor the Turks as conquerors of the Serbs. The Porte gave them an official reception. For their entertainment Namik Kemal's play *Vatan*, with all its patriotic sentiment and anti-Russian overtones, was staged again.<sup>142</sup> This was a dangerous spirit, which Midhat was probably foolish to have encouraged, though possibly he believed he could control it.<sup>143</sup> His main task, of course, was not to pick a fight with Russia, but to get the constitution into operation. A booklet issued anonymously in Istanbul on January 29, 1877, summed up the situation accurately. It reflected Midhat's attitude, and may have been inspired by him. The revolts of 1875, it declared, should have been suppressed at once. European intervention was inadmissible, and contrary to the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The grand council, truly national, was, in a sense, the first application of the constitution. The Constantinople Conference should have helped the empire to establish its constitution instead of proposing international intervention in the Balkans. The constitution was a start in the right direction, but it would not automatically ensure either reforms or progress, which would depend not only on the maintenance of peace, but on capable officials and a tremendous activity.<sup>144</sup> Perhaps this was too great a demand, but such was Midhat's task. If any Ottoman statesman of the day could do it, Midhat, with all his personal deficiencies, was that man.

Yet Midhat was not vouchsafed the time to do this. His tenure of the grand vezirate lasted only forty-nine days, a period shorter than his term of office in 1872. The cause for Midhat's dismissal was the friction that had been built up between him and the sultan, which made it practically impossible for them to work together. There seems to have been no sympathy at all between them even before Midhat's appointment on December 19. After that date, in addition to Abdülhamid's final hesitations over the constitution, particular points of argument separated the two even farther, though the final split did not come until after the European plenipotentiaries had been safely packed off to their homelands. One source of friction concerned Midhat's relations with Namik Kemal and Ziya—relations

<sup>142</sup> Elliot to Derby, #1398, 29 December 1876, FO 78/2468; *Levant Herald*, 30 December 1876 and 23 January 1877; Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans*, p. 244.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. the strictures of İzzet Paşa, based on "certain papers that I have recently had in my hands": *Denkwürdigkeiten des Marschalls İzzet Pascha* (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 79-81.

<sup>144</sup> *La Turquie après la Conférence* (Constantinople, 1877).

which were far too close to suit the sultan. Midhat was accused of talking freely to them about government business, and probably he did so. They were often at his house. Furthermore, these two and others had been active in promoting a committee to send clothing, tobacco, and other gifts to soldiers stationed on the Serb-Montenegrin front during the winter; Midhat had presided at meetings. Now the offices of this relief committee, as the war spirit grew, became a recruiting center for the *Asâkir-i milliye*, a sort of volunteer national guard, the members of which were given to shouting long life to Midhat and Namık Kemal and to singing the latter's patriotic songs from *Vatan*. Obviously to Abdülhamid this looked as if Midhat were not only gaining popularity among soldiers, but might enjoy the support of a kind of private army. Redif Paşa, the war minister, was ordered to abolish this volunteer militia and absorb it into the regular army, but it resisted the move. The sultan thereupon wanted to get Namık Kemal and Ziya out of İstanbul, and even Midhat's friend Ismail Kemal gave him similar advice.<sup>145</sup>

Abdülhamid further objected to Midhat that the İstanbul press was allowed a freedom which it abused. Again Ziya was involved, for he was suspected of inspiring articles in the *İstikbal (Future)*—edited by the liberal Theodore Cassape (Kasap), who had once been a protégé of Alexandre Dumas—to throw doubt on the sultan's sincerity in issuing the constitution and to imply that he, Ziya, was one of the principal originators of that document. *İstikbal* had moreover, said the sultan, quite unnecessarily published Mustafa Fazıl's notorious letter of 1867 to Abdülaziz. Having already in vain ordered Midhat to appoint Ziya ambassador to Berlin, Abdülhamid was now incensed to learn from the newspapers that Ziya was a popular candidate for election to the chamber from İstanbul. His candidacy was unacceptable, said the sultan, who thereupon ordered Midhat to rusticate Ziya as vali of Syria. Ziya gave in, and left for his post. But Namık Kemal resisted appointment to a post of exile, and Midhat refused to force him to take one. Meanwhile the sultan ordered Midhat to elaborate a press law which would curb the liberty to which the press pretended

<sup>145</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 266-267; Sami, *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi*, pp. 63-73, 78; Kuntay, *Namık Kemal*, I, 295-296; Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 136-137; Y. A., *Midhat-Pacha, la constitution ottomane et l'Europe* (Paris, 1903), p. 11; Chaudordy to Décazes, 10 January 1877, *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5987.

under the new constitution, and to have it done in four days.<sup>146</sup> Beyond question, some of the İstanbul papers were highly irritating to the sultan.

There were other sources of friction between the sultan and the grand vezir. One was over official appointments, particularly over replacing the finance minister, Galib Paşa, whom Midhat accused of incompetence.<sup>147</sup> Another was over the question of admission of non-Muslims to military schools.<sup>148</sup> But all this friction was only symptomatic of a basic incompatibility which was compounded of two interrelated elements. One element was Abdülhamid's very natural fear of a grand vezir who had a considerable popular following, and who had already been a principal figure in deposing two sultans and in creating two. Abdülhamid certainly feared for the security of his own throne. He was more antagonistic to Midhat than might otherwise have been the case because he knew that in the depositions Midhat had acted purely for the good of the state, and not because of personal rancor against the reigning sultans. Such a man could not be suborned, and he might so act again, as the self-appointed interpreter of the common weal—this time against Abdülhamid. Of course, Abdülhamid owed his throne to Midhat as much as to anyone, but this would not make him grateful; quite to the contrary, he would not wish to be beholden to Midhat as kingmaker, and would inevitably want to get rid of so powerful a statesman if he could.

The sultan's fears were undoubtedly fanned by Damad Mahmud Paşa and others with palace connections. They may well have accused Midhat of subversion, of republicanism, of wanting to be a dictator, as is often reported. Abdülhamid believed such stories. When Midhat objected to the sultan's naming Galib Paşa a senator before the confusion in finances had been straightened out, a matter which the chamber of deputies might look into, the sultan was told, "He threatens you with the deputies."<sup>149</sup> But probably the sultan's chief fear was always that he himself might be deposed. Such fear was nourished by

<sup>146</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 122-127; *idem*, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 396-398; Y. A., *Midhat-Pacha*, pp. 9-10; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 268. On Cassape see Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 350-352; Fesch, *Constantinople*, pp. 37-38; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 288-289.

<sup>147</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 121-122, 138-141; Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 267-268.

<sup>148</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Life*, pp. 141-143; *idem*, *Tabsıra-i ibret*, pp. 330-331; Y. A., *Midhat-Pacha*, p. 12.

<sup>149</sup> İnal, *Son sadriâzamlar*, p. 357.

the discovery in the locker of a military academy student, Ali Nazmi, known as an admirer of Namık Kemal, of a paper saying that the caliphate properly belonged not to the house of Osman, but to the *şerif* of Mecca.<sup>150</sup> Murad, of course, was still alive, and there had already been in late November or early December 1876 one hare-brained plot, the so-called "Stavrides affair," to rescue him from internment.<sup>151</sup> Maybe there would be other plots, with Midhat's backing. The sultan's suspicion affected even their unimportant relationships: "Pasha, you don't like me at all," said Abdülhamid one day because Midhat, disliking diamonds, did not wear the diamond cuff links given him by the sultan.<sup>152</sup>

The other element of incompatibility revolved around the conception held by each man of his own place in the government. Abdülhamid was intent on maintaining his supreme authority. One way of expressing this, in addition to controlling all appointments and public acts, was to insist that he was the author of the constitution. As the semiofficial *La Turquie* put it after Midhat's dismissal, Abdülhamid alone had the right to conceive it and to grant it to his subjects. Midhat simply had the honor of being the interpreter of the august will.<sup>153</sup> Midhat, for his part, was trying to act like a European prime minister, despite the fact that the constitution had not created this role. This involved downgrading the sultan's authority. Ziya partially expressed Midhat's view in most unpolitic fashion when, en route to his Syrian governorship, he stopped off at İzmir and made remarks to the effect that, under the constitution, the sultan is the servant of the state.<sup>154</sup> The same view was fully expressed in a letter to the sultan dated January 30, 1877, which is often attributed to Midhat. It put his thoughts almost brutally: that the constitution was aimed at abolish-

<sup>150</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 267; Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 146-147; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 229-231.

<sup>151</sup> Elliot to Derby, #1336, 6 December 1876, and #1342, 7 December 1876, FO 78/2467. Cf. İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, "Beşinci Murad ile oğlu Salâhaddin Efendiği kaçır-mak için kadın kıyafetinde Çırağana girmek isteyen şahıslar," *Bellekten*, 8:32 (1944), 589-597.

<sup>152</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Hâtıralarım*, pp. 10-11. Cf., on the sultan's fears, İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, pp. 360-362.

<sup>153</sup> *La Turquie*, 8 February 1877. This emphasis on Abdülhamid as the true father of the constitution appears also in Ahmed Midhat's *Üss-i inkılâb*, written for the sultan: II, 177, 189-193.

<sup>154</sup> Fesch, *Constantinople*, pp. 49-50; Mordtmann, *Stambul*, I, 239; Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani*, I, 181. Cf. Abdolonyme Ubicini, *La constitution ottomane* (Paris, 1877), p. 15, n.2.

ing absolutism and defining the sultan's rights and duties, as well as those of the ministers; that the sultan is responsible to the nation; that the grand vezir, by the ordinances of the *şeriat*, must refuse obedience to imperial commands which do not coincide with the national interest; that the state is organized on the basis of consultation. Midhat offers to accept dismissal if the sultan disagrees.<sup>155</sup> Whether or not this letter was ever sent to the palace, it indicated Midhat's stand, and for some days at the beginning of February he kept to his house, having in effect broken direct relations with the sultan until matters on which he had requested action should be cleared up. Undoubtedly Midhat overestimated his position vis-à-vis the sultan, both as constitutional grand vezir and as popular leader. It was in this period that Midhat expressed the view that the people would uphold him. "I will not resign," he said. "If the sultan dismiss me, let him. But my dismissal this time will not be comparable to former ones. The people will come to take me from my house and place me in the grand vezirate." But since this would create difficulties, he said he was prepared to go to live on the island of Midilli (Mitylene) instead.<sup>156</sup>

When after some days Midhat was asked to come to the palace, on

<sup>155</sup> A. H. Midhat, Midhat Paşa's son, published this letter in four books: *Tabssira-i ibret*, pp. 394-396; *Life*, pp. 143-144; *Midhat Pasha*, pp. 117-118; *Hâtıralarım*, pp. 26-27. The English translation in *Life* is loose in places. In *Hâtıralarım*, p. 25, the son says that the opinion that someone other than Midhat wrote this letter is groundless. Midhat, however, is reported to have denied the authenticity of the letter, saying, "Those are my ideas, but I have never spoken so impertinently to the Sultan." *Stamboul*, 1 March 1877. Devereux, *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, p. 96 and n.5, records that Midhat also denied the authenticity to Léouzon le Duc. İnal, *Son sadrîâzamlar*, pp. 358-359, says the letter was undoubtedly a fabrication and that Midhat denied its authenticity. M. T. Gökbilgin in *İslâm ansiklopedisi*, VIII, 279, s.v. Midhat, thinks it conceivable that Midhat sent such a letter. Baykal, "93 meşrutiyeti," p. 66, raises no question as to the authenticity of the letter. *Levant Herald*, 6 February 1877, seems to refer to this letter as a fact.

The first publication of the document, so far as the author knows, was in the *Manchester Guardian*, 16 February 1877, in telegraphic summary datelined Pera via Giurgevo, 13 February. A full version appeared in *The (London) Times*, 20 February 1877, taken from the *République Française* of unnamed date, and also in the *Journal des débats* of 20 February 1877, taken from an unnamed English paper! All these versions date the letter as 4 February, not 30 January. Denials of the authenticity followed swiftly. Midhat is quoted as declaring it to the *Neue Freie Presse* a "fabrication composed by his adversaries," and to a Naples newspaper as "apocryphal," which the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* also reported: *Manchester Guardian*, 24 and 26 February 1877; *Journal des débats*, 25 and 27 February 1877. The appearance of the letter in the European press remains unexplained.

<sup>156</sup> Mahmud Celaleddin, *Mirât-ı hakikat*, I, 268. Cevdet says Midhat thought he was immune from dismissal under the constitution: Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 139, n.118.

the pretext that all his recommendations had been accepted, it was only to be told to give up the seal of office. He was dismissed as grand vezir on February 5, 1877, and immediately packed off to the imperial yacht, without being allowed to return to his house. The yacht took him to Brindisi, and to exile. The sultan had presumably acted under the exile power clause of article 113 of the constitution, having been furnished some short police reports, as required by that clause, showing that Midhat was dangerous to the state. Certainly Abdülhamid had the right to dismiss the grand vezir from office. But the legality of the exile, under the constitution, was dubious, since the clause was a part of the article on a state of siege, which did not then exist.<sup>157</sup> The constitution, further, in guarantee of individual liberty, forbade punishment except according to the procedures prescribed by law. The real reason for the exile was not that Midhat was a danger to the state, but that he was a danger to the sultan's concept of his own role in the government. The truth was hinted at in the *hat* of February 5 appointing Edhem Paşa as Midhat's successor; it said that officials must not exceed their competence.<sup>158</sup> More of the truth appeared between the lines of the official communiqué published in the press two days later, which said that Midhat was trying to resurrect the absolutism which Abdülhamid, by issuing the constitution, had suppressed. Midhat, further, had not stopped plots against the sultan's prerogatives. Therefore, to preserve the constitution, the sultan was obliged to get rid of Midhat.<sup>159</sup> Further semiofficial comment was less guarded in following the same line. Midhat did not stay within bounds in upholding the sovereign prestige, said *La Turquie*. The sultan, therefore, had to appoint another vezir who really understood the constitution. To insinuate that Midhat's dismissal was a move against the constitution was more than an evil thought; it was an evil act. As for exile instead of trial, Abdülhamid chose this in order to spare the country more domestic confusion.<sup>160</sup>

The most candid explanation of Midhat's fall and exile was given in confidence to the British Government by the Ottoman under-secretary for justice, Vahan Efendi, who was charged personally by

<sup>157</sup> It first existed in İstanbul in late May 1877 when the fall of Ardahan led to a soft invasion of the chamber of deputies.

<sup>158</sup> *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #5997.

<sup>159</sup> *Stamboul*, 7 February 1877. A similar proclamation was posted in İstanbul; text in Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>160</sup> *La Turquie*, 8 February 1877, quoted in *Levant Herald*, 10 February.

Abdülhamid to do just this. Midhat, said the sultan's emissary, had assumed a position which was incompatible with the sultan's authority, "took all power into his own hands, seemed disposed to allow the sultan no voice in public affairs," and kept appointments under his own control. He used unbecoming language about the sultan's ideas, "and was surrounded by a party whose language was not such as any Minister ought to countenance." Persons connected with Midhat talked about unnecessary palace expenditures and of replacing Abdülhamid with some other member of the family. Midhat did not suppress such talk, saying that "he could not interfere with the free expression of opinion." And Midhat allowed people to think that the constitution was his own work, "extorted" from Abdülhamid against the latter's will.<sup>161</sup> Like the parting of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890, the parting of Midhat and Abdülhamid II came about because the government was not big enough to hold both the young self-assertive ruler and the older self-assertive statesman.<sup>162</sup> This, despite rumors that Midhat's fall was due to Russian intrigue, to a plot to restore Murad, to Midhat's opposition to the employment of British experts, and other similar concoctions, seems to be the essential truth.<sup>163</sup>

There was some danger that Midhat's exile might provoke a popular demonstration that could embarrass the sultan, for in the capital Midhat was undoubtedly more popular than Abdülhamid. As a precaution the imperial yacht was ordered to wait twenty-four hours in the Sea of Marmara before proceeding, so that a signal for Midhat's return might be sent if necessary. But the exile was so sudden, and opinion about it among officials so divided, that there was no significant demonstration, and probably no leadership for it. Some newspapers suspended themselves voluntarily for a few days, some individuals made their feelings known by writing to newspapers or posting placards demanding Midhat's return, but this was all. And Midhat himself had acquiesced without resistance. A good many among the officials seem to have been happy over the exile, the bulk of the İstanbul population depressed, the press rather divided. Ali Suavi proclaimed joyfully that now equality was achieved, since a grand vezir was exiled where formerly that was the fate only of defenseless

<sup>161</sup> *Staatsarchiv*, 32 (1877), #6327.

<sup>162</sup> On the dismissal and exile: A. H. Midhat, *Tabstra-i ibret*, pp. 195-198; *idem*, *Life*, pp. 145-146; *idem*, *Hâtralarım*, p. 28; Story, *Ismail Kemal*, pp. 147-149.

<sup>163</sup> On rumors see Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 304-306; ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #488, 8 February 1877; *Levant Herald*, 6, 8, 19, 22, 26 February 1877.

individuals.<sup>164</sup> Ahmed Midhat, Midhat Paşa's old protégé who had just been made director of the imperial printing office, turned against his mentor in his journal *İttihad* and praised the sultan.<sup>165</sup> The division of opinion ensured that Edhem Paşa could take up office as grand vezir without fear of Midhat's immediate return.<sup>166</sup>



The immediate significance of Midhat's exile was that Abdülhamid had proved to himself he could violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the new constitution and get away with it. He was, of course, careful still to pose as a defender of the constitution. But he began immediately to strengthen his grip on the government. The imperial *hat* which named Edhem grand vezir also, in unusual fashion, made more than a dozen other official appointments, as if to indicate that now appointments were in the sultan's own hands.<sup>167</sup> Cevdet, Midhat's opponent, was significantly made minister of the interior, an office in abeyance since Âli's death, and he at once began to keep a file of dossiers on all Porte officials.<sup>168</sup> Ahmed Vefik, also an opponent of Midhat, was, in contradiction to the provisions of the constitution, named president of the chamber of deputies, which was supposed to elect its own slate of candidates. Then various friends of Midhat were arrested, including Namık Kemal, on trumped-up charges. Namık Kemal, acquitted by a tribunal, was nevertheless exiled to Midilli, while Abdülhamid fired the courageous chief judge of the court involved.<sup>169</sup>

Seen in broader perspective, Midhat's exile meant that the Tanzimat period was drawing to a close. This was not for want of further reform decrees, but for want of the driving spirit that Midhat and his associates might have provided. Abdülhamid, not so bad a

<sup>164</sup> *Stamboul*, 8, 9, and 10 February 1877. Ali Suavi was now growing incoherent; some of his writing here is nonsense.

<sup>165</sup> *Stamboul*, 8 February and 1 March 1877.

<sup>166</sup> On reactions to the exile: ABCFM, Western Turkey Mission II, #623, 7 February 1877, and #488, 8 February 1877; Kératry, *Mourad V*, pp. 245-251; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 342-346; Raschdau, "Die Botschafterkonferenz," pp. 25-26, 28; A. H. Midhat, *Hâtıralarım*, p. 29; *Stamboul*, 10, 22, 28 February and 2 March 1877. In reward Ahmed Midhat was made director of the official gazette, the *Takvim-i vekayi*, and Ali Suavi named head of the Galatasaray lycée.

<sup>167</sup> *Levant Herald*, 6 February 1877; Ahmed Midhat, *Üss-i inkişâb*, II, 385-389.

<sup>168</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 139, n.118.

<sup>169</sup> *Stamboul*, 10, 12, and 15 February 1877; *Levant Herald*, 16 February 1877; Gallenga, *Two Years*, II, 352-354; İhsan Sungu, *Namık Kemal* (Istanbul, 1941), p. 23.

sultan as he has often been painted, was in his own way a reformer. Like the statesmen of the Tanzimat, he meant to strengthen, improve, and save the Ottoman Empire, but he meant to do it himself. The locus of power was to be in the Palace, not the Porte or the parliament. Abdülhamid had begun by approving the constitution, to help counteract European diplomacy. As soon as he could, he shook off the influence of Midhat and the constitutional reformers who would have checked his power, as his ancestor Mahmud had done away with the Janissary and *derebeyi* controls. It may have been a political mistake for the sultan to get rid of Midhat, for the latter might have controlled opinion and officials in the empire sufficiently to avoid the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 that brought a disastrous defeat to the Turks and complete independence to the provinces of Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania.<sup>170</sup> Nevertheless, Abdülhamid persisted in his quest for power. When, a year later, he felt that it was safe, he dissolved the second session of the chamber of deputies and called no other for thirty years. The two sessions of March to June 1877 and December 1877 to February 1878 had proven that the deputies had sufficient intelligence and independence of mind to criticize constructively the actions of the administration. The constitutionalists of 1876 were vindicated by the deputies' performance.

In a final explosion to a committee of senators and deputies, one of whom dared to blame the administration for the bad situation at the end of the Russo-Turkish War, and to castigate it for not taking the chamber's advice, Abdülhamid said: "I made a mistake when I wished to imitate my father Abdülmecid, who sought reforms by permission and by liberal institutions. I shall follow in the footsteps of my grandfather, Sultan Mahmud. Like him I now understand that it is only by force that one can move the people with whose protection God has entrusted me."<sup>171</sup> Five years later Abdülhamid expanded on these views to a European journalist: "People are wrong in representing me as opposed to liberty. I know that a country must keep up with the times, but the excess of a liberty to which one is un-

<sup>170</sup> This was İzzet's opinion later: *Denkwürdigkeiten*, p. 81.

<sup>171</sup> Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclis-i Meb'usân, 1293/1877, zabıt ceridesi* (Istanbul, 1940-1954), II, 401, quoted by Robert Devereux, *A Study of the First Ottoman Parliament* (Washington, George Washington University, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1956), p. 179. In this thesis by Devereux, and in his *First Ottoman Constitutional Period*, is the best analysis of the organization and work of the Ottoman parliament, based on the two volumes of reconstructed proceedings by Us, cited above, and other sources.

accustomed is as dangerous as the absence of all liberty." He would, instead, prepare the country for liberty by increasing educational opportunities, he said. But his real objection followed thereafter. "When it was seen that this country could not support a Constitution, and a Parliament which did not entirely represent the country, but only part of the country, people came to me and began to talk about responsibilities. It was another way of reorganizing a Constitution. I refused this. Those who spoke of responsibilities only saw in this a means of substituting their will for mine at the expense of others, and the great mass of the country would only have changed from the will of one to that of another."<sup>172</sup> In an easier situation Abdülhamid might have dismissed the constitutional commission without letting it finish the job, as Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia dissolved the constituent assembly in 1848; or he might simply never have applied the constitution, as Schwarzenberg, acting for his emperor, Franz Joseph of Austria, managed never to apply the Kremsier constitution of 1849. But in the crisis of 1876 to 1878 Abdülhamid felt his way gradually—first weakening the constitutional draft, then getting rid of the chief supporters of the constitution, then proroguing the chamber sine die, but never abolishing the constitution. From his viewpoint, he did well. Palace controlled Porte, and parliament was no more.

From the viewpoint of the constitutionalists, of course, the strangulation of the infant constitution was a disaster. At some point before his death in 1880, while he was in provincial exile, Ziya penned this refrain to what has been called "probably the saddest poem in the Turkish language":

"Naught but sorrows on the loyal to this Empire ever wait;  
Sheerest madness is devotion to this People and this State."<sup>173</sup>

With the strengthening of Abdülhamid's personal rule, liberal political reform was driven underground or to foreign countries.



Later generations of Turks have often castigated the men of the Tanzimat not so much for their failure to oppose Abdülhamid and to keep the constitution in working order as for their half measures, their superficiality, and their lack of understanding of the fundamental

<sup>172</sup> H. de Blowitz, *My Memoirs* (London, 1903), p. 290.

<sup>173</sup> E. J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry* (London, 1900-1909), v, 68-69.

necessities of Turkish development. The Tanzimat statesmen, it is sometimes said, attempted to import alien institutions and graft them onto Turkish society. They were ignorant of Islamic culture. They should have developed Muslim law, *vakıf*, and the medrese to meet the needs of the age. Instead, they created a fatal dualism of European and Ottoman institutions side by side. They were usually concerned with matters of form only, not of substance. The forms and slogans with which they bemused themselves found no popular following. They introduced institutions of representative government into a society unprepared to receive them. They rejected the absolutism of the sultan only to impose their own absolutism. Or again, critics have said that the Tanzimat reformers were not radical enough. They kept outworn snippets of Islamic culture. They should have abandoned these relics of a dead age and gone more rapidly toward secularism.<sup>174</sup>

Obviously the critics are not in agreement on what was wrong with the Tanzimat. Yet, considered separately and *in vacuo*, each of the criticisms has merit. Considered in the context of the times, however, most of the criticisms appear irrelevant, because they disregard the necessity for both change and continuity in history, for doing what is possible, for grafting the new on the old. Because of the failures of the Tanzimat period, it is easy to make such criticisms. Hayreddin Paşa had voiced some similar opinions in a memorandum of 1882 to Sultan Abdülhamid: "It is impossible to transplant the institutions of one country to another where the temperament of men, their customs and their education as well as climatological conditions are different." He went on to say that the efforts of the past forty years had failed because the Tanzimat statesmen had not been willing to undertake radical reform fitted to the needs of the country.<sup>175</sup> But temperament, customs, and education, of course, disposed the Ottomans to resist any radical reform. Despite the truth of other portions of his memorandum, the critic destroyed himself.

It is more to the point to inquire whether the Tanzimat statesmen

<sup>174</sup> For examples of such twentieth-century criticism, see Niyazi Berkes, ed., *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (New York, 1959), pp. 133, 146, 223, 237, 249, 260, 262, 270, 276, 286-290, 307-308; Okandan, *Umumî âmme hukukumuz*, pp. 111-112, 203-204; Onar, "Transformations," pp. 779-780; Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, "L'institution du Vakouf," *Vakıflar dergisi*, II (1942), 3-48; Âfet İnan, *Aperçu général sur l'histoire économique de l'Empire turc-ottoman* (Istanbul, 1941), p. 16.

<sup>175</sup> A. Demeerseman, "Idéal politique de Khérédine: Sa valeur morale," *IBLA*, 20:79 (3ème trimestre, 1957), 205-206.

achieved what they sought. Their main objective was to preserve the Ottoman Empire by reinvigorating it. This involved reforming the central administration, creating flexible provincial administration which would combine central control with a local voice in government, and maintaining the allegiance of all peoples of the empire. Only thus could the intervention of foreign powers be warded off, separatist drives of the minorities be blunted, and the empire again be made a going concern. The many reform decrees aimed at these objectives introduced into the empire in varying degrees western political and administrative forms, some western law, some western educational concepts and institutions, and the concept of equal rights for all subjects of whatever race or creed. It became fashionable in Europe to regard these reform decrees as so many varieties of waste paper, designed simply to deceive the powers and to postpone their effective intervention to improve the state of affairs in the empire. Up to a point, this was a valid judgment. Certainly many of the decrees had served a diplomatic purpose. None, furthermore, was applied with complete success. Good men were lacking in sufficient numbers to administer good measures. Popular education and understanding were not yet equal to accepting the needed changes. The base of economic reform for a vigorous empire was lacking. The Tanzimat represented the views of a small bureaucratic and intellectual elite, and not even of all that elite. Such reform from the top down is less likely to achieve success than reform that has vigorous popular support. One can go further, to acknowledge that the critics were frequently right in saying that external forms were changed while the substance was not. In addition to coming from the top down and the outside in, reform also sometimes came backward: for instance, parliamentary procedure was introduced into the central government in the Supreme Council in 1839, the principle of representation in the same body in 1856, but actual election of representatives—and then only indirect—first with the constitution of 1876.

When all this is admitted, it is still possible to maintain that the condition of the empire, aside from the public debt, was better by the time of the constitution of 1876 than it had been in 1839, or even in 1856. Though like all governments the Porte was more successful in making plans than in putting them into effect, something had been accomplished. Administration was a little more efficient. The organs both of central and of provincial government were better adapted to

the demands of the age, though good men to fill the offices were still in short supply. Justice was a little better. The westernized codes were enforced in part. Where in 1839 the emphasis was primarily on security of life and property, enough had been achieved in this regard so that by 1876 the emphasis was on equality. The educational system was improved. An active press had developed, partly with government encouragement and partly despite government. The non-Muslim millets were better administered despite the many flaws still present. The principle of *Osmanlılık* had made some progress, though it had aroused much opposition. The representative principle had become established in government, both local and national. The constitution of 1876—developing out of the Tanzimat decrees since 1839, the vilayet and millet reforms, and the New Ottoman program—was the culmination of the reform movement. Given the temper of the times, and the psychological resistance to change, the achievement was considerable. It by no means measured up to the standards set by the reform decrees themselves, but perhaps this is a false standard. It is as fair or as unfair to compare Ottoman performance to promise as it is to compare the performance of elected western governments to their campaign platforms. The important fact is that the tone of public life had by 1876 changed perceptibly. The Ottoman Empire was now irrevocably committed to the path of modernization and westernization. Some progress had been made. The creeping fact was more significant than the sweeping promise.

In the long run, the most signal failure of the Tanzimat period was the attempt to hold the empire together with the doctrine of *Osmanlılık*. Though equality was increased, and though the 1876 constitution gave promise of furthering it, the effort was probably both too little and too late. Yet it had to be made. The Ottoman statesmen could not have been expected to prepare the empire for partition. They were simply unable to meet the challenge of the new nationalism among minority peoples, supported as it was by great power action. It is worth pointing out that in the Tanzimat period the Ottoman Empire lost definitively not one bit of territory, and even gained a little through the Crimean War and through conquest in Arabia. But the bonds of control over Serbia, Montenegro, Roumania, and Egypt had been loosened; Crete and the Lebanon had new special status; and the Bulgars were going rapidly in the same direction. Probably nothing that the Tanzimat statesmen could have done would have

kept the empire as it was. Many Christians moved out of a separate millet consciousness into a nationalist consciousness without ever having wholly accepted Osmanlılık. The Turks found in the Tanzimat period, through the patriotic Islamic reaction to Europe and the writings of the New Ottomans, the seeds of their own future nationalism, without ever having wholly accepted Osmanlılık in its Tanzimat connotation. Even the Tanzimat statesmen believed, for the most part, in a Turkish-colored Osmanlılık. The equality finally attained, years after the Tanzimat, was that of competing independent national sovereignties, instead of the equality of a brotherhood of different races and creeds within one empire.

But these results came after 1876. In its day the Tanzimat may be considered either a qualified success or a qualified failure. Whichever view one adopts, it is a period significant for many beginnings in administration, law, education and the like, which carried on through Abdülhamid's reign into the Young Turk period and the era of the present-day republic. The Tanzimat period was a seedtime. These beginnings, usually western-inspired, did sometimes create new institutions alongside old. This was not necessarily a fatal dualism, as critics have said, but may, on the contrary, be viewed as a part of the normal process of growth. No sweeping reforms like Atatürk's could have been effected in the years 1856 to 1876; but his reforms could not have been effected in his own time without the preparation that the Tanzimat gave. The comparatively cautious steps of Âli and Fuad, and the still reasonably cautious moves of Midhat, were of fundamental importance. These men were not, as has often been charged, reckless westernizers, but went only as fast as possible without causing a fatal reaction, and as the way opened. The preparation of the Tanzimat period was not only of new or reformed institutions, and of men with experience in them, but of minds—a greater emphasis on individual liberties, on the importance of the people, on government by representation and consultation, on public opinion, on the concept of territorial sovereignty as opposed to monarchical sovereignty. The constitution of 1876, which epitomized these concepts, was suspended by Abdülhamid, but he could not snuff out the new mentality. Cevdet Paşa, in 1892, saw fit to warn the sultan about the power of public opinion.<sup>176</sup> The constitution remained a symbol to which men would again rally in 1908.

<sup>176</sup> Mardin, *Cevdet*, p. 10, n.7.

GLOSSARY

- berat - a patent or warrant
- bid'at - innovation, in a pejorative sense
- çorbacı - a notable in a Christian community
- derebeyi - "lord of the valley," a local semi-autonomous ruler
- efendi - a title used after the name, like "Mr.;" also the usual designation for a government clerk or other educated person
- esnaf - artisans; artisan or trade gild
- evkaf - plural of vakıf; also the government office in charge of these religious trusts
- eyalet - province; the term commonly used before 1867
- ferman - an edict or decree of the sultan
- fetva - a formal opinion on a question of religious law by a müfti
- gâvur - a non-Muslim, infidel; an uncomplimentary term
- hat - a writing; in the forms hatt-ı hümayun and hatt-ı şerif an edict of the sultan to his grand vezir (see Chapt. I, n.61)
- irade - a decree (usually of the sultan)
- kadı - a judge
- kaime - paper money; treasury obligations
- kariye - a commune or town quarter in the vilayet organization
- kaymakam - governor of a kaza, in the vilayet organization
- kaza - subdivision of a sancak, in the vilayet organization
- kocabası - elected headman of a community
- mazbata - a protocol, minute, or written report
- mecelle - the codified Muslim civil law, done by Cevdet's commission
- meclis - an assembly, council (used in many combinations)
- meclis-i umumî - a general assembly; as of notables in the capital, or in the vilayet capital under the 1867 organization
- medrese - the higher Muslim school
- mekteb - school, particularly primary or grammar school
- millet - religious community; in later usage, "nation"
- mirî - belonging to the state; especially, state-owned land
- muhtar - headman of a village or commune
- mutasarrıf - governor of a sancak
- müdür - governor of a nahiye
- müfettiş - inspector; commissioner on inspection
- müfti - Muslim jurist or juriconsult
- mülk - property held in fee simple; freehold property



#### GLOSSARY

- nahiye - a group of hamlets or farms, subdivision of the kaza in the vilayet organization  
Osmanlılık - "Ottomanism," the concept of equality and brotherhood of all Ottoman subjects  
rüşdiye - the higher level of state primary school  
sancak - formerly a province; in the vilayet organization, a subdivision of a vilayet  
softa - a Muslim theological student  
şeriat - the religious law of Islam  
seyh - leader of a tribe; or a head of a Muslim religious order  
seyhülislâm - chief müfti of the capital and chief Muslim official of the empire, ranking just after the grand vezir  
tekke - a dervish convent  
tımâr - formerly, a fief  
ulema - the body of learned men of Islam  
vakıf - a pious foundation or charitable trust  
vali - governor of a vilayet, and earlier of an eyalet  
valide sultan - mother of the reigning sultan; sultan-mother  
vatan - fatherland, in the later nineteenth-century meaning  
vezir - the highest rank classification in Ottoman officialdom; the grand vezir was the sultan's chief official  
vilayet - the term for a province after 1867

#### APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

### *Foreign Intervention in Ottoman Affairs Under the Paris Treaty*

Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, said that the communication of the Hatt-ı Hümayun to the signatories of the treaty "cannot in any case, give to the said powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects nor in the internal administration of his empire."<sup>1</sup> But the mere fact that the *hat* was officially recognized in the treaty thrust it into the area of diplomatic concern, and damaged the prestige of the Ottoman government, as did also the phrase in the same article that Abdülmecid's ferman "records his generous intentions toward the Christian population of his empire." Resid argued, in effect, that the mere mention of the *hat* in the Paris treaty, in whatever phraseology, made it an integral part of the treaty and would give the powers a right of intervention and supervision over reforms.<sup>2</sup> This was an extreme interpretation. It could be argued also that the nonintervention pledge should be taken at its face value, as some Turks did in later crisis periods.<sup>3</sup>

It soon became obvious that the powers did not regard the non-intervention pledge as binding, and in the next twenty years they made frequent representations, based on the Hatt-ı Hümayun's promises, to the Porte. Stratford deplored the prohibition on intervention,<sup>4</sup> and soon was proposing to Abdülmecid that he put teeth in the Hatt-ı Hümayun by calling to Istanbul an Anglo-Turkish contingent of twenty thousand, all of whose superior officers were English.<sup>5</sup> By 1876 Stratford argued that the nonintervention pledge was "limited and conditional" and, further, that article 9 said only that the

<sup>1</sup> Treaty text in Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1897-1903), III, 70-79.

<sup>2</sup> Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 1-12*, ed. by Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), pp. 72, 82.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Mehmed Memduh, *Mirât-ı şâhinat* (İzmir, 1328), p. 58, in discussing the Andrassy Note of 1875.

<sup>4</sup> Stratford to Clarendon, 19 March 1856, in Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Hon. Stratford Canning* (London, 1888), II, 442.

<sup>5</sup> Prokesch to Buol #37B Réservé, 8 May 1856, HHS, XII/56.

communication of the edict to the powers did not warrant intervention, but that there were certainly many other grounds justifying interference.<sup>6</sup>

Likewise the treaty of April 15, 1856, in which Britain, France, and Austria guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was destined to remain a dead letter. Cevdet argued that this treaty also, though advantageous, damaged Ottoman independence and sovereignty because the empire was not a signatory.<sup>7</sup>

## APPENDIX B

*Population of the Ottoman Empire*

There are no trustworthy figures on the population of the empire. Reasonably accurate statistical methods have not existed in Turkey until very recent years, under the republic. Not only have the census methods been defective, but eastern peoples generally have resisted being counted, since this meant to them only that taxation and military conscription would follow. The census has generally been in bad odor.<sup>1</sup> This reluctance to be counted also led to a reluctance to vote when elections for the first Ottoman parliament were held in 1877, again for fear of taxation.<sup>2</sup> The first "modern" census taken in the Ottoman Empire under Mahmud II was, as a matter of fact, primarily for conscription purposes.<sup>3</sup> Karal explains the methods used. One general method of estimating the population was to count houses and multiply by the estimated average number of a family under one roof.<sup>4</sup>

The figure for mid-century which has found greatest acceptance is between 35,000,000 and 36,000,000. This total is derived from a census taken in 1844 for military service.<sup>5</sup> Midhat Paşa in 1877 accepted the

<sup>6</sup> Stratford's letter to *The (London) Times*, 3 January 1876.

<sup>7</sup> Cevdet, *Tezâkir*, p. 88.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. II Sam. 24: 1-15.

<sup>2</sup> Abdurrahman Şeref, *Tarih musahabeleri* (Istanbul, 1339), p. 213.

<sup>3</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Nizam-ı cedid ve Tanzimat devirleri* (Ankara, 1947), pp. 159-160.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Henry J. Van Lennep, *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London, 1870), I, 4-5; ABCFM, Armenian Mission V, #166, 3 April 1857. See, further, on census difficulties and errors, H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia* (London, 1901), II, 414-415.

<sup>5</sup> Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1857-1858, vol. 58, *Accounts and Papers*,

figure of 36,000,000.<sup>6</sup> Other estimates have ranged as high as 56,000,000 (in 1874).<sup>7</sup> A semiofficial tabulation of 1867 placed the total population at an even 40,000,000.<sup>8</sup> Every writer on the Ottoman Empire selected whatever figures seemed to him most reliable, or else those which he wanted to prove a point about minorities. Often these figures were given on the authority of others; sometimes they were based partly on investigations conducted on the spot.<sup>9</sup>

## APPENDIX C

*Âli Paşa's Political Testament*

Mehmed Emin Âli Paşa is supposed to have written a political testament which was published in the newspapers of the time after

vol. 26, Foreign Countries, p. 162; Abdolonyme Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, tr. by Lady Easthope (London, 1856), I, 18-25. İbrahim Hakkı Aykol describes the deficiencies of the 1844 census in *Tanzimat*, I (Istanbul, 1940), 548-550, but calls it the first census in the whole empire on modern principles.

<sup>6</sup> Ali Haydar Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903), p. 167, Midhat to Kâmil Bey, November 1877.

<sup>7</sup> Edouard Scrosoppi, *L'empire ottoman au point de vue politique* (Florence, 1874), I, 257-277.

<sup>8</sup> Salaheddin Bey, *La Turquie à l'exposition universelle de 1867* (Paris, 1867), pp. 210-214.

<sup>9</sup> Population estimates may be found in: Aykol, *Tanzimat*, I, 549, n.2; Ami Boué, *La Turquie d'Europe* (Paris, 1840), II, 32; E. H. Michelsen, *The Ottoman Empire and its Resources* (London, 1853), pp. 139-140; Alfred de Bessé, *The Turkish Empire* (Philadelphia, 1854), pp. 184-185; ABCFM, Armenian Mission VIII, #59, April 1857; Edmond Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie* (Paris, 1858), pp. 10-11; B. C. Collas, *La Turquie en 1864* (Paris, 1864), pp. 38-40; A. Synvet, *Traité de géographie générale de l'Empire ottoman* (Constantinople, 1872), pp. 214-215; Ali Suavi, *A propos de l'Herzégovine* (Paris, 1875), pp. 69-74; Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, *Etat présent de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1876), pp. 17-70; James L. Farley, *Turks and Christians* (London, 1876), pp. 96-97; G. G. B. St. Clair and C. A. Brophy, *Twelve Years' Study of the Eastern Question* (London, 1877), p. 245; Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1890), I, preface; Karl Süssheim, *Der Zusammenbruch des türkischen Reiches in Europa* (Munich, 1914), p. 78; Halil İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar meselesi* (Ankara, 1943), p. 1, n.1; Friedrich Wilhelm von Reden, *Die Türkei und Griechenland* (Frankfurt a.M., 1856), pp. 66-71; F. Bianconi, *La question d'Orient dévoilée* (Paris, 1876), pp. 12-13; *idem*, *Ethnographie et statistique de la Turquie d'Europe* (Paris, 1877).

Isidore Loeb, *La situation des israélites en Turquie* (Paris, 1877), p. 2, gives figures for Jewish populations of various Ottoman cities; Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York, 1955), pp. 43-44, appraises figures for the Armenian population; A. Synvet, *Les Grecs de l'Empire ottoman* (Constantinople, 1878), pp. 8-9, gives figures for Greeks, which fail to add correctly; Lorenz Rigler, *Die Türkei und deren Bewohner* (Vienna, 1852), I, 141, gives 1846 census figures for Istanbul.

his death.<sup>1</sup> I have not seen a copy of the document in Turkish, though presumably it has been published in that language.<sup>2</sup>

I have found only the French version of Âli's testament, which appeared in 1910.<sup>3</sup> The only reference to this French edition in other works that I have noticed is by Edouard Driault and Michel Lhéritier, who list the testament under "published documents" in their bibliography and apparently accept it as genuine.<sup>4</sup> The document is addressed to Sultan Abdülaziz, its first paragraph states explicitly that the author is writing a political testament, and it is provided with Âli's name at the end and dated "Bebek, September 1871." There is no indication of the original language of the testament, and no editor or translator is named. Âli could have written in French, but it is more likely that he would have written in Turkish. For Abdülaziz, Turkish would have been necessary, since his French was scanty. The date offers no clew to authenticity, since it was public knowledge that Âli died in his house at Bebek (a suburb of Istanbul on the Bosphorus) on September 6, 1871. A brief review of Âli's life prefixed to this French version states that Âli died in 1872, an error which is insufficient to impugn the genuineness of the document.

The testament is interesting as a review of the previous decade of Turkish history, and as a summary of the supposed views held by Âli on foreign and domestic political matters. It would be possible to conclude from internal evidence that the document is genuinely Âli's, since almost everything in it accords with his known views, and some parts echo his famous 1867 memorandum on reforms. The testament recommends that Christians be taken into the Ottoman army, which Âli really may have opposed, though he had in his 1867 memorandum adumbrated this opinion also. One sentence

<sup>1</sup> Mehmed Gâlib, "Tarihten bir sahife—Âli ve Fuad Paşaların vasiyetnameleri," *Tarih-i osmanî encümeni mecmuası*, 1:2 (1329), 70. The author does not specify the newspapers, their date or place of publication, or the language in which the testament appeared.

<sup>2</sup> The late Walter L. Wright, Jr., in letters to the author of May 23 and October 28, 1939, stated that he was sure that "Âli . . . left a sort of political testament" and that it has been printed in Turkish. The bibliography of *Tanzimat*, 1 (Istanbul, 1940), 982, lists *Âli Paşanın vasiyetnamesi* (Istanbul, no date) as a separate publication; but the late J. K. Birge, in a letter to the author of October 21, 1948, says that although the testament is listed in this volume he is told that it never actually appeared in print.

<sup>3</sup> [Aali Pacha], "Testament politique," *La Revue de Paris* 17:7 (1 April 1910), 505-524; 17:9 (1 May 1910), 105-124. A separate offprint of the same was published as Aali-Pacha, *Testament politique* (Coulommiers, 1910).

<sup>4</sup> *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce* (Paris, 1925-1926), III, ix.

may indicate that the document was composed or altered by an unknown hand: a direct quotation attributed to Abdülaziz, who asks why Napoleon III did not open his veins with scissors rather than submit to defeat by the Prussian armies in 1870. Such a quotation may be genuine, particularly if the testament originally appeared at the time of Âli's death in 1871, although it sounds like a later justification for the claim that Abdülaziz committed suicide by that method in 1876 and was not murdered.

Mehmed Gâlib, in the article above referred to, conjectures that Âli's testament was written by a Persian, Melküm Han (usually called Malkom Khan in the West), and that Melküm did this to gain revenge on Âli because the latter had refused to appoint Melküm to a post in the Ottoman government despite Fuad's sponsorship.<sup>5</sup> But this is only conjecture, not proof. Since the testament did castigate Abdülaziz for excessive expenditures, its publication would turn the sultan against the memory of Âli; but this is small revenge, and the testament does not attempt the greater revenge of grossly distorting Âli's political views. It is theoretically possible that Melküm could have written Âli's testament. Melküm was a curious character, the son of an Armenian convert to Islam, educated at least partly in France, and the founder of a Freemasonic lodge in Tehran. Melküm could easily have written in French, and may have known Âli as a brother Mason. He was acquainted with Âli, and was in Istanbul after having fled Iran and the shah's displeasure. The year after Âli's death, Melküm was appointed Persian minister to London.<sup>6</sup>

Mehmed Gâlib, in his attempted proof that the testament is not Âli's, fails to argue that it was not customary for Ottoman statesmen to write political testaments. Yet this is true.<sup>7</sup> Âli, however, was sick for several months before his death, and might have used the occasion of his illness to write a testament.

None of these considerations is sufficient either to prove or disprove the authenticity of the testament, or to prove who wrote it if Âli did not. My own feeling is that Âli would not have done this sort of thing, but this is again conjecture. Whoever did write the testament

<sup>5</sup> Mehmed Gâlib, "Tarihten bir sahife," pp. 73-74.

<sup>6</sup> On Melküm see *ibid.*; Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia* (London, 1930), I, 397-399; Charles Mismar, *Souvenirs du monde musulman* (Paris, 1892), pp. 132-143.

<sup>7</sup> The late Dr. Abdülhak Adnan-Adıvar gave great weight to this argument: interview with the author, March 29, 1947.

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had a good knowledge of the state of the Ottoman Empire and of Âli's political views. Although this verisimilitude seems to indicate that the testament may be used with caution, I have actually placed no reliance on it.

APPENDIX D

*Was Sultan Abdülaziz Murdered?*

In 1881 Midhat was arrested, interrogated, and tried for implication in the murder of Abdülaziz. A complete theory of conspiracy to depose Abdülaziz, and to assassinate him thereafter, was worked out by Abdülhamid and his henchmen. Confessions, probably paid for, were obtained from several servants who said they had held Abdülaziz while one slit his arms with a knife. Other evidence, probably also contrived, was introduced to prove that not only Murad, his mother, some other palace functionaries, and two imperial brothers-in-law were involved, but also a "directing commission" of Mehmed Rüşdi, Hüseyin Avni, Midhat, and Hayrullah, which controlled the government at that time. Midhat was given a rather farcical, though public, trial. He was then convicted and sentenced to death. This was changed to life imprisonment and exile to Taif, in Arabia, where Midhat was strangled in 1884. A. H. Midhat, *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903) and *idem*, *Mirât-ı hayret* (Istanbul, 1325) give extensive accounts of much of this. In İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüşdü Paşaların tevkişlerine dair vesikalar* (Ankara, 1946) appears most clearly the charge of complicity in murder, with the outline of the supposed plot, in the report on the 1881 interrogation of Mehmed Rüşdi; see especially pp. 135-137, 147-148. Mehmed Rüşdi's answer to this, p. 148, was, "This is an open lie." At the end of his interrogation the inquisitors asked what his defense was against their proof that Abdülaziz had died by another hand, and their demonstration of those involved in the murder. He replied: "I have no defense. What shall I defend? If the causes were thus may Allah and the Prophet and the whole world be damned" (p. 167). Midhat also disclaimed all knowledge of the alleged murder by hired servants (pp. 90-99). Midhat's comment on the indictment drawn up against him for his trial was that it was correct in just two places: the *besmele* ("invocation") at the start and the date at the end (A. H. Midhat,

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*Mirât-ı hayret*, p. 217). The whole charge of conspiracy and murder betrays a pathological fear on the part of Abdülhamid II that he might be deposed like his uncle or might be assassinated, and a fear of those who had twice carried through depositions of his predecessors. The denials of Midhat and Mehmed Rüşdi, though they were interested parties, are more convincing than the charges, however detailed and circumstantial and supported by confessions.

Cevdet Paşa, often associated with Midhat although a personal antagonist in 1876, severely tarnished his otherwise good name by lending his support to Abdülhamid's charges and the inquisition of Midhat. Cevdet further, and evidently not honestly, altered slightly his original account of the events of the day of Abdülaziz's death, to replace his original statement of suicide with a more ambiguous one allowing the possibility of murder: Ebül'ulâ Mardin, *Medenî hukuk cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Paşa* (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 258-259.

APPENDIX E

*Did Abdülhamid Sign a Pledge to Abdicate?*

Sir Edwin Pears, writing in about 1916, said that "the belief almost universally entertained among the Turks is that there was such a document."<sup>1</sup> What became of it is a mystery, for which he offers two rumored solutions, one of which was that Midhat sent it to London. Others have testified to belief in the same document. Georges Dorys, a Greek journalist in Istanbul, and said to have been close to the Palace, wrote in 1901 that Midhat Paşa had obliged Abdülhamid to give him such a written pledge, which Midhat then placed in good hands in London.<sup>2</sup> Albert Fua, a prominent Young Turk exile and writer of the 1890's, goes so far as to say that Midhat got the document from Abdülhamid (on August 31, the wrong date) at the ceremony of girding at Eyüb, when the Mevlevi *şeyh* of Konya refused on legal grounds to proceed with the ceremony since Murad was not yet legally deposed.<sup>3</sup> This sort of story sounds like wishful thinking on the part of later Young Turks who wanted to depose Abdülhamid.

<sup>1</sup> Edwin Pears, *The Life of Abdul Hamid* (New York, 1917), pp. 42-43.

<sup>2</sup> Georges Dorys, *Abdul Hamid intime* (Paris, 1901), p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> Albert Fua, *Abdul Hamid II et Mourad V* (Paris, 1909), pp. 33-34.

The fact that some later scholars have tended to accept the story of a promise, written or unwritten, to abdicate proves nothing.<sup>4</sup>

But there are some who believed in an abdication pledge whose word carries more weight. Midhat's personal secretary, who served him in 1876, wrote that on August 31, 1876, the day of his accession, Abdülhamid signed such a promise, which was then sealed and kept by Midhat.<sup>5</sup> But it is not clear that Vasif ever saw the document. He is not always trustworthy in his recollections, as other evidence in his book makes plain. The major source for the story of the signed abdication pledge is, however, Midhat's own son, Ali Haydar Midhat. When he published his *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903) he made no mention of such a document. But in the rather different French biography of his father he explains that since 1903 he has found among his father's papers proof that at the Musluoğlu interview Abdülhamid promised to quit the throne if Murad regained his health. Now he can document the rumor. But the "proof" he gives is the translation of a note written by Midhat to his wife in 1881, when he was arrested by Abdülhamid in Izmir.<sup>6</sup> The original Turkish text of the note is given in three other works published by the son.<sup>7</sup> Its brief text says that inside a black portfolio, in a blue envelope, is a document on the imperial accession, which should be given to whoever will be the heir of the sultanate. Send it to M. Mayer the banker at 6 East India Avenue in London. If this can't be done, it should be destroyed, so as not to fall into the hands of officials.

This, of course, is proof of nothing, since the document to which Midhat's note refers is not adequately described. Ali Haydar Midhat refers to it as a pact or written agreement (*mukavele*) between Midhat and the heir Hamid Efendi, but this is his term, not his father's. And, according to the son, Midhat's wife destroyed the document, having no chance to send it to London.<sup>8</sup> The son of Süleyman Paşa also believed in the existence of such a document, called

<sup>4</sup> Rıza İzzet, *La Turquie réformatrice et Midhat Pacha* (Lille, 1913), pp. 65, 68; Harold Temperley, "British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey (1830-1914)," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, IV (1933), 173.

<sup>5</sup> Clécian Vassif, *Son Altesse Midhat-Pacha* (Paris, 1909), p. 75.

<sup>6</sup> A. H. Midhat, *Midhat Pacha. Sa vie—son oeuvre* (Paris, 1908), p. 65. This was published before the 1908 revolution.

<sup>7</sup> *Midhat Paşa, Hayat-i siyasiyesi*, I: *Tabsira-i ibret* (İstanbul, 1325), 394; *Midhat Paşa* (Cairo, 1322), p. 469; *Hâtıralarım* (İstanbul, 1946), p. 135.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

by him a *sened* ("written agreement," "convention"). His evidence comes, however, entirely from two of Ali Haydar Midhat's works.<sup>9</sup> Osman Nuri also relies on the same evidence, although, unlike Süleyman's son, he quotes the note inaccurately.<sup>10</sup> All this then goes back to the note that Ali Haydar Midhat found in his father's papers some twenty-five years after the arrest of 1881.

The nearest thing to a contemporary statement by one of the principals is contained in a document from Midhat's interrogation in 1881. His questioners alleged that his private secretary, Vasif, had said in various circles that Abdülhamid signed a pledge containing conditions concerning his accession and that Midhat later sent it to England. Midhat's answer, as recorded, was that he had never said such a thing, the charge was false, and that his secretary, a truthful man, should be questioned directly.<sup>11</sup>

It may be argued, as some have, that the existence of such a signed abdication pledge, or Abdülhamid's belief in its existence, was a fundamental reason for the arrest, trial, exile, and murder of Midhat. But Abdülhamid had reason enough to fear Midhat, who had been instrumental in deposing two sultans and in promulgating a constitution that limited the sovereign powers. And it seems unlikely that Abdülhamid, in view of his patent opposition to any sort of conditional rule, would have signed such a paper. In any case, no documents seem now to remain from the confrontation of Midhat and the heir Abdülhamid.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Süleyman Paşa zade Sami, ed., *Süleyman Paşa muhakemesi* (İstanbul, 1328), p. 52 and n.2.

<sup>10</sup> Osman Nuri, *Abdülhamid-i Sani ve devr-i saltanatı* (İstanbul, 1327), I, 98.

<sup>11</sup> İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı devrinde son sadrîâzamlar* (İstanbul, 1940-1953), p. 411.

<sup>12</sup> Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, "93 meşrutiyeti," *Belleten*, 9:21/22 (January-April 1942), 51, n.12.

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